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3Abstract
This thesis analyses processes of discursive European identity formation in
three cultural journals: Esprit, from France, the British New Left Review and the
German Merkur during the time periods 1989-92, and, a decade later, during
2003-06.
The theoretical framework which the thesis brings to bear on this analysis
is that of the European Public Sphere. This model builds on Jürgen Habermas’s
original model of a “public sphere”, and alleges that a sphere of common debate
about issues of European concern can lead to a more defined and integrated
sense of a European identity which is widely perceived as vague and inchoate.
The relevancy of the public sphere model and its connection to the larger
debate about European identity, especially since 1989, are discussed in the first
part of the thesis.
The second part provides a comparative analysis of the main European
debates in the journals during the respective time periods. It outlines the
mechanisms by which identity is expressed and assesses when, and to what
extent, shared notions of European identity emerge. The analysis finds that
identity formation does not occur through a developmental, gradual
convergence of views as the European public sphere model envisages. Rather,
it is brought about in much more haphazard back-and-forth movements.
Moreover, shared notions of European identity between all the journals only
arise in moments of perceived crises. Such crises are identified as the most
salient factor which galvanizes expressions of a common, shared sense of
European identity across national boundaries and ideological cleavages.
The thesis concludes that the model of the EPS is too dependent on a
partial view of how identity formation occurs and should thus adopt a more
nuanced understanding about the complex factors that are at play in these
processes. For the principled attempt to circumscribe identity formation as the
outcome of communicative processes alone is likely to be thwarted by external
events.
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8Introduction
In Europe, the year 1989 fundamentally altered the political landscape in place
since 1945 and throughout the Cold War. The events of the year triggered a
process of reassessing the status quo of the political East/West divide and,
with it, Europe’s self-understanding. For the increasing political integration of
the European Union throughout the 1990s demanded new ways of explaining
and legitimising this political union by exploring anew its historical, cultural,
political and philosophical basis. European self-enquiry and analysis has been
a concern for writers, intellectuals, philosophers and historians during many
periods of upheaval and change throughout European history and is thus not
new or unprecedented. In contemporary terminology, this self-exploration has
become increasingly expressed as a search for “European identity”, a term
which especially in the last two decades has permeated media discourse and
the language of political rhetoric alike. European identity encompasses
attempts to define Europe’s shared past, give a diagnosis of its present state,
and present a vision of its future. It can be used for various conflicting political
and ideological attempts and purposes, yet despite the vagueness over what
European identity is meant to connote, the term has become an indispensable,
and fashionable, explicator for post-1989 cultural, social and political
developments in Europe.
In a roughly contemporaneous development, the political integration of
the European Union has been plagued and sometimes hampered by an
ongoing lack of political legitimacy, widely referred to as the Union’s
“democratic deficit”. Especially since the Maastricht Treaty, the “permissive
consensus” which had been the tacitly agreed principle of European integration
was seen as no longer workable and new ways of ensuring political legitimation
for the process of political integration were needed. In this context, the concept
of the European public sphere was developed initially as a normative model in
order to address this European legitimacy crisis. Based on Jürgen Habermas’s
original model of a public sphere, it was alleged that a Europe-wide public
sphere would serve as a notional space in which the media initiate
9transnational debates about European issues, a process which would then lead
to more understanding and involvement in the European decision-making
structures for its citizens. Eventually, this would enhance the perception of the
European Union as a legitimate political entity. Moreover – and relevant to this
thesis – it was argued that an EPS would strengthen the vague and inchoate
sense of European identity on the basis that discursive deliberation and
argumentation over issues of common, European concern, would in turn
develop and bring about a more defined sense of European identity.
In this thesis, the notion of a European identity and of a European public
sphere provide the respective set of questions and theoretical framework that I
will bring to bear on the analysis of three contemporary cultural journals from
France, Britain and Germany during the years 1989-1992 and 2003-2006. The
key questions which this thesis will address can be summarized as follows.
What is the role of contemporary European cultural journals in the writing of
European identity? Through which discursive mechanisms and strategies is
European identity enunciated and constructed? In what ways do these
publications from different European countries address, discuss, (re)imagine,
narrate and give meaning to the narrative of the Europe that has emerged
since the pivotal events of 1989? What is the relevance of the European public
sphere for the formation of a European identity? And finally, can we identify
other shaping factors, such as external political developments, which determine
how such an identity is articulated?
The theoretical framework will be established in detail throughout the
first two chapters of this thesis. This introduction will begin by sketching out the
intellectual, national, and political context of cultural journals, and provide a
brief individual overview of the journals chosen for this study; the French
“revue” Esprit, the British “journal” New Left Review and the German
“Zeitschrift” Merkur. I will then outline the contribution this thesis seeks to
make, provide an explanation of the research approach and establish the aims
of the five chapters in this study.
10
1. Cultural Journals in Context
Cultural journals inhabit a small niche in the vast field of available printed
media today. They might be situated between journalistic and academic
publishing, although they do not neatly fit into either of these categories. Like
the mass-circulation news-media of newspaper and magazines, cultural
journals provide analysis and reflection on current events, but do so by drawing
extensively on academic discourses from the realm of cultural, literary, political,
philosophical or sociological enquiry. Moreover, journals use the literary genre
of the essay as a way of presenting a personal viewpoint on a given theme,
combined with an ongoing reflection and discussion of the journal’s own
position. Typically, about half to the major part of the space within these
journals will consist of essays which provide commentary on political, social
and cultural events, with the remaining part traditionally devoted to reviews of
non-fiction books and novels, films or exhibitions. While social sciences and
humanities tend to dominate in most journals, the natural sciences are also
discussed – often with a view to discussing the ethical or moral implications of
scientific research and discoveries. Although contributors to cultural journals
are increasingly drawn from a pool of journalists and academics, the essay
format in these journals might be described as the principal medium of
expression for intellectuals.
Crucially, journals do not merely chronicle the political and intellectual
life of a specific culture, but provide a forum for the development of a certain
aesthetic theory, a particular philosophical school, a political movement, or
simply a particular intellectual milieu at a certain time and in a particular
country, all of which factor as relevant and possible entry points for the study of
cultural journals. A cursory glance at the possible range of frameworks within
which to study cultural journals reveals that these depend on the historical
moment of the journal itself, and on the changing roles and relevance that
intellectuals have assumed throughout the - roughly speaking - last two
hundred fifty years, when cultural journals first developed.
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Their emergence approximately coincides with the European
Enlightenment, more specifically with the development of criticism through the
use of reasoned argument, discussion and debate during that time. Journals
are considered as one of the key breeding grounds for developing the ideal of
an impartial truth as fostered by the French philosophes in the eighteenth
century, which provides, in very broad terms, an ideal template for the ethos of
intellectuals. Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out that contemporary intellectuals
ideally aim to recapture the “production and dissemination of knowledge during
the age of Enlightenment.”1 The question of the extent to which cultural
journals in the eighteenth century lived up to the ideal of enlightened, reasoned
debate and dialogue is the subject of numerous, mainly German-language
studies which have adopted the framework of the European Enlightenment as
an entry point for the study of cultural journals of that time. 2
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, journals
increasingly developed within their national cultures. Accordingly, there are a
number of studies on journals which primarily explore this national context of
individual journals. For example, a number of monographs deal with individual
British journals from the beginning of the twentieth century, such as The
Strand, Spectator or Scrutiny.3 These studies usually adopt a chronological
approach and study the inception and intellectual development of a journal, and
in most instances study its demise (most commonly due to financial
constraints). In the majority, the overall assessment is one of qualified and
1 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and
Intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 1. In order to limit to a reasonable minimum
the number of footnotes in this thesis, a full note reference will be given once after the first
reference in each chapter to a book, book chapter or article. Further references within the
chapter will be then given after quotations in the text, where necessary with the author’s name
and an abbreviated form of the title.
2 Among them publications such as: Christoph Groffy, Die Edinburgh Review 1802-1825:
Formen der Spätaufkla ̈rung (Heidelberg: Series Anglistische Forschungen 150, 1981); Paul
Hocks and Peter Schmidt, Literarische und politische Zeitschriften 1789-1805: von der
politischen Revolution zur Literaturrevolution (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1975); Wolfgang Martens, Die
Botschaft der Tugend: die Aufkla ̈rung im Spiegel der deutschen Moralischen Wochenschriften
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968); Harry Pross, Literatur und Politik: Geschichte und Programme der
politisch-literarischen Zeitschriften im deutschen Sprachgebiet seit 1870 (Olten: Walter-Verlag,
1963).
3 William Beach Thomas, The Story of the Spectator, 1828-1928 (London: Methuen & Co.,
1928); Reginald Pound, The Strand Magazine 1891-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1966); Francis
Mulhern, The Moment of ‘Scrutiny’ (London: NLB, 1979).
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measured appraisal regarding the positive contribution of these journals to the
“development of a culture”,4 and the role of the intellectuals in the task of
“writing the nation”.5
The positive contribution of cultural journals towards the cultural and
intellectual discussion of a country has been questioned much more critically,
especially in the context of twentieth-century European postwar history, when
this ideal self-image of the intellectuals became tarnished. One of the reasons
behind this lies with the failure of Western European intellectuals to respond
forcefully to the ideologies of fascism and communism, or at the least to retain
a critical distance and independence from these prevailing ideologies. The pro-
Communist, and partly pro-Stalinist leanings of a substantial part of the
Western European Left in the 1950s and 1960s,6 which were voiced in
numerous cultural/intellectual publications of this time (including Esprit), have,
with hindsight, been judged not only by critics but by the intellectuals
themselves as a collective failure to act as the “legislators” of enlightened truth
and disinterested reason. At the same time, cultural journals were also
implicated on the other side of the ideological divide in the “culture wars” of this
time. Some publications such as Encounter in Britain, Preuves in France,
Tempo Presente in Italy and Der Monat in Germany were secretly financed and
underwritten by the CIA in order to generate an output of pro-Western debate
against the pro-Communist views espoused by their intellectual counterparts.7
Although these developments have to be read in the complex context of the
polarized postwar Cold War atmosphere, they reveal the often meddlesome -
rather than benevolent and enlightened - involvement of intellectuals in political
4 From the subtitle of a monograph on an Argentinean journal by John King, Sur: A Study of the
Argentine Literary Journal and its Role in the Development of a Culture 1931-1970
(Cambridge: CUP, 1986).
5 From the booktitle: Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective, ed. by Stefan Berger
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
6 Tony Judt, for example, has published on the legacy of the French postwar-Left in Past
Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). See
also Jeremy Jennings, ‘Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modern France’, in Intellectuals in
Politics: from the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie, ed. by Jeremy Jennings, Anthony Kemp-
Welch (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 65-89.
7 For a more detailed account see Tony Judt, ‘Culture Wars’, Postwar: A History of Europe
since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005), pp. 197-226, and in Ulrike Ackermann,
Sündenfall der Intellektuellen. Ein deutsch-französischer Streit von 1945 bis heute (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 2000).
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and ideological debates, and have partly undermined their public standing
today.
The intellectual ethos of these journals, their role in “writing the nation”,
and their involvement in political and ideological debates, as well as the
changing roles and self-image of the intellectuals in different historical contexts,
are all relevant aspects in the study of these journals. Although I will not
address these questions as a main concern in this thesis, I would like to
exemplify them in the brief introduction of the journals chosen for this study.
Esprit’s first issue was published in October 1932 by a group of friends
led by Emmanuel Mounier - only 27 at the time - who was the leading
intellectual figurehead and editor-in-chief until his death in 1950.8 Today, the
journal is published on a monthly basis (one bi-monthly issue in the summer
months) and operates independently from publishing houses or other media
enterprises. Esprit, it is said, was founded out of a sense of deep crisis felt by
Mounier and his peers in the aftermath of the First World War, the Bolshevik
Revolution and the Great Depression. Mounier developed his own school of
thought known as “personalism”, which might be characterized as a blend of
humanist, Christian and communitarian ideals.9 The collapse of Christianity and
Rationalism in Mounier’s view called for a “spiritual and social revolution”,
towards a more “organic society” in which the “creative, integral personality can
flourish”.10
Mounier’s Catholic background and his calls for a liberal and politically
engaged Catholicism in France still remains an integral component of Esprit. In
8 Principal sources for this summary are Esprit’s detailed self-account, ‘Esprit: Une revue dans
l’histoire 1932-2002’ <http://www.Esprit.presse.fr/help/history/historique.pdf> [accessed 7
August 2008]. It is co-authored by its current editor-in-chief, Marc Olivier Padis, his
predecessor Olivier Mongin and by Daniel Lindenberg, a contributor and member of the
editorial board. The self-presentation includes an extensive bibliography for further reading on
Emmanuel Mounier and on postwar French intellectual history. Other sources include Michael
Winock’s extensive study on Esprit’s early years, Histoire politique de la revue “Esprit” 1930-
1950 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975), and Jaye Miller, ‘Anarchism and French Catholicism in
Esprit’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (1) (1976), 163-174.
9 See Emmanuel Mounier’s own account in Communisme, anarchie et personnalisme (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1966).
10 Noël O’Sullivan, ‘From Revolutionary Idealism to Political Moderation: The French Search for
an Accommodation with Liberal Democracy since 1945’, in European Political Thought since
1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 63-94 (p. 70).
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contrast to the other journals surveyed here, it engages in theological debates
and questions of religion on a regular basis. Mounier’s successors and a large
part of the editorial board are practising Catholics and the journal points out in
its self-description that it considers questions of religion as relevant as other
social and political concerns and a valid theme for intellectual enquiry.
However, Esprit refuses the label of “la revue chrétienne Esprit” (‘Esprit: Une
revue’, p. 55), preferring to stress that it adheres in spirit to a specific French
secularism: “partageant et soutenant des idéaux de la tradition laïque telle
qu’elle s’est constituée à partir de la Révolution française et sous la IIIe
République en France” (p. 54).
Esprit is well known for intervening and participating in many
philosophical debates and has published and discussed the works of famous
theorists and philosophers, such as Lévi Strauss, Ricoeur, Foucault, Althusser
and Merleau-Ponty. Its influence on contemporary intellectual thought is for
example manifest in a recent edited collection of essays, entitled New French
Thought: Political Philosophy.11 Of the eighteen essays in the volume, which
were selected as being representative of current French thought, five
contributions alone are translated and reprinted Esprit articles. The journal
today takes its place among other well-established French journals such as
Revue des Deux Mondes, Les Temps modernes, founded in 1945 by Jean-
Paul Sartre (and since 1985 published by Claude Lanzmann), or the more
recent journals, le débat, initiated in 1980 by Pierre Nora, and Multitudes,
published since 2000. With them, Esprit shares what Michael Winock has
identified as stylistic “inclinations typiquement françaises”, including a high level
of abstraction and complexity, a propensity towards a moralising tone, a self-
image of French intellectuals as “la conscience de la société française”, and a
certain absolutism, or “tout ou rien” mentality in their judgements (Histoire
politique, pp. 374-375).
Esprit published throughout the 1930s, but was shut down in 1941 on
the orders of the Vichy regime. However, in the early days of Vichy France,
Esprit was initially allowed to continue publishing and Mounier taught for a brief
11 New French Thought: Political Philosophy, ed. by Mark Lilla (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
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period of time at Vichy’s cadre school at Uriage. The question of Mounier’s
possible collaboration or at least accommodation with the Vichy regime in the
initial phases of the occupation remains a central point of contention in studies
of the journal.12
Publication resumed in 1944 and Esprit’s outlook in the immediate
aftermath of the war veered sharply towards the Left. Esprit’s vocal support of
communism and its pro-Stalinist leanings as well as its fiercely anti-American
tone at the time provide the basis for a further point of criticism levelled against
the journal today,13 relating to the previously mentioned failure of the Western
European Left to recognize and speak out against the crimes committed in the
name of communism. Michael Winock mentions “la timidité d’Esprit devant le
stalinisme saute aux yeux“ and criticizes its failure to encourage “une gauche
non communiste” (Histoire politique, p. 367). In the wake of the Budapest
Uprising in 1956, Esprit readjusted its position somewhat and exchanged its
rhetoric of revolution and utopias for a more pragmatic tone engaging with
attainable social goals. Moreover, Esprit’s anti-Americanism waned slightly
under the editorship of Jean Marie Domenach who aimed at a more nuanced
engagement with the United States.
During the 1950s, Esprit also developed a sustained critique of
European colonialism and voiced its support for Algerian independence from
France during the French-Algerian war.14 With regard to domestic and
European concerns, Esprit’s focus lay on formulating a critique of Western
12 For critical assessments of Mounier’s wartime record see Seth Armus, ‘The Eternal Enemy:
Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and French Anti-Americanism’, French Historical Studies, 24 (2)
(2001), 271-304, and more extensively in Zeev Sternhell, Ni droite, ni gauche (Paris: Éditions
du Seuil, 1983), pp. 300-310. Michael Winock, however, defends Mounier against Sternhell’s
attacks in ‘French-Style Fascism, or Fascism Nowhere to be Found?’, in Nationalism, Anti-
Semitism and Fascism in France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 195-205.
A detailed history of French literary journals during Vichy France can be found in a study by
Olivier Cariguel: Panorama des revues littéraires sous l’occupation: juillet 1940-août 1944
(Paris: Institut Mémoires de l’édition contemporaine, 2007). The history of Esprit is however not
included here, since the study is exclusively concerned with literary, rather than more broadly
defined cultural journals.
13 For further reading on Esprit’s anti-Americanism see Jean-Philippe Mathy, ‘Culture in Soda
Cans: The Cold War of the French Intellectuals’, in Extrême-Occident: French Intellectuals and
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 137-162, and Richard Kuisel,
Seducing the French: the Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993).
14 For an analysis of Esprit’s critique of European colonialism see Michael Kelly, ‘Emmanuel
Mounier and the Awakening of Black Africa’, French Cultural Studies, (17) 2 (2006), 207-222.
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consumerist societies during the 1960s and 70s, which lacked the requisite
spiritual dimension as they were led by technocratic governments.
In the 1980s, the journal became increasingly interested in the civil
society movements and engaged to an extent with dissidents from Eastern
Europe. Since 1989, the journal’s main analytical framework has been to
rethink conditions of democracy in Europe, to provide a framework of critique
for globalisation processes, and to address questions of social inequality in
Europe by establishing “un nouveau type de solidarité d’État providence”
(‘Esprit: Une revue’, p. 65). Esprit sees its role in exploring the diverse
religious, philosophical and intellectual strands of Europe, and in engaging with
the ongoing political integration of the European Union.
Of the three journals surveyed here, New Left Review (hereafter NLR) is the
youngest and the one most closely aligned with a clear political ideology.15 The
journal is the result of a merger of two journals, Universities and Left Review,
and The New Reasoner, which developed around the “New Left”, a political
group which comprised disaffected Labour Party members and Communists
critical of Stalinist orthodoxies. Both journals began publication in 1956, a year
which provoked a series of crises for Communists in Western Europe (see
Esprit) with the political repercussions of the failed uprising in Budapest and the
publication of the secret Khrushchev speech. Universities and Left Review was
committed to a broadly based socialism but was composed by intellectuals and
writers from a cosmopolitan and avant-garde milieu based in Oxford and
London, most notably Stuart Hall. The New Reasoner, by contrast, engaged in
a serious reassessment of British communism and a critique of Stalinism; its
well-known figures include John Saville and Edward Palmer Thompson, who
15 Principal sources used for this overview are Michael Kenny, The First New Left: British
Intellectuals after Stalin (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), and the edited volume, Out of
Apathy: Voices of the New Left Thirty Years On: Papers based on the Conference Organized
by the Oxford University Socialist Discussion Group, ed. by Robin Archer, et al (London: Verso,
1989), which includes accounts of the founding years written by the original members of the
New Left group. In addition, NLR’s self-presentation provides a useful historical overview:
Robin Blackburn, ‘A Brief History of New Left Review’
<http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=history> [accessed 9 May 2006]. On NLR’s more recent
developments see also Perry Anderson’s extensive essay ‘Renewals’
<http://www.newleftreview.org/A2092> [accessed 9 May 2006].
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were also involved in the initial phases of NLR. This journal was based in
Yorkshire and had its ties in a much more provincial, working class culture than
its counterpart. The two journals merged in 1960 to form one organ for the New
Left movement, but internal splits and recriminations led to its eventual demise
in 1962. However, the journal remained in publication under the leadership of
Perry Anderson, who became its editor in 1962 and who remained in the post
until 1982. He then returned as editor from 2000-2003, and still retains a seat
on the journal’s editorial board. Brother of the equally well-known Benedict
Anderson, he has a prolific publication record of his own, and holds a position
at UCLA University as professor of history. Today, NLR is published on a bi-
monthly basis by the left-wing academic publishing house Verso and publishes
a translated version in Turkish, as well as in Spanish and Brazilian
Portuguese.16
In its initial stages, NLR positioned itself as a critical voice against the
British Labour party,17 and aimed to provide a theoretical underpinning for an
assessment and, after 1989, re-assessment of “international socialism”.
Anderson quickly established the journal as a cosmopolitan, “international”
publication, rather than one tied to its British roots. This continues today as the
journal rarely features articles devoted to purely British concerns. Rather, in the
view of Geoffrey Wheatcroft, NLR’s “happiest legacy is its cosmopolitanism,
helping to make the names of Adorno, Lefebvre and Della Volpe familiar
here.”18 NLR, more than most British journals from the time, introduced in its
pages Western European or “Continental” thinkers and philosophers to British
readers. It displayed a keen interest in Western European Marxists such as
Gramsci and Lukács, as well as the French-dominated schools of thought of
existentialism and psychoanalysis. Moreover, because cultural criticism was
seen as an “intrinsic part of an extended political process of defining values
16 NLR is one of a few cultural journals which publishes translated versions of its issues. The
political monthly Le monde diplomatique is probably the most successful of such ventures, with
25 editions in other languages. Another example is the literary/cultural journal lettre
internationale, which has independent editorial staff for each language edition. The editions
share the same title, but do not cooperate on a systematic or institutionalized basis.
17 See in Donald Sassoon, ‘The Revival of Ideology and the Student Contestation’, in One
Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: The
New Press, 1996), pp. 383-407 (p. 404).
18 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, ‘Left within the Pages’, Times Literary Supplement, 28 July 2006, 6-9.
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and shaping society” (Out of Apathy, p. 6), the journal’s coverage included
theoretically informed criticism of arts and culture.
In NLR’s self-styled cosmopolitanism, with its heavy emphasis on theory
and its engagement with ‘Continental’ thinkers, the journal certainly went
against the grain of most comparable British cultural publications. Where
French intellectual discourse veers towards high-minded abstraction, British
intellectual discourse is typically characterized as more pragmatic and more
interested in “analyzing, classifying and defining”,19 rather than transforming a
given status quo.
A cursory sketch of NLR’s main concerns throughout the decades must
include its fierce anti-colonialism and its focus on “Third World” issues during
the sixties and seventies. NLR was characterized by a principled rejection of
European colonialism, imperialism and more generally a Western or
Eurocentric world view. This critique of Eurocentrism explains why NLR from
the 1960s onwards has been “far more interested in revolutionaries in the
developing world than dissidents in Eastern Europe” (Kenny, The First New
Left, p. 79). As Tony Judt critically remarked, the reasons had do with “the new
taste for the exotic” amongst the young intellectual Left: after the unfruitful
attempts of Eastern European intellectuals, most notably the failed Budapest
uprising in 1956, the “revolutions in Cuba and China especially were invested
with all the qualities and achievements so disappointingly lacking in Europe”
(Postwar, p. 406). However, while issues closer to home were low on NLR’s
agenda, the journal intervened in the debate surrounding Britain’s entry into the
European Union in 1973, and, contrary to the mainstream of the British Left, led
the cause for membership.20
During the 80s, NLR became increasingly involved in issues of the
peace movement and the nuclear disarmament movement through its links with
the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), which gave way in the early
90s to a concern with a “reassessment” of the state of international socialism in
19 Noël O’Sullivan, ‘British Political Thought since 1945: The Limitations of Pragmatism’, in
European Political Thought (see O’Sullivan, above), pp. 20-62 (p. 24).
20 See here the extensive essay by Tom Nairn, ‘The Left against Europe?’, NLR, 75 (1972), 4-
72.
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the wake of its collapse. While NLR witnessed the demise, rather than
flourishing of its political aims of establishing a “socialist humanism”, it has,
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, forcefully argued against humanitarian
interventions (for example in the Balkans), thrown its weight behind anti-
globalisation movements such as ATTAC, and vociferously opposed the first
and second US invasion into Iraq.
As with Esprit and NLR, the founding year of the journal Merkur provides a clue
about the political Zeitgeist in which it was conceived, in this case the year
1947, close to Germany’s political new beginning, or “Year Zero”.21 Judging by
the choice of the journal title, however, its founders Hans Paeschke and
Joachim Moras did not deem Germany’s cultural and intellectual legacy in need
of such a new beginning, since Merkur is also the name of two earlier German
cultural journals, the Teutscher Merkur and the Neue Merkur. Founded in 1773
by the German man of letters Christoph Martin Wieland, the Teutscher Merkur
is generally considered as the original German cultural journal, with the goal of
establishing a European rather than exclusively German journal to instruct and
enlighten readers in the spirit of the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideal.22
The Neue Merkur was a relatively short-lived, but well-received publication that
appeared from 1914 until 1925 (publication was interrupted for two years
during the First World War).23 Its editor, Efraim Frisch, originally from Austria
but working in Munich, was a member of the assimilated bourgeois German
Jewry. His journal showcased literary, artistic and intellectual figures from a
21 Sources used in this summary include: Die Botschaft des Merkur: eine Anthologie aus
fünfzig Jahren der Zeitschrift, ed. by Karl Heinz Bohrer and Kurt Scheel (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta,
1997); Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National
Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Henry Lowood, ‘Karl Heinz Bohrer’,
Stanford Presidential Lectures in the Humanities and Art
<http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/bohrer/>
[accessed 17 February 2008], as well as the brief self-description of Merkur, ‘Selbstdarstellung’
and ‘About us’ (in English and German) <http://www.online-Merkur.de/> [accessed 11
September 2008].
22 See: Der ‘Teutsche Merkur’- die erste deutsche Kulturzeitschrift?, ed. by Andrea Heinz
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2003); Karin Stoll, Christoph Martin Wieland.
Journalistik und Kritik: Bedingungen und Maßstab politischen und ästhetischen Räsonnements
im ‘Teutschen Merkur’ vor der Französischen Revolution (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1978).
23 The history of the Neue Merkur is chronicled in Guy Stern, War, Weimar and Literature: The
Story of the Neue Merkur 1914-1925 (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971).
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varied, cosmopolitan milieu and his circle of correspondence included Robert
Musil, Franz Kafka, Christian Morgenstern, Lou Andreas Salomé and Thomas
Mann.24
The legacy of these journals forms the basis of what Merkur aimed to
continue and uphold. For one thing, its subtitle “Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Europäisches Denken” or “German Journal for European thought” indicates
that Merkur aspires to be unconstrained by national boundaries in its
intellectual pursuits, much like Wieland’s original Teutscher Merkur. Moreover,
the legacy of the writers and intellectuals assembled in the German interwar
period represents the German cultural and literary tradition that Paeschke and
Moras seemingly wished to continue.
Moras, who died in 1961, was in fact involved as one of the editors of a
previous German cultural journal called Europäische Revue, which was
extremely well-connected to influential Austrian/ German circles of aristocrats,
financiers and bankers, as well as high-ranking army figures and diplomats.
Troublesome is the fact that the Europäische Revue published without
interruption from 1925 onwards until 1944: not only did it appear with the tacit
support of Goebbel’s propaganda ministry but was also employed by it as
propaganda tool, all the while maintaining its elitist appeal and façade of high-
brow cultural content. However, the journal did in some instances also publish
critical voices of the German ‘inner emigration’.25
While the current Merkur is in no way implicated with the ideology of its
predecessor magazine, it maintains an unapologetically elitist view of culture
and literature and is specific about the role that art and literature should play in
modern societies. Far from NLR’s conviction that art is always inherently
political, Merkur maintains that art should be judged by aesthetic criteria alone.
Its current editor since 1984, Karl Heinz Bohrer, has especially promulgated the
need for applying a theory of aesthetics to literature and the arts and has
24 Source: Leo Baeck Institute: Catalogue of the Archival Collections, ed. by Fred Grubel
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), p. 71.
25 The history of the Europäische Revue is summarised by Ina Ulrike Paul, ‘Konservative
Milieus und die Europäische Revue (1925-1944)’, in Le Milieu Intellectuel Conservateur en
Allemagne, sa Presse et ses Réseaux (1890-1960); Das Konservative Intellektuellenmilieu in
Deutschland, seine Presse und seine Netzwerke (1890-1960), ed. by Michel Grunewald and
Uwe Puschner (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 509-557.
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voiced his suspicion of any form of “littérature engagée”.26 Bohrer is probably
best known for his writing on aesthetic theory, which he also pursued in his
academic position as a professor for German literary history at the University of
Bielefeld until his retirement in 1997. Prior to his editorship of the Merkur, he
established a name for himself as the responsible editor until 1974 of the
feuilleton pages of the German conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung. Bohrer has co-edited the journal with the philologist and political
scientist Kurt Scheel since 1991.27 The journal is published monthly (one bi-
monthly issue in autumn), and is financially backed by the Ernst H. Klett
foundation of the German publishing house Klett-Cotta, but enjoys editorial
independence.
Politically, the journal has firm conservative credentials, aligned most
closely with the Christian Democratic Union, the CDU party. During the 50s, the
journal supported Adenauer’s “Westeinbindung” of Germany into transatlantic
political structures and, Jan Müller notes, underwrote Adenauer’s concept of
Europe as a Christian Catholic, “Abendland”, “as the rallying point against the
Communist threat from the East” (Another Country, p. 21). Merkur has a long
history of support for the American political and economic model and has
argued for close transatlantic cooperation between Europe and the United
States.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Merkur continued to intervene in
West-German historical and intellectual debates, often fiercely attacking the
views of the German Left. Despite being a journal for “European thought”,
Merkur criticized progressive European integration. More specifically, it argued
against what it saw as a German leftwing consensus that the country’s
catastrophic past could only be overcome by embedding Germany firmly into
the European Community. Merkur has consistently opposed European political
integration on the grounds that it encroaches on national sovereignty.
26 See in Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Karl Heinz Bohrer: Recovering Romanticism and Aestheticizing
the State’, in Another Country (see Müller, above), pp. 177-199.
27 From a portrait on Karl Heinz Bohrer by Ijoma Mangold, ‘Der anarchische Aristokrat’,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 March 2006, p. 36.
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Merkur strongly supported German reunification, against the opinions of
several influential intellectuals on the German Left such as Grass or
Habermas28 who expressed misgivings about the possibility of a strong,
reunited Germany. For Bohrer, reunification presented an opportunity to
recover Germany’s cultural, spiritual and intellectual legacy, which had been
suspended and partly erased during the years of its division. In the early
nineties, Merkur espoused the views of the so named “German New Right”,29
which argued for a more assertive role of German national interests on the
European and world stage. In 1998, as an acknowledgment of the symbolic
relevance of the re-established capital of the “new” German republic, the
journal moved its editorial offices from its long-term home in Munich to Berlin.
2. Project and Outline of Thesis
The contribution that this thesis seeks to make is to study these three
European journals within a framework which has not yet been applied.30 The
theoretical departure point of this thesis is the model of the European public
sphere, which has become a much-used framework especially in the social
sciences. Similarly, the concept of ‘European identity’ has been much theorized
and discussed, but, as the public sphere theorists Risse and van de Steeg
point out, “very few attempts have been made to study identity in relation to the
question of an emerging EU public sphere”.31 Rather, most studies link the
28 See Siobhan Kattago, ‘Unified Germany’s Double Past’, in Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi
Past and German National Identity (Westport: Praeger, 2001), pp. 117-169 (pp. 120-121).
29 Jan Werner Müller, ‘From National Identity to National Interest: The Rise (and Fall) of
Germany’s New Right’, in German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and
Culture of the Bonn Republic, ed. by Jan Werner Müller (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
pp. 185-206.
30 Some comparative studies of European journals exist in the form of PhD theses, but in
relation to a different timeframe and thematic focus. See Dolores Anne Signori, ‘Nationalism
and Internationalism: Criteria of Literary Taste in three European Journals, 1815-1830’
(unpublished doctoral thesis, The University of Toronto, 1976); Salah Dean Assaf Hassan,
‘Between Issues: The Politics of Cultural Journals in the Postwar Era, 1944-1962’ (unpublished
doctoral thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 1997). A recent study refers to discussions
of European identity in one French journal, but is confined to the interwar period: Étienne
Deschamps, ‘L’Européen (1929-1940): a Cultural Review at the Heart of the Debate on
European Identity’, in European Review of History, 9 (1) (2002), 85-95.
31 Marianne van de Steeg and Thomas Risse, ‘The Emergence of a European Community of
Communication: Insights from Empirical Research on the Europeanization of Public Spheres’
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public sphere to questions of the political legitimacy of the EU and take for
granted, but do not question further, the relationship between the public sphere
and European identity formation. Moreover, most empirical research on the
public sphere is based on an analysis of daily newspapers or television news,
which are considered the principal opinion-makers within the public sphere,
rather than on cultural journals. In short, this thesis aims to study cultural
journals within a set of questions which have thus far not been linked.
I would contend that journals offer a concrete and systematic access
point to study questions of European identity because they feature reflexive
essays and articles on a broad range of cultural, literary, political or
philosophical themes, and because they adopt a more long-term perspective
on the questions raised. This makes them well-suited to study the discursive
construction of European identity which in itself will not be revealed in one
single instance, but might be observed over a longer period of time.
Furthermore, the very fact that journals are situated in a specific national
and historical context while at the same time aspiring in theory at least to a
cosmopolitan, international or European agenda provides for an interesting
source of tension in relation to the way in which these journals express notions
of European identity.
This thesis pursues an interdisciplinary approach and draws on literature
from the social and political sciences and to a lesser extent on cultural studies
and intellectual history. Primarily, the aim is to contribute to the ongoing
debates about the European public sphere and the possible emergence of a
discursively driven formation of a European identity. It seeks to answer to what
extent a European public sphere is relevant for the question of identity in these
journals. However, the empirical part of this thesis might prove to be of more
general interest to those concerned with the ongoing political and historical
debates of post-1989 Europe.
<http://www.atasp.de/downloads/eps_vandesteeg_risse_070513.pdf>
[accessed 28 September 2007].
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The timeframe analysed in this thesis spans the years 1989-1992 and
2003-2006. These dates were chosen because they coincide with key dates in
Europe in regard to external political events (the 1989 revolutions and the 2003
American-led Iraq invasion), as well as internal ones (the Maastricht treaty in
1992, the debates about a European constitution in 2003, as well as the
question of Turkey’s possible accession to the EU). The aim in focussing on
certain themes lies in revealing patterns of identity formation as they are
expressed through the discussion of these issues. The justification for this
approach has been highlighted by Cathleen Kantner, who writes:
“[m]ethodologically, it seems to be worthwhile to analyse the processes of
political identity formation systematically, policy issue by policy issue, instead of
speaking in an undifferentiated and general manner of ‘the collective
identity’.”32
The length of the timeframe was chosen in order to do justice to the
diachronic changes and developments in European identity, rather than
analysing only the discourse in relation to one issue at one particular moment
in time. This will provide more reliable insights into recurring or changing
patterns of European identity formation. The need for more long-term studies
on this topic has also been highlighted in a recently published study on the
Europeanization of public discourse, in which the authors argue that, thus far,
the long-term development and gradual processes of a possible European
identity formation remain under-researched;33 this thesis aims to contribute to
filling this gap.
Any study concerned with Europe or the European Union faces the challenge
of selecting which countries should form the basis of the study, since a study of
all European countries is far beyond the scope of this thesis and indeed of
most research projects. While it is true that the countries here present the
perspective of Western Europe, it might be pointed out that, thematically, the
32 Cathleen Kantner, ‘Collective Identity as Shared Self-Understanding: The Case of the
Emerging European Identity’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (2006), 501-523 (p. 516).
33 Stefanie Sifft, et al, ‘Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European
Union from a Public Discourse Perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (1) (2007),
127-155.
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concern is with how these countries attempted to adapt to the changing
dimensions of Europe to include those of Eastern Europe in the wake of
1989.34 The inclusion of more than one journal from each country in order to
attain a broader and more representative sample was discounted because a
relatively detailed and in-depth analysis of each journal was called for in order
to present a nuanced view of the often complex positions presented there. In
addition, the aim was to encourage a transnational, rather than an intra-country
comparison.
Since the three journals chosen here are all very distinct publications in
their own right, and because they write for such specific audiences, it is not my
aim to claim that these publications are representative of the French, British or
German discourse. Rather, the primary concern was to choose journals which
enjoy a certain level of recognition in their countries as a forum for intellectual
discussion. Three factors were relevant in the choice of the journals. First, the
selected journals have been in publication for a comparatively long period of
time over which they have built up a reputation as well established and
respected journals, even if their political opinions and judgements have proven
controversial or less than prescient at times.
Second, a certain level of engagement with European issues - whether
for or against - needed to be observable in the journals. In the British case, this
narrowed down the options considerably because the often-mentioned neglect
of European issues in the British media also holds true for cultural journals. A
more recent publication, Prospect, which has a relatively strong interest in
European issues, only began publication in 1997 - too recent for this thesis.
Other influential periodicals were not chosen due to their stronger emphasis on
reviews and literary criticism. NLR is one of the few British publications
evincing a modicum of engagement in European issues, and this has offset
34 The term “Eastern Europe” is used throughout this thesis to refer to those countries of the
former Eastern Bloc which joined the European Union in 2004, as this is the term
predominantly used by the journals. Of course, in recent years other terms have been
proposed by these countries themselves to refer to the region such as “Central Eastern
Europe” or “Central Europe”, in order to transcend the division into “Eastern” and “Western”
Europe which is considered as a remnant of a Cold War mentality. It is not the aim here to reify
the East-West divide, but to adequately capture the journals’ use of the term.
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some of the drawbacks involved in choosing a journal with such a highly
ideological treatment of the themes.
Finally, the political stance of the journals was considered. While it is
difficult to attain parity in a study of three journals, the choice of Merkur reflects
the aim to include a counter-viewpoint to publications such as NLR and the
more moderately left-wing Esprit. It might be added that the choice of two left
and one right-wing journal reflects the fact that the large majority of European
cultural journals are indeed left-wing publications.
The first chapter of this thesis aims to connect cultural journals to a
methodological working framework. To this purpose, it provides an account and
overview of the original concept of the public sphere as developed by
Habermas and explains the relevance of his theory for the discussion of
cultural journals. Following that, the chapter provides an overview of the
academic debate on the European public sphere and a working definition for
the purpose of this analysis. Chapter Two explores the premises on which
identity formation has been linked to the model of the European public sphere.
Moreover, it will outline some of the historical sources and influences which are
relevant to current debates on European identity, and point to some of the
current European identity models, which will also feature in the discussion of
the journals.
Although the main thrust of the analysis is provided by a qualitative
discussion, Chapter Three provides some quantitative data on the overall
composition of the journals. This includes some information about the number
of articles in relation to Europe and the background of the authors and
contributors. The aim is to assess whether the number of articles has increased
quantitatively over the periods of study, and whether there are indications that
the journals have become more interconnected.
The subsequent two chapters provide the analysis of the discussions in
the journals. Chapter Four is concerned with how the question of European
identity is phrased in the wake of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and
considers to a lesser degree the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. Chapter Five
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looks at the debates around the proposed European Constitution, or rather the
effects of the No-Vote against it in 2005. To a lesser degree, the question of
Turkey’s membership into the European Union will be addressed, yet the main
focus of this chapter lies in tracing the discussion about Europe’s identity in the
aftermath of the American-led Iraq invasion. Finally, the conclusion will
reconnect the findings of the chapters to the research questions and discuss
their implications for our understanding of a European identity formation as
related to the public sphere.
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Chapter 1
The Public Sphere: Developing Habermas’s Original Model Towards a
European Research Agenda
1.1 The Ideal Type: Jürgen Habermas’s Model of the Public Sphere
A poll conducted by the British magazine Prospect on “The World’s Top 100
Public Intellectuals” placed the German social philosopher Jürgen Habermas in
seventh place.1 Although the merits of such a poll are of course debatable, they
nonetheless attest to the enduring international interest in his work which
encompasses a broad range of theoretical concerns such as historical
materialism, universal pragmatism, critiques of modernity and epistemology.2
Habermas also established his name as a public intellectual, initially within the
context of German debates, but increasingly also on questions of European and
international concern. Most recently, he commented on the global financial
crisis that unfolded in the autumn of 2008 which he interpreted as the
unravelling of the neoliberal ascendancy in the Western world.3
Within Germany, he made his mark in national debates from the 1960s
onwards. For example, he initially supported the German student protests in
1968, but later distanced himself and criticized their radicalism. In the 1980s he
took a position in the German Historikerstreit against the conservative
revisionism of right-wing historians, and in 1990 voiced his reservations about
the political handling of German Reunification.4 Habermas has also pursued a
long-standing intellectual engagement with the role of the European Union and
1 David Herman, ‘Global Intellectual Poll Results’, Prospect, November 2005
<http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/pdfarticle.php?id=7078> [accessed 12 December 2005].
2 Habermas’s output includes more than twenty books, well over 100 essay publications and his
work has been translated into more than 30 languages. See: ‘Jürgen Habermas: Interpretation’,
in Demokratie Theorien: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, ed. by Peter Massing, Gotthard
Breit (Bonn: Schriftenreihe Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2003), pp. 253-261 (p. 256).
On the breadth of Habermas’s theoretical concerns see also: Robert Holub, Jürgen Habermas.
Critic in the Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1991), and Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Jarle Weigard,
Understanding Habermas: Communicative Action and Deliberative Democracy (London:
Continuum, 2004).
3 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Nach dem Bankrott’, Die Zeit, 6 November 2008, pp. 53-54.
4 See: ‘The Normative Deficits of Unification’, in The Past as Future: Jürgen Habermas
Interviewed by Michael Haller, ed. by Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 33-54.
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European integration. In his work, he has reflected upon the possibility of the
democratic legitimation of the European Union and the challenges imposed
upon the EU in the age of “postnational constellations”, marked by processes of
globalisation and diminished nation state power.5 One of Habermas’s most
noteworthy forays into European debates took place in the form of the
simultaneous publication of six articles on 31 May 2003 in different European
newspapers by mainly European intellectuals (the late philosopher Richard
Rorty was the one American in this group), which he initiated.6 The articles
considered the possibility of Europe’s “renewal” in the wake of the American-led
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Habermas’s article, co-written with Jacques
Derrida and published in German and French in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung and in Libération alleged that the European-wide protests against the
Iraq war would go down in history as a sign of the “birth of a European public
sphere”. 7
The discussion over the state of the European public sphere will be the
subject of the second part of this chapter. To begin with, the original concept of
the public sphere as formulated by Habermas in The Structural Transformation
of the Public Sphere will be outlined.8 Following this, the role and relevance of
the cultural journals in such a public sphere will be illustrated. Thereafter, I will
sketch how the model of the public sphere has been reconceptualized in the
contemporary context and address the role and relevance which the journals
play today. The latter part of this chapter will then discuss the conceptual
5 See his articles: ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’,
Praxis International, 12 (1) (1992), 1-20; ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of
Globalization’, NLR, 35 (1999), 45-60; ‘Beyond the Nation-State? On Some Consequences of
Economic Globalization’, in Democracy in the EU. Integration through Deliberation?, ed. by Erik
Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 29-42; ‘The Postnational
Constellation and the Future of Democracy’, in The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays,
ed. by May Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 58-113.
6 For English translations of all the original articles of this initiative, see Old Europe New Europe
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War, ed. by Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and
John Torpey (London: Verso, 2005).
7 Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, ‘Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt
Europas’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 May 2003, p. 33, quoted here from the English
translation ‘February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign
Policy, Beginning in Core Europe’, in Old Europe New Europe Core Europe (see Levy, above),
pp. 3-14 (p. 9).
8 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society, transl. by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1989).
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framework of the European public sphere and adumbrate relevant points of
enquiry and discussion in the academic debate. The aim is to connect the
cultural journals to a methodological working framework and to set this enquiry
in its most fruitful perspective of approach.
1.1.1 The Rise of a Public Sphere
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (hereafter abbreviated as
STPS) provided a socio-historical approach to the concept of the public sphere;
it was considered groundbreaking at the time of its publication in 1962 and
established Habermas’s reputation in the German academic scene.9 His work
was not translated into English until 1989, but when it was, it opened up a whole
new line of scholarly inquiry in political and social sciences. STPS proceeds
roughly chronologically and describes the rise of a public sphere in the
eighteenth century and its disintegration and eventual demise throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Habermas first charts the social and
material conditions for the genesis of this public sphere and provides case
studies of three European countries: Great Britain, Germany, and France.10 In
the second part, he exposes some of the inherent contradictions, ambivalences
and limitations of the public sphere that led to its demise, before discussing the
social and political conditions under which the public sphere eventually faltered
in the twentieth century.
The public sphere can be understood as a notional space between the
state and its citizens. It entails the complex interplays and dynamics that take
place between state and citizens in a public arena through practices of the
articulation, deliberation and exchange of ideas. Habermas’s public sphere can
cover everything from “the domestic realm to the literary marketplaces, modes
9 It was originally written as Habermas’s “Habilitationsschrift” and published under the German
title Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen
Gesellschaft (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1962; repr. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1990).
10 Habermas points out that each of these countries underwent different degrees of social and
political transformation. In his account, Great Britain is to be seen as the “model case” where an
independent political public sphere was most developed, whereas in Germany, political critique
developed to a lesser degree. In France, the Revolution of 1789, which Habermas discusses
extensively, marked the beginning of the public sphere’s demise, as the flourishing publishing
scene and its lively exchanges which had existed prior to the Revolution fell victim to the
increasing radicalization of political culture. See the chapters in STPS, ‘The Model Case of
British Development’ (pp. 57-67), and ‘The Continental Variants’ (pp. 67-73).
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and institutions of sociability, and arenas of political debate.”11 It is not confined
to a space or aspect of public life, but can cover many meeting places where
private individuals come together to discuss matters of public concern – be that
“virtually”, through the medium of newspapers and journals, or in “real” meeting
places such as coffee houses, debating societies, clubs and salons.
Yet Habermas does not merely describe or “locate” these meeting places
but goes on to develop an understanding of the processes which the public
sphere generates. He explores how “public opinion can be formed through
unrestricted discussion of matters of general interest” and how it is “assigned a
critical and controlling function”12 in relation to the state: he traces not only the
social and historical processes under which the development of public opinion
became possible, but how this public opinion for the first time became
recognized as a political entity; “sovereign” in its own right and capable of
rendering states accountable to their citizens. For example, he draws attention
to the fact that the very term “public” was not officially recognized in Great
Britain until 1792, when it was first officially recorded and attributed to a British
member of parliament in reference to “public opinion”. Prior to that, he explains,
the word was only unofficially acknowledged, if at all, as “the sense of the
people”, “vulgar opinion” or “common opinion” (STPS, p. 66). Similarly in
France, historian Roger Chartier notes the first edition of the legendary
Encyclopédie did “not acknowledge the notion of ‘public opinion’”, since this
notion “did not yet exist in this philosophic summa of the eighteenth century”.13
What, then, were the necessary processes and shifts which had to take place
from the initial development and self-realization of the public as an independent
entity, towards an official acknowledgement and recognition of a concept of the
“public”?
In Habermas’s account, the rise of the public sphere is closely connected
with Enlightenment ideas concerning the use of reason through the
11 James van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: CUP,
2001), p. 10.
12 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1978),
p. 15.
13 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham, NC.: Duke University
Press, 1991), p. 29.
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advancement of science and the circulation of knowledge. Yet, as Geoff Eley
remarks, Habermas develops the concept of the public sphere not only in
relation to the intellectual and philosophical Zeitgeist of the Enlightenment, but
also sees it as
the complex effect of a socioeconomic developmental process (the
transition from feudalism to capitalism, the rise of capitalism,
commercialization, the birth of a consumer society) mediated via the
novel institutional structures of the public sphere.14
Relevant to this process are three long-term developments adumbrated by
historian James van Horn Melton. He identifies the rise of the modern nation
state and the consolidation of power in absolutist regimes through which society
emerged as a distinct realm from the state. This is crucial, because only the
understanding of “state” and “society” as two separate entities enables us to
think of them as realms with potentially divergent interests. Secondly, the rise of
capitalism contributes to a more autonomous and self-aware society by
fostering a sense of self-interest among citizens, in which the capitalist
marketplace, rather than the operations of the state become the central concern
for its citizens. Of particular relevance here is the third development, which
relates to the general increase of printed material in the form of novels,
newspapers and periodic journals. For this flourishing print culture of the
eighteenth century brings about, in Habermas’s account, the “new domain of a
public sphere whose decisive mark was the published word” (STPS, p. 16).
Through the discussions and writings in the journals, a space for different
and conflicting opinions arises, which contributes to the emergence first of a
literary public sphere, and, later on, a political sphere. The precursor literary
public sphere comes into being via the novel and book reviews in journals and
newspapers which are then discussed in the reading circles, coffee-houses and
book-clubs in which the educated bourgeoisie meets and initially engages in
debates about cultural matters. This reading and debating culture serves as a
springboard for the more developed political public sphere, in which the
publication of debates and arguments about matters of common interest is
14 Geoff Eley, ‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures’, in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed.
by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 289-340 (p. 303).
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instrumental to the systematic and sustained articulation of opinions, which in
turn leads to the self-awareness of a public sphere as an independent entity. As
the sense of critical judgement is furthered, the application of reason turns
towards a critical enquiry of political and religious issues, which in turn leads to
a politicization of the public. Roger Chartier defines this politicization process as
the “application, beyond a literary domain alone, of a critical judgement
unconstrained by limits on its empire or by obligatory subjection to instituted
authority” (Cultural Origins, p. 162).
In this guise, the public sphere has then realized its full potential as
participants develop demands for general and abstract laws, based on
deliberation and reason in opposition to notions of unrestrained sovereignty.
Herein perhaps lies the fundamental contribution of the public sphere to our
modern understanding of sovereignty, which is based principally on the use of
reason and common deliberation rather than a simple assertion of power
through the use of will. Dena Goodman has pointed out that Habermas “finds in
the bourgeois public sphere, its critical and open discourse, and the public
opinion that represents it, the best hope for a modern democratic political
structure”.15 Thus, she points out, for Habermas, the sphere of public opinion
represents “the great historical development of the modern world” (p. 5).
1.1.2 The Role of Cultural Journals in the Original Public Sphere
In the following, I would like to exemplify some of these developments by
discussing the role of cultural journals as one of the formative agents of the
original public sphere. The aim here is to illustrate some of the developments
sketched out above and to highlight more clearly how the model of the public
sphere can “confer causal power”16 on developments such as reading and
writing practices which evolved in the journals at this time. Two relevant aspects
will be mentioned: firstly the development of argumentative reason and the
practice of written exchanges between a journal and its readers, and secondly
15 Dena Goodman, ‘Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current
Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime’, History and Theory, 31 (1992), 1-20 (p. 5).
16 John Brooke, ‘Reason and Passion in the Public Sphere: Habermas and Cultural Historians’,
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 24 (1) (1998), 43-67 (p. 48).
34
the development of intellectual sociability, which was vital to build and foster
intellectual networks in which the journals could take root and extend their
reach.17
To begin with, one brief note on the use of the word “journal” in the
eighteenth century. While the term “journal” or “periodical” initially referred to
either a newspaper or a periodical, it increasingly came to denote a daily
publication. Anthony Smith points out that:
[i]n the mid eighteenth century a journal was defined by Diderot as a
‘periodical work which contains extracts from a newly published book,
together with details of recent discoveries in the arts and sciences’. […]
Yet by the end of the eighteenth century the meaning had shifted
considerably, and in 1777 the first enduring daily paper in French,
containing political as well as cultural information, called itself a journal.18
However, contemporary literature almost exclusively employs the term journal in
order to denote the emerging periodical press: in rare instances, the term
“literary periodical”, “learned periodical” or “printed periodical” is used, but in line
with most secondary literature, I will use the term journal in reference to the
periodical press.
Even though most journals were mainly directed at the enlightened
intelligentsia, such as the French philosophes, the German Gebildeten, or the
English men of letters, many journals existed also in order to “instruct the
‘common man’”.19 Initially, they developed an “ethos of servicing others” by
“announcing discoveries and publishing requests for data, announcing and
reviewing new publications”.20 On a basic level journals were responding to a
17 These developments have been researched by social or cultural historians who have mapped
for example the spread of Enlightenment ideals by considering the increase in book-trade and
the rise of the printing press. See: Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A
Publishing History of the Encyclopédie 1775-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1979) and Revolution in Print: The Press in France 1775-1800, ed. by Robert
Darnton, Daniel Roche (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Others, such as Roger
Chartier, have referred to transformations in reading practices from a reverential to a more
critical style of reading or concentrate on the new social structures which emerged from literary
societies, reading and book clubs, and the coffeehouses..
18 Anthony Smith, The Newspaper: An International History (London: Thames and Hudson,
1979), p. 9.
19 Eckhart Hellmuth, Wolfgang Piereth, ‘Germany 1760-1815’, in Press, Politics and the Public
Sphere in Europe and North America, 1760-1820, ed. by Hannah Barker, Simon Burrows
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp. 69-113 (p. 73).
20 Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 29.
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demand for information and news, but they additionally fostered a new sense of
critical reflection.21
Alongside new approaches to ordering and presenting knowledge, the
journals are said to have been crucial in developing a style of argumentative
criticism and reasoning which, the historian Reinhart Koselleck has sketched
out, grew in the eighteenth century out of a consideration and examination of
Christian morals and eventually developed into the application of critical,
independent thought.22 In the first instance, Koselleck outlines, writers turned
their attention to antique texts, literature, works of art, and later towards a more
articulated and sustained critique of the church and the state. Eventually, the
use of critical reason was applied to all other scientific enquiries (Kritik und
Krise, pp. 86-105) as expressed as early as 1700 by the French philosopher
and man of letters, Pierre Bayle: “on s’est tourné vers la justesse du
raisonnement (…), on devient sensible au sens et à la raison plus qu’à tout le
reste.”23 John Gray also points to the shift of “the traditional morality of the past
founded on revelation and the authority of the church”, towards “a new morality,
grounded in reason”,24 as one of the defining developments of the
Enlightenment.
Another development relates to the flourishing practice of letters to the
editors. Although epistolary exchanges between men of letters had long been
part of the self-cultivation and self-presentation between individuals within a
private sphere, they provided here the basis for a more institutionalized and
formalised form of exchange between journals and its readers. This, in turn, had
ramifications for the development of journals as “nerve centres”25 for the
21 For a detailed case study about the development of style and content of one exemplary
eighteenth-century journal see: Harcourt Brown, ‘History and the Learned Journal’, Journal of
the History of Ideas, 33 (3) (1972), 365-378.
22 Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973).
23 Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (Rotterdam: Livineius, 1720) quoted here in
Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 289.
24 John Gray: ‘Enlightenment Humanism as a Relic of Christian Monotheism’, in 2000 Years and
Beyond: Faith, Identity and the ‘Common Era’, ed. by Paul Gifford, et al (London: Routledge,
2003) pp. 35-50 (p. 36).
25 Robert Darnton, George Washington’s False Teeth: An Unconventional Guide to the
Eighteenth Century (New York: Norton & Company, 2003), p. 33.
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transmission and spread of debate and new intellectual trends, since the
printing of letters provided the readers with a forum where they could express
and exchange their own opinions and respond to those of others.26 For this
alleged principled openness and “disinterested” pursuit in presenting all sides of
an argument, the historians Bödeker and Hellmuth even state that the “journal is
considered, with good reason, as the medium of the Enlightenment par
excellence”.27
Finally, the interactions of intellectual sociability that were cultivated in
the journals served to build incipient intellectual networks. Historical research
has shown how the imaginary framework of the Republic of Letters propagated
an ideal of scholarly pursuits that in turn informed the social interactions of its
members. For example the German novelist and man of letters Christoph Martin
Wieland (and editor of the original Merkur journal, the Teutscher Merkur)
propagated the idea that the programme of the Enlightenment was founded
“außer auf unbehindertes öffentliches Räsonnement noch […] auf
gemeinsinnige […] Aktivitäten der aufgeklärten Individuen”.28 These social or
communal interactions, Goldgar writes, took place in the form of “reading and
discussing journals, visiting academies, libraries, bookshops, universities,
cabinets of curiosities” (Impolite Learning, p. 2) where the stress was placed not
solely on scholarly pursuits, but on aspects of social exchange and sociability.
In a historical perspective, these networks are said to have strengthened the
sense of self-awareness and self-recognition of the journal and its readers as
an independently-minded entity, and thus a vital stepping stone for the
development of a public sphere.
The point here was to illustrate the way in which journals have been
portrayed as a contributing factor in the development of the public sphere
conceived by Habermas, and to outline the relevant mechanisms which are at
26 An argument made by Ann Goldgar in Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the
Republic of Letters 1680-1750 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
27 Hans Erich Bödeker, ‘Journals and Public Opinion: The Politicization of the German
Enlightenment in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, in The Transformation of Political
Culture. England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century, ed. by Eckhart Hellmuth
(Oxford: OUP, 1990), pp. 423-447 (p. 435).
28 Wolfgang Albrecht, ‘Wielands Vorstellungen von Aufklärung und seine Beiträge zur
Aufklärungsdebatte am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts’, Impulse, 11 (1988), 25-60 (p. 41), quoted
here from Klaus Schaefer, Christoph Martin Wieland (Stuttgart: Verlag J.B Metzler, 1996), p. 30.
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the basis of this newly emerging print culture. Evidently, the developments
sketched here present an idealized version and arguably overstate the
contribution and impact of the journals to a public sphere at the time. However,
it is not the purpose to claim that the public sphere really existed in the form
presented above, as a “Paradise Lost”, which the contemporary cultural journals
ought to aim to retrieve. Nor is the concern of this thesis to “test” the extent to
which contemporary cultural journals constitute or possibly recreate an ideal
public sphere in the Habermasian sense. Indeed, numerous historians have
objected that Habermas retrospectively applied and romanticized his model of a
public sphere of the eighteenth century.29 However, it is important to note in this
context that the public sphere should not be understood as a factual historical
account. Rather, it serves as a model, an “ideal type” in the sociological
meaning of the term, which is, as the next section will demonstrate, precarious
and transient, continuously caught between external constraints and internal
contradictions, between aspiration and reality.
1.1.3 The Public Sphere’s Decline
A significant proportion of STPS is dedicated to outlining the public sphere’s
transformation, or indeed decline, by analysing the internal contradictions and
external factors which intrude upon it. Habermas points out how the public
sphere, allegedly only interested in the pursuit of the truth and reason,
nevertheless operates in a society which has private interests and agendas to
defend. These initially private and subsequently organized political or corporate
interests enter the public sphere and contribute to its demise. For the public
sphere simply cannot function as a sanctified space where private, power, and
property interests are set aside.
Moreover, the “inclusionary” principle of the public sphere, its being
principally open and accessible to every citizen, actually hastens its demise.
With increasing levels of democratisation throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, a more diverse and broadly educated public gains access
to the public sphere. However, this does not lead to a democratic rejuvenation
29 As suggested by A.E.B Coldiron in ‘Public Sphere/Contact Zone’, Criticism: A Quarterly for
Literature and the Arts, 46 (2) (2004), pp. 207-218.
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of the public sphere, but rather to its depoliticization. To the extent that political
participation widens, the “exclusivity” of the public sphere dwindles, and with it
the standards of educated, rational debate and self-reflection (See STPS, p.
132). Herein lies the paradox, that the public sphere - by following through the
message of democratization and openness which it purports to deliver - brings
about its own demise.
In the final part, Habermas relied on critical tools designed by the
Frankfurt School to analyse the external factors of the demise of the public
sphere in the twentieth century.30 With the further rise of liberalism and the
increasing dominance of capitalism, he argued, the reasoning public sphere is
eventually replaced in the twentieth century by a consumerist public sphere,
which is part of a depoliticized cycle of production and consumption. The press,
the public sphere’s most “pre-eminent institution” (STPS, p. 181), is at the heart
of this shift, as it becomes increasingly commercialized. Consequently, news
and politics are sold for profit as “entertainment”, rather than to initiate debate
within a reasoning public. In this account of “late capitalist mass culture”, the
citizen is reduced to a passive consumer who in van Horn Melton’s terms
conforms and assents (The Rise of the Public, p. 4), rather than participates in
the public sphere. The book ends on this profoundly pessimistic note, arguing
that the conditions for a critical, reasoning public have essentially ceased to
exist.
Habermas eventually modified his original findings in later publications. In
a speech delivered at a symposium entitled ‘Further Reflections on the Public
Sphere’, he conceded that his original account of the degradation of the
“culture-debating to a culture-consuming public” in STPS was “too simplistic and
pessimistic”.31 The reasons for this, he explained, lay in an excessive reliance
on Adorno’s sombre assessment of modern mass culture and in the absence of
more sophisticated sociological research on modern state-society relationships,
30 See Martin Jay, ‘Aesthetic Theory and the Critique of Mass Culture’, in The Dialectical
Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 173-219.
31 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’, in Habermas and the Public
Sphere (see Calhoun, above), pp. 421-462.
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opinion formation, and media analysis and research, which could have refined
his somewhat simplistic assessment of the twentieth century.32
He also subsequently rephrased the continued relevance for a public
sphere in what is widely regarded as Habermas’s major work, The Theory of
Communicative Action, published in 1984.33 Here, he restated the case for a
public sphere by pointing out that democratic governments today rely on
legitimacy, that is, their policies and laws have to be perceived by the citizens
as legitimate and fair. The process by which legitimacy is created can only take
place in a public sphere, rather than through “force or strategic manipulation”.34
Put simply, only a society which exchanges, discourses and opines in a public
sphere will produce a functioning and resilient democracy. It is for these
reasons that critical theorists such as Nancy Fraser acknowledge that
“something like Habermas’s idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical
social theory and democratic political practice”,35 and why Craig Calhoun
maintains that the model of the public sphere offers “the richest, best developed
conceptualization available of the social nature and foundations of public life”,
which will continue to work “as an immensely fruitful generator of new research,
analysis and theory” (Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 41).
1.1.4 The Public Sphere Model Updated
Indeed, the model of the public sphere has become a much-applied and
debated model, and the numerous critical responses to Habermas’s work have
sought to redefine the public sphere in a contemporary context in the light also
of the criticism that his work has elicited.
32 Craig Calhoun tellingly formulates one weakness of Habermas’s analysis as follows.
“Habermas tends to judge the eighteenth century by Locke and Kant, the nineteenth century by
Marx and Mill, and the twentieth century by the typical suburban television viewer. Thus
Habermas’s account of the twentieth century does not include the intellectual history, the
attempt to take leading thinkers seriously and recover the truth from their writings.” In:
‘Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere’ (see Calhoun, above), pp. 1-35 (p. 33).
33 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society, Volume 1, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
34 Simone Chambers, ‘Discourse and Democratic Practices’, in The Cambridge Companion to
Habermas, ed. by Stephen White (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 233-259 (p. 242).
35 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, in Habermas and the Public Sphere (see
Calhoun, above), pp. 109-143 (p. 111).
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One line of criticism relates to Habermas’s over-emphasis on rational
discourse as the only permissible means of debate in a public sphere. Craig
Calhoun has argued that the focus on rationalist discourses entails a disregard
for other discourses such as the non-rationalistic and popular entertainment
discourses (Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 38). He maintains that
Habermas’s preference for rational discourse points to an unwillingness to
rescue anything meaningful or valid from public sphere discourses, which
operate on a purely emotional, speculative or imaginative level. The critic Meili
Steele takes this argument further.36 According to Steele, Habermas’s focus on
a rational-critical discourse overlooks what he calls the “social imaginary” of
cultures. Steele points out that Habermas renders irrelevant the “images, plots,
symbols, and background practices through which citizens imagine their lives”
(p. 410). He claims that the emphasis on rational discourse leaves no room for
expressing and discussing non-rational factors by which people gain an
understanding of their social, political, and cultural environment.
Here I disagree with Steele that the use of reason impairs the ability to
express the “social imaginary” of a culture. While Habermas is certainly wary
about types of discourses which he considers too populist or emotive, he does
not dismiss their principal validity and importance. Crucially, the rational aspect
is considered to be the ideal standard for a debate, but it does not mean that,
within it, arguments and discussions about the “images, symbols and
background practices” are banned as insignificant from the debate – quite the
contrary. Especially with a view to the ensuing discussion of our cultural
journals, we will find that their debates about European issues invoke a large
number of references to shared (and imagined) historical and cultural
phenomena and appeal to a social imaginary, rather than to a rational case for
or against Europe.
Moreover, one should acknowledge that Habermas does not try to
advocate a thoroughly rationalized world that denies the relevance of the social
imaginary and cultural bonds. Nicholas Garnham observes: “Its rationalist and
universalist vision must […] be distinguished from that other strand in the
36 Meili Steele, ‘Hiding from History: Habermas’s Elision of Public Imagination’, Constellations,
12 (3) (2005), 409-439.
41
dialectic of the Enlightenment, that of scientific rationality and the hubris of
human power that accompanied it”.37 Habermas’s “rationalism” does not overlap
with a purely instrumental or strategic use of reason, but rather is “tied to
subject-subject relations between communicating and interacting individuals”
(Eriksen and Weigard, Understanding Habermas, p. 4). The use of reason is
best suited for discussions and deliberations, since they guarantee the optimal
prerequisite for a meaningful and resilient public debate; however, Habermas
does not preclude the “social imaginary” from the public sphere.
Numerous responses to Habermas have further criticized the allegedly
“universal” character of the public sphere, which Marxist and feminist critics
have exposed as being made up in fact of a male bourgeois audience.38 Geoff
Eley argues that Habermas has neglected “the existence of competing publics”
(‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures’, p. 306), by which he means the
existence of a public potentially opposed to the goals and aims characteristic of
the bourgeois sphere. He alleges that Habermas “ignores alternative sources of
an emancipatory impulse in popular radical traditions” and effectively subsumes
all positive impulses “into his ‘liberal model’ of the bourgeois public sphere” (p.
306). Feminist critiques have stressed how the allegedly universal public sphere
was essentially gendered and male-dominated. In the view of Joan Landes, the
public sphere is “essentially, not just contingently, masculinist.”39
In short, these lines of criticism undermine the claim that a public sphere
will automatically work towards the common good of the entire society and that
the concerns of various citizens can be adequately addressed within one
inherently consensual public sphere. In the wake of this postmodern critique,
the implicit claim of the public sphere, which revolves around universal
understanding and communication, does not hold anymore “due to the death of
37 Nicholas Garnham, ‘The Media and the Public Sphere’, in Habermas and the Public Sphere,
(see Calhoun, above), pp. 359-377 (p. 374).
38 For a comprehensive overview of criticism see: After Habermas: New Perspectives on the
Public Sphere, ed. by Nick Crossley, John Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
39 Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 7.
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legitimating metanarratives and the corresponding fragmentation of the
discursive realm”.40
In the light of these qualifications, the critical theorist Nancy Fraser has
incorporated the existence of potentially competing publics into a model,
outlined in her article ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, which recognizes multiple
public spheres rather than privileging one public sphere as an ultimate model. In
modern democratic societies, she argues, it is indispensable to recognize these
multiple, conflictual public spheres and “counterpublics” as a framework in
which issues of social - and gender exclusion can be addressed. She writes: “I
contend that in stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate
contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of
participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public” (p.
122).
The contested and diverse nature of the public sphere has also been
stressed by the sociologist Somers, who has defined it as a “contested
participatory site in which actors with overlapping identities as legal subjects,
citizens, economic actors, and family and community members (i.e. civil
societies) form a public body and engage in negotiations and contestations over
political and social life.”41
Habermas has since responded to these lines of criticism and has
conceded that his original model formulated “ideals of bourgeois humanism”
(‘Further Reflections’, p. 430). He also admitted the “patriarchal character of the
public sphere”, and points out that not only women, but also other groups such
as “workers and peasants”, “were denied equal active participation in the
formation of political opinion and will” (pp. 427-428). In fact, he greatly extended
and expanded his original definition of a public sphere in his later works, among
them in Between Facts and Norms (1996), where he revisited the political
function of the public sphere in contemporary societies and sought to provide a
40 Dana Villa, ‘Postmodernism and the Public Sphere’, American Political Science Review, 86
(3) (1992), 712-722 (p. 712).
41 Margaret R. Somers, ‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and
Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy’, American Sociological Review, 58 (5) (1993),
587-620 (p. 589).
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more theoretical rather than historical account of the public sphere.42 His
definition in Between Facts and Norms seemingly covers the entire “realm of
public debate and social communication and interaction”,43 which he
differentiates as follows.
[The public sphere] represents a highly complex network that branches
out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local
and subcultural arenas. Functional specifications, thematic foci, policy
fields, and so forth, provide the points of reference for a substantive
differentiation of public spheres that are, however, still accessible to
laypersons (for example, popular science and literary publics, religious
and artistic publics, feminist and ‘alternative’ publics, publics concerned
with health-care issues, social welfare, or environmental policy) (pp. 373-
374).
Habermas further distinguishes between levels of institutionalization and density
of communication: from informal encounters to abstract levels of the public
sphere in the form of “isolated readers, listeners, and viewers scattered across
large geographic areas, or even around the globe and brought together only
through the mass media” (p. 374).
These reformulations, I would maintain, aim to redefine the public sphere
as a diverse and plural place which encompasses the different discourses and
variegated media outlets of modern societies. They have removed some of the
essentialist claims involved in the idea that one overarching public sphere can
address the concerns of the entire society, while staying true to the original
procedural principles of the public sphere of reasoned criticism and
argumentative exchange.
Today, cultural journals form a small segment of the public sphere which is
characterized by a multiplicity and divergence of tone, and style. It is not my
intention to claim here that they are representative of the public discourse in
France, Britain and Germany. Rather, the journals present the deliberations of a
certain set of writers, editors, journalists or “public intellectuals”. And whilst the
42 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy, transl. by William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
43 Chris Rumford, ‘European Civil Society or Transnational Social Space: Conceptions of
Society in Discourses of EU Citizenship, Governance and the Democratic Deficit: An Emerging
Agenda’, European Journal of Social Theory, 6 (1) (2002), 25-43 (p. 28).
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journals can be presented - as above - as the “exemplary” medium of the
original public sphere (whose editors and readers incidentally conformed to the
bourgeois, educated, liberal audience of Habermas’s original model), I do not
contend that these journals occupy a special or privileged role in the
contemporary public sphere. Indeed, their influence would be described as
marginal by many, given their low print-run that cannot compete with mass
circulation newspapers.
Even so, the late Bernhard Peters has suggested their influence is
noticeable in other, less direct ways.44 In his view, cultural journals “come in
[sic] with very small readerships, a questionable influence on everyday opinion,
as it were, on the current public agenda, but with high respect among the
educated classes and possibly a long-term influence on wider cultural
developments that is very hard to assess empirically” (p. 2). In spite of the
empirical difficulties, however, Peters proposed the “hypothesis of a cultural and
intellectual trickle-down effect” (p. 6), in which these journals play a part. It is
true, he wrote, that in the short run “small and dedicated groups of cultural or
intellectual aficionados do not have much immediate political or cultural impact
on the broader social, cultural and political scene” (p. 6). However, he writes
that “if we take a longer perspective” and consider “deeper cultural changes and
innovations and the development of influential public ideas” (p. 6), cultural
journals can play a role for the testing and probing of new ideas and arguments,
first within an - admittedly - elite readership, which eventually influence and
determine the debates once they percolate into the political and societal
mainstream. This is, I would suggest, how one might most adequately
characterise the role of cultural journals, which neither exaggerates their reach
and influence, nor unduly underplays their part in a public sphere.
Thus far, I have aimed to outline the notion of the public sphere and to
introduce its origins in a historical perspective, as well as to demonstrate how
44 Bernhard Peters, ‘Ach Europa: Questions about a European Public Space and Ambiguities of
the European Project’, Speech held at the 17th Meeting of Cultural Journals, ‘The Republic of
Letters? Cultural Journals in a European Public Space’ (Tallinn, 14-17 May 2005)
<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-06-21-peters-en.html> [accessed 3 December 2005]
pp. 1-8 (p. 2).
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this model has been rethought and adapted in a contemporary perspective.
Crucially, we saw that that the model of the public sphere as an ideal type
remains a valid tool to conceptualize the relevance of debate, exchange, and
contestation in media discourses.
1.2 The European Public Sphere
1.2.1 A Remedy for the Legitimacy and Identity Deficit?
The concept of the public sphere has been applied to many countries far and
beyond its original European context in order to account for ongoing political
developments and changes in the media landscape.45 However, within Europe
this model has evolved into a research agenda of its own that has become part
of the larger European Studies area.46 In the following, I will retrace how the
perceived “need” for a European public sphere (hereafter abbreviated as EPS)
has been put forward and summarize recent theoretical and empirical findings
of this research.
The systematic focus on an EPS emerged in the early 1990s when
scholars turned towards Habermas’s public sphere model in order to glean
some ideas about its potential to lend more legitimacy to the EU. At the time,
the EU was undergoing one of its recurring periods of malaise marked by voter
indifference and apathy in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. The
45 As the following articles attest: Mark Lynch, ‘Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public
Sphere’, Politics & Society, 31 (2003), 55-91; New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging
Public Sphere, ed. by Dale Eickelman, Jon Anderson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1999); Michael Hanchard, ‘Black Cinderella? Race and the Public Sphere in Brazil’, Public
Culture, 7 (1) (1995), 165-185; Guobin Yang, ‘The Internet and the Rise of a Transnational
Chinese Cultural Sphere’, Media Culture Society, 25 (2003), 469-490.
46 Current academic research groups include for example the ‘Public Sphere Research Group’
at the Jacobs University, Bremen
<http://www.jacobsuniversity.de/schools/shss/research/sfb/project/> [accessed 8 December
08], the group ‘EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of the European Public Sphere’, at the University
of Lancaster <http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/activities/289/> [accessed 8 December 08],
or the research centre ‘ARENA: Centre for European Studies’ in Oslo
<http://www.arena.uio.no/> [accessed 8 December 08].
For a general discussion of the academic turn towards the model of the EPS, see: Hans
Kleinsteuber, ‘Strukturwandel der europäischen Öffentlichkeit? Der Öffentlichkeitsbegriff von
Jürgen Habermas und die European Public Sphere’, in Europäische Union und Mediale
Öffentlichkeit: Theoretische Perspektiven und empirische Befunde zur Rolle der Medien im
europäischen Einigungsprozess, ed. by Lutz Hagen (Cologne: Herbert von Halem, 2004), pp.
29-47.
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negative perception of the EU by its citizens was explained in part by the
negligent treatment that the EU received in media coverage. More precisely, the
absence of a balanced and informed debate, coupled with the lack of adequate
provision of information about the decision-making processes in the EU, was
identified as one of the root causes of this shortfall of interest. European
citizens, it was said, had no outlet to form a common public opinion because
only national, rather than European public spheres existed. At a time when
political decision-making structures had become increasingly transnational, so
the argument went, the media had remained attached to national perspectives
and frames of reference.47 It was suggested that a Europe-wide public sphere
initiated by the media would firstly produce the necessary conditions to provide
legitimacy to the European integration project and secondly give a more unified
voice to the weak and underdeveloped sense of European identity.
Concerning the first point, the absence of a European media sphere was seen
as troubling because, Michael Greven has pointed out, the European Union
comprised a system of governance with its own actors, rules, and competencies
that amounted to an autonomous political system to which European citizens
required corresponding possibilities for democratic participation.48 The
challenge was now to reconceptualize ideas of democratic participation and
debate from a national to a European level, in order to open up new avenues for
channelling legitimacy. Habermas described the problem in the 2001 NLR
article ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ as follows.
Legitimacy flows more or less through the channels of democratic
institutions and procedures within each nation-state. This level falls short
of what is needed for the kind of supranational and transnational
decision-making that has long since developed within the institutional
framework of the Union […].49
47 This argument is made by Jürgen Gerhards, ’Missing a European Public Sphere’, in Will
Europe Work? Integration, Employment and the Social Order, ed. by Martin Kohli and Mojca
Novak (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 145-159.
48 Michael Greven, ‘Mitgliedschaft, Grenzen und politischer Raum: Problemdimensionen der
Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union’, in Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen, ed. by Beate
Kohler-Koch (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), pp. 249-270.
49 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, NLR, 11 (2001), 5-26 (p. 14).
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He concluded that there would be “no remedy for the legitimation deficit,
however, without a European-wide public sphere - a network that gives citizens
of all member states an equal opportunity to take part in an encompassing
process of focused political communication” (p. 17). If these processes did not
take place and if the European Union was seen to be conducting politics solely
on the basis of a top-down approach of governance, backed only by a
“permissive consensus” from EU citizens, then its legitimacy would be inevitably
compromised, since the expectations towards democratic legitimacy were at
such a level that a permissive consensus would neither be a satisfactory nor
tolerable state of affairs. Therefore, the theorists Eriksen and Fossum pointed
out, only a functioning public sphere could “legitimate the political union and […]
reconstruct democracy as governance based upon the public use of reason”
(‘Post-National Integration’, p. 2). In this chain of argumentation, the EPS would
provide the vital source of legitimacy for the European Union.
Whilst the political legitimacy argument remains a relevant point of concern for
political scientists, it is not the main focus of this thesis. Rather, this research
will be concerned with examining the second premise, namely that an EPS will
bring about a more defined sense of European identity. This point presupposes
that the European Union, in addition to its legitimacy deficit, suffers from a lack
of identity and sense of belonging. Communal affinities, so it was argued, are
overwhelmingly directed at the clearly delineated nation state, rather than a
supra-national structure like the European Union. According to the well-known
arguments put forward by Anthony Smith, Europe would not be able to compete
against the “thick” and affective sense of identity that is invested in the nation-
state with its origins, traditions and foundations. Europe would prove too
fragmented in its cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic landscapes to instil a
sense of belonging.50
Yet despite this pessimistic assessment about the emergence of a
European sense of identity, it was argued by many that the substrate for a
stable and enduring political entity is essentially a communal bond that ties the
50 Anthony Smith, ‘Supra- or Super-Nationalism?’, in Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 116-147.
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citizens together and guarantees a degree of solidarity between them.
“Communicative processes” were seen as central and formative to generate this
sense of common belonging. Cathleen Kantner has emphasized the need to
develop a sense of identity based on such communication processes that can
touch upon a shared sense of memory and history.51 Hans Jörg Trenz has also
stressed the need for a “transnational communication space”, not only to create
legitimacy, but to enable processes of identity formation:
Für die Ausbildung der Legitimität der neuen Ordnung bedarf es der
Ausbildung eines transnationalen Handlungs- und Kommunikations-
raumes, der von aktiven Bürgern gefüllt wird, die sich in kollektive
Identitätsbildungsprozesse einbeziehen.52
Ideally, the EPS is to provide the forum where citizens can discuss and argue
about commonalities and differences amongst European nations and cultures
which will then lead to processes of identity formation, or in the words of Eriksen
and Fossum, “the binding force of words in communicative practices” will be
able to take hold (‘Post-National Integration’, p. 2).
These two points provide the premise on which the alleged need for an
EPS was formulated and I will retrace and examine in more detail the link
between the EPS and concepts of European identity formation in the following
chapter. We might note at this point that the research agenda concerning the
EPS carried at its core a strong pro-integrationist stance, which assumes that a
stronger, more developed sense of identity will lead to a stated outcome,
namely enhancing political legitimacy. That said, subsequent research on the
EPS soon found the gap between these aspirations and reality to be
disappointingly wide.
51 See: Cathleen Kantner, Kein modernes Babel. Kommunikative Voraussetzungen
europäischer Öffentlichkeit (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), p. 181.
52 Hans Jörg Trenz, ‘Soziologische Perspektiven: Auf der Suche nach der europäischen
Zivilgesellschaft’, in Theorien der europäischen Integration, ed. by Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Monika
Lerch (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), pp. 373-398 (p. 377). An increase in
communication and debate as a means to strengthen a sense of European identity is also put
forward in Heiko Walkenhorst, Europäischer Integrationsprozess und europäische Identität. Zur
politikwissenschaftlichen Bedeutung eines sozialpsychologischen Konzeptes (Baden Baden:
Nomos Universitätsschriften Politik, 1999).
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1.2.2 Evolving Concepts of the European Public Sphere
The discussion about the EPS has spanned many different approaches in the
course of which numerous models have been proposed and repudiated. As a
general trend, one can state in summary that over the years an increased
emphasis on empirical research has taken place from normative models of one
homogenous EPS to more pragmatic assessments and analysis of the existing
media discourses.53 In the following, I would like to provide an outline of the
current state of research in order to establish the points of departure for the
analysis presented in this thesis.
Initially, the notion of an EPS centred on the creation of a new European media
system, which, it was envisaged, would provide an integrated and unified
European information stream and set the agenda for public debates and
discussions. This model has been termed a “cross-national European public
sphere”, also called the “vertical perspective”,54 whereby a new pan-European
media outlet, in the form of television, radio, or print media would provide a
multilingual rendition of European news and thereby instigate debates. Such
transnational media outlets exist; however, none of them has captured a mass
audience but caters instead to arguably specialized tastes and interests. In the
cultural sector, one can point to the most prominent televisual example of Arte,
the bilingual publicly funded French-German arts channel. Although often
praised for its high-quality output, its viewing figures are relatively low and it
53 Relevant theoretical discussions and interventions have been made amongst others by Hans
Jörg Trenz, ‘In Search of the European Public Sphere: Between Normative Overstretch and
Empirical Disenchantment’, Recon Online Working Paper, 2008/07
<http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_0807.pdf?fileitem=16662548> [accessed 8
May 08]; Hans Jörg Trenz, Klaus Eder, ’The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public
Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism’, European Journal of Social Theory, 7
(1) (2004), 5-25; Jessica Erbe, Ruud Koopmans, ‘Towards a European Public Sphere?’,
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 17 (2) (2004), 97-118; Jürgen
Gerhards, ‘Missing a European Public Sphere’, in Will Europe Work?, (see Kohli, Novak,
above), (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 145-159.
54 For a more detailed explanation about “horizontal” and “vertical” perspectives, see:
’Introduction: Topic of the Conference: The European Public Sphere’, Europäische Akademie
(Berlin, 28-30 November 2003) <http://www.stoyke.com/eupub/index.php?id=home> [accessed
13 October 2005].
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certainly could not be described as a media provider that initiates European
debates.55
Within their niche, cultural journals have made attempts to overcome the
constraints of the national frameworks long before the self-conscious,
formalized framework of the EPS came into being. For example, the short-lived
Revue Internationale, founded in 1962, was an attempt by German, French and
Italian writers and intellectuals to create a collaborative journal with a truly
international perspective. Even though the editorial committee boasted
prestigious literary names, publication eventually faltered due in large part to
internal infighting and radically different ideas about how such an international
perspective would be put in practice.56 In fact, the account of the Revue
Internationale’s ambitious goals and its eventual demise reads like a case study
of the difficulties involved in creating a journal which traverses national writing
styles and overcomes the cultural references, markers, and modes of
expression different to each language and culture and which, as the ensuing
discussion of the selected journals will show, are particular and relevant to the
profile of the publication.
The attempt to create transnational media spaces for cultural journals
has been partly successful on the Internet. The internet journal Eurozine, based
in Vienna and funded in part through the Culture Programme of the European
Union, is one such example. Eurozine is both a journal in its own right, and a
platform for European cultural journals. Its aim is to facilitate textual exchange
and the translation of articles - in effect to establish the groundwork for an
incipient EPS.57 A similar project is Eurotopics, initiated in December 2005 and
55 See: Barbara Thomas, ‘Public Service Broadcasting als Faktor einer europäischen
Öffentlichkeit’, in Europäische Union und Mediale Öffentlichkeit (see Hagen, above), pp. 47-63.
For more about the role of television for an EPS see Fritz Groothues, ‘Television News and the
European Public Sphere: A Preliminary Investigation’, European Political Communication
Working Paper Series, 6 (2004).
56 Participants in the editorial committee included for example Hans Magnus Enzensberger,
Ingeborg Bachmann, Martin Walser, Maurice Blanchot, Robert Antelme, Marguerite Duras,
Roland Barthes, Pier-Paolo Pasolini and Italo Calvino. For a summary of the history of this
journal see: Henning Marmulla, ‘Internationalisierung der Intellektuellen? Möglichkeiten und
Grenzen einer “communauté internationale” nach dem Algerienkrieg’, in Zwischen den Fronten:
Positionskämpfe europäischer Intellektueller im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006), pp. 179-200.
57 Eurozine <http://www.eurozine.com/about_Eurozine.html> [accessed 5 January 2006].
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funded by the German Agency for Civic Education. This project encompasses a
weekly online magazine and a daily newsletter on European debates which is
available in French, English and German. Editors and correspondents from 28
European countries (the EU member states and Switzerland) select material
from national newspapers which are summarized in the newsletter and
presented with a short introductory overview and links to the original articles.
Eurotopics’ self-stated objective is to promote “transeuropean discussions and
the development of new networks for media, cultural and political exchanges.”58
Other examples of a segmented Europeanization are the more
established publications chiefly interested in the European economic and
financial agenda such as the Financial Times or the Economist. However, these
examples given above are all seen as instances of a mere “elite”
Europeanization which has not yet reached into the mainstream. Thus,
researchers such as Philip Schlesinger and Kevin Deirdre have argued that
overall initiatives to shape a new “European information area have been
fragmented and did not bear fruit”,59 since the mass national media remain
overwhelmingly organized along the lines of national news.
Various reasons for this perceived failure have been presented: firstly,
the language diversity within Europe is seen as a severe and insoluble
impediment to the creation of an integrated EPS. Secondly, the European Union
itself was blamed, for presenting matters of European concern as purely
technocratic exercises in order to minimise potential dangers of open discussion
and the airing of possibly dissenting voices. Hence, the European Union had
failed to nurture a culture of controversy and debate from the outset. Thirdly, the
cultural, social and political differences within Europe were seen as simply too
great and significant for the creation of such a public sphere. National culture
and the national public spheres were considered too potent and crucially
58 Eurotopics <http://www.eurotopics.net/en/magazin/magazin_aktuell/> [accessed 6 December
2005]. The Eurotopics newsletter is produced by n-Ost: Network for Reporting on Eastern
Europe.
59 Philip Schlesinger, Deirdre Kevin, ‘Can the EU Become a Sphere of Publics?’, in Democracy
in the EU. Integration through Deliberation? (see Eriksen and Fossum, above), pp. 206-230 (p.
211).
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significant to compete against a relatively thin and undefined European
culture.60
In 2002, Marianne van de Steeg’s article ‘Rethinking the Conditions for a
Public Sphere in the European Union’,61 raised the question, however, as to
whether the fault lay not with the European media as such, but rather with the
expectations of how such an integrated media system might work. Models for
an EPS, she pointed out, worked from the simplistic assumption that each
national public sphere presented something like a perfect model of a self-
sufficient, homogeneous sphere that corresponded to one integrated media
system, established democratic institutions and one dominant language, which
was now supposed to be emulated on a European level in the guise of one
integrated EPS. “The idea is that the public sphere is delimited by the state’s
borders, thus creating a space in which everything – the citizenry, language, the
media, the national collective identity, the national interests, etc. – coincides” (p.
502).
However, she pointed out that this approach ignored the fact that national
spheres too were marked by differentiation and heterogeneity, and - as
established in the previous section - refer to complex and stratified networks,
rather than a unitary, integrated discourse. Especially with regard to the cultural
journals, for example, one can safely say that the various media outlets
“address a certain readership, not the national public”.62 Thus, she noted, in the
case of the EPS, one should be prepared to accept a similar level of contrasting
discourses, heterogeneity and contestation, rather than expect the creation of a
unified European media system. For one thing, there are the obvious practical
60 In this paragraph I am summarizing the arguments and findings from Philip Schlesinger’s and
Kevin Deirdre’s abovementioned article, as well as those of Craig Calhoun, ‘The Virtues of
Inconsistency: Identity and Plurality in the Conceptualization of Europe’, in Constructing
Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension, ed. by Lars-Erik Cederman (Boulder, Colorado: L.
Rienner, 2001), pp. 36-57; Jürgen Gerhards, ‘Missing a European Public Sphere’ (see
Gerhards, above), Ruud Koopmans, Friedhelm Neidhardt and Barbara Pfetsch, ‘Conditions for
the Constitution of a European Public Sphere’, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung (WZB), Paper presented at the Conference ‘Democracy beyond the Nation-
State’ (Athens, 5-7 October 2000).
61 Marianne van de Steeg, ‘Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in the European
Union’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5 (4) (2002), 499-519.
62 Hans Jörg Trenz, ‘Media Coverage on European Governance: Exploring the European Public
Sphere in National Quality Newspapers’, European Journal of Communication, 19 (3) (2004),
291-319 (p. 312).
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difficulties involved in simply creating new media as an “add-on” to the
traditional ones and to expect these to attain a large readership and influence
on public opinion. Further, according to political scientist Thomas Risse, this
view about how such a system would operate also wrongly implies
that we must somehow transcend our national public spheres and that a
‘European public sphere’ is somehow located above and beyond the
various national media and publics. In concrete terms, the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung and Le Monde could never be part of the same public
sphere by definition. 63
Yet he contends that exactly these same newspapers should in fact be the
bearers of an emerging EPS. Risse suggests analysing the emergence of a
possible “Europeanization” of the media by observing the social and discursive
practices in the existing, rather than potential, future media discourses, as they
might lead to a more viable “Europeanization of national public spheres”.
Whereas the first model saw national media as the “stumbling stone” and
obstacle that needed to be overcome to create an EPS, they now emerged as
its “building blocks”,64 and hence the departure point for investigating and
researching communication processes which traverse national boundaries.
In recent years, therefore, research has increasingly focused on
comparisons between national media to ascertain to what extent these debates
are integrated and interconnected and whether common European
perspectives, reference points and analysis are apparent. This approach has
had the advantage of considering the EPS not as something that “exists” at any
particular time, but rather as a potential process in the making. Risse outlines
this point as follows.
Public spheres are not a given, are not out there waiting to be discovered
by some analysts. Rather, they are constructions in the true sense of the
word. Public spheres emerge in the process in which people debate
controversial issues in public. [...] Public spheres and communities of
communication emerge through social and discursive practices, in the
63 Thomas Risse, ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Implications and
Empirical Indicators’, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the European Studies
Association (Nashville, TN., 27-30 March 2003) <http://aei.pitt.edu/6556/01/001315_1.PDF>
[accessed 5 January 2009] pp. 1-11 (p. 4).
64 Sebastian Kurpas, ‘When the European Constitution went National: A Plea for a European
Public Sphere’, Centre for European Policy Studies
<http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=421& > [accessed 3 December 2005].
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process of arguing about controversial questions. Europe is no exception
(p. 5).
Quantitative research has attempted to account for these processes and
developments through computerized coding of datasets, such as articles from
European newspapers. Analysis has been deduced from the frequency of
certain keywords such as “EU” and “EU governance” over a given timeframe.65
In addition, Risse has proposed to measure the extent of “similar levels of
attention” (‘An Emerging European Public Sphere?’, p. 5) in the media
discourse to European topics as a basic relevant parameter, because, as he
notes, topics have to be discussed simultaneously in different countries in order
for there to be a meaningful debate about them in the first place. Moreover, van
de Steeg has suggested tracing the level of “discursive interaction” (‘Rethinking
the Conditions’, p. 512) between different publications by establishing how
much space in articles is devoted to recapitulating and furthering arguments
from other countries, or by including texts from foreign authors which would lead
to a “transplantation” of opinions. These parameters will also be used in the
initial quantitative discussion of the journals in Chapter Three.
Risse’s crucial, and in my view defining, indicator for an EPS in a
qualitative analysis is as follows: he maintains that it is not necessary to always
agree and reach the same conclusion on a given topic, but rather to agree on
the “frame of reference” within which a given topic is discussed. He exemplified
this point with reference to the debate about the American-led Iraq invasion.
We can disagree on whether the attack on Iraq is consistent with
international law or not. But ‘same criteria of reference’ requires that we
do agree that compliance with international law is significant in debating
questions of war and peace. If we do not agree about international war
as a frame of reference to discuss the war against Iraq, we cannot
meaningfully communicate about this issue (p. 5).
This criterion, I would contend, does justice to the traits of heterogeneity,
plurality, and contestation which define a public sphere, while at the same time
implying that the EPS is not simply a cacophony of competing voices or a forum
65 For a detailed quantitative analysis see Stefanie Sifft, et al, ‘Segmented Europeanization:
Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective’, Journal
of Common Market Studies, 45 (1) (2007), 127-155.
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of opinion where anything goes. Rather, it is a space where participants can
express differences of opinion and diverging viewpoints, but still find themselves
in discursive contact with each other because they share a common
understanding of what criteria are relevant in discussing a topic.66 This question
of whether or not “same criteria of reference” are apparent in the debates of the
cultural journals provides the underlying question in the subsequent qualitative
discussion of the journals in Chapter Four.
Despite extensive studies, researchers continue to disagree on whether national
media are in fact becoming increasingly Europeanized in line with political and
economical integration. Some recent studies have suggested that a tentative
EPS is slowly emerging in some segments of the European media.67 Yet others
maintain that the results are either inconclusive or that no increasing
Europeanization is taking place.68 This suggests that the answer to the bluntly
put question “does a European Public Sphere exist?”, inevitably has to be: it
depends on a number of variables, such as the benchmarks for what constitutes
an EPS, the methods of analysis, the type of media analysed, and, of course,
on the countries involved in such a case study.69 All these factors account for
66 Bernhard Peters has used different terms to denote similar indicators to Risse’s. He
established “simultaneity of issues and agendas” across the media as a first indicator for an
EPS, and furthermore proposes to establish whether these topics are discussed according to
the same “patterns of interpretation”, as sign of a “common understanding” amongst the
participants of an EPS. See: ‘Ach Europa’, (see Peters, above), pp. 2-3.
67 As suggested by Thomas Risse, Marianne van de Steeg, ‘The Emergence of a European
Community of Communication: Insights from Empirical Research on the Europeanization of
Public Spheres’, Centre for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy, Freie
Universität Berlin <http://www.atasp. de/downloads/eps_vandesteeg_risse_070513.pdf>
[accessed 22 October 2007].
68 As suggested by Hans-Jörg Trenz, ‘In Search of the European Public Sphere’ (see Trenz,
above).
69 Since the field of EPS research has been largely dominated by German researchers, many
empirical media studies usually include Germany and one or two other countries. The following,
by no means exhaustive, selection of books and journal articles indicates some of the themes
and countries of comparison. Roberta Carnevale, Stefan Ihrig and Christian Weiss, Europa am
Bosporus (er-)finden: Die Diskussion um den Beitritt der Türkei zur Europäischen Union in den
britischen, deutschen, französischen und italienischen Zeitungen (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang,
2005); Helmut Scherer, Simone Vesper, ‘Was schreiben die anderen – Ausländische
Pressestimmen als Vorform paneuropäischer Öffentlichkeit: Eine Inhaltsanalyse deutscher
Qualitätszeitungen’, in Europäische Union und Mediale Öffentlichkeit (see Hagen, above), pp.
195-211; Christiane Eilders, Friedhelm Neidhardt and Barbara Pfetsch, ‘Die Stimme der Medien
im politischen Prozeß: Themen und Meinungen in Pressekommentaren’, Discussion Paper FS
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the wide discrepancy in conclusions that have been reached about the state of
the EPS.
It is, however, not the main aim of this thesis to simply pose the question
of whether an EPS “exists” in these cultural journals. Rather, the particular
interest of this research lies in the possibilities and limits of debate within a
public sphere in relation to questions of European identity. It seeks to establish
to what extent this model of the public sphere with its emphasis on debate and
exchange of arguments can in fact contribute to the development of a more
defined and integrated sense of European identity, as suggested by social
theorists.
In this section, I have endeavoured to give a summary of the existing
debates and research on the EPS and to provide a useful working definition for
the context of this thesis. Specifically, I referred to using national media as an
organising point for the discussion and to conceptualize the EPS as a “social
construction” (Risse’s term) and a process in the making. Importantly, this EPS
was characterized as consisting of a variety of views that are connected by
common underlying criteria of relevance. The next chapter will probe more
deeply into the ideological underpinnings of the EPS model in relation to identity
formation and provide an overview of recurrent motifs of European identity.
III98-106 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin <http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/1998/iii98-106.pdf>
[accessed 17 December 2008].
Recent English language examples include Paul Statham, Emily Gray, ‘The Public Sphere and
Debates about Europe in Britain: Internalized and Conflict Driven’, Innovation, 18 (1) (2005), 61-
81; Swantje Renfordt, ’Do Europeans Speak with One Another in Time of War?’
Recon Online Working Paper, 2007/17
<http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/workingpapers2007/papers/wp07_17.pdf> [accessed 15
October 2007].
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Chapter 2
Locating European Identity
2. 1 European Identity: Its Conceptual and Terminological Emergence in
Postwar Europe
This chapter begins by retracing the emergence of European identity as a
concept in postwar Europe and then outlines current approaches to identity
studies, which emphasise the role of textual discourse, especially the public
sphere as a relevant locus for identity formation. The second part will point to
some historical narratives which are relevant in contemporary declarations
about European identity, and will sketch out some current identity models. The
majority of these, I will argue, can be understood as projections of political
aspirations and philosophical ideals.
The concern with the “idea” of Europe, as suggested in the introduction, has
been variously put by writers, philosophers, historians, and intellectuals as
much as by politicians and geographers throughout the centuries as a question
of Europe’s, “essence”, “soul”, or its “spirit”, “mystique”1 or “consciousness”.2
The use of the term “identity” is, however, of very recent origin and according to
Luisa Passerini originated in the United States in the 1960s with the emergence
of “new social, cultural, ethnic and regional movements”.3 Since then, the term
has diffused “across disciplinary and national boundaries, establishing itself in
the journalistic as well as the academic lexicon and permeating the language of
social and political practices as well as social and political analysis”.4 In Europe,
Bo Stråth points out, the term “identity” slowly replaced the buzzword of
1 Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘What is Europe, Where is Europe? From Mystique to Politique’,
Encounter, 64-65 (1985), 9-17 (p. 13).
2 Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, trans. by Richard Mayne (London: Penguin, 1995),
p. 423.
3 Luisa Passerini, ‘From the Ironies of Identity to the Identities of Irony’, in The Idea of Europe.
From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. by Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press and CUP, 2002), pp. 191-208.
4 Rogers Brubaker, Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society, 29 (2004), 1-47
(p. 3).
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European “integration”, which had dominated the 50s and 60s; by the early
1970s the term “European identity” appeared for the first time in an official
communiqué of the European Community at the 1973 EEC Copenhagen
Summit.5
In Stråth’s view, the use of the term at the Copenhagen summit signified
the political appropriation of identity for a political programme. For the talk about
a European identity, however undefined, was in his view an attempt to deal with
the sense of economic malaise which gripped Europe in the early 1970s,
specifically “in the wake of the collapse of the dollar and the subsequent oil-
price shock, at a time of general crisis for national economic governance”.6
Numerous political scientists and sociologists have offered the explanation that
the increasing popularity of European identity has coincided with the gradual
weakening of the nation state model. This argument contends that the nation
state had been in a period of decline and lost its capacity to manage the
economic and political challenges thrust upon it.7 Meanwhile, the increasing
European political cooperation and economic steering mechanisms weakened
the “ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state [and] its position as
the charismatic locus […] of collective identity”.8 Increasingly, the nation state
provided just one of many possible sources of identification, and national
identity was eroded from below in the form of local allegiances – to a region,
city, or community – and diluted from above in the form of transnational or
supranational structures, one of them being the then EEC, now EU.
Thus the absence of an automatic congruence between national borders
and corresponding identities weakened the nation’s exclusive grip on the
concept of identity in the collective imagination. It is suggested that while
national identity today still provides an undeniable appeal and strong
5 Bo Stråth, ‘Introduction: Europe as a Discourse’, in Europe and the Other and Europe as the
Other, ed. by Bo Stråth (Peter Lang: Brussels, 2004), pp. 13-54 (p. 14).
6 Bo Stråth, ‘Introduction’, in The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among
Nations, ed. by Mikael af Malmborg, Bo Stråth (Oxford: Berg, 2002), p. 11. The oil-price shock is
also seen as a caesura by the French social theorist Edgar Morin, who considers the event as
his personal European awakening. He writes that in the wake of the oil-price shock: “(j)e suis
devenu un néo-Européen parce que j’ai vu l’Europe malade et la répétition générale de son
agonie.” Edgar Morin, Penser l’Europe (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1987), p. 23.
7 One of the central theses in Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa:
Gesellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Moderne (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M., 2004).
8 Shmuel Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus, 1 (2000), 1-29 (p. 16).
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resonance, “the older territorial and national boundaries of the world become
increasingly uncertain”, which would explain why “the quest for national and
transnational identity has intensified”.9 Arguably, a European identity is
emerging as a possible alternative or complementary source of identification for
Europeans. However, the as yet unanswered question is how these new forms
of transnational governance and free trade would translate into an identity which
belongs to “something larger than […] the nation, yet smaller and more
culturally specific than “humanity”.10
The ongoing political integration and economic deregulation throughout
the 1980s gave sustained impetus to the concern, or in Stråth’s words
“obsession”, with European identity during this decade (Europe as Discourse, p.
14). The publication of Milan Kundera’s 1984 essay, ‘The Tragedy of Central
Europe’ published in the New York Review of Books,11 is frequently mentioned
as a defining moment for a reassessment of European identity, which, as
Kundera pointed out, had, in the wake of the Cold War, largely become a matter
of Western European identity and had ignored the plight of the countries behind
the Iron Curtain.12 While the essay certainly made an impact in intellectual
circles, the question of Europe’s division into an “Eastern” and a “Western” part
did not arise on a larger scale until 1989, when Europe was confronted with the
challenge of asserting its position - and defining its identity - in a changed world
order. In this sense, 1989 triggered a qualitative reassessment of European
identity, because discussions about it could no longer be neatly confined to the
“Western” European Community countries. It is for these reasons, the
9 Anthony Pagden, ‘Introduction’, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union,
ed. by Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and CUP, 2002), pp. 1-32
(p. 1)
10 Anthony Pagden, ‘Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent’, in The Idea of Europe (see Pagden,
above), pp. 33-55 (p. 53).
11 Milan Kundera, ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, New York Review of Books, 26 April 1984,
pp. 33-37. For a critical review of Kundera’s article see Tony Judt, ‘The Dilemmas of
Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East-Central Europe’, Eastern European Politics and
Societies, 2 (2) (1988), 185-241 (p. 224).
12 See Kevin Wilson, Jan van der Dussen, ‘Europe since 1945: Crisis to Renewal’, in The
History of the Idea of Europe, ed. by Kevin Wilson, Jan van der Dussen (Milton Keynes:
Routledge, 1998), pp. 151-205.
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introduction has already intimated, that I take this historical caesura as the
starting point for discussion.13
2.2 The Constructivist Premises of Identity Formation
It is a commonplace to point out that “identity” today is a capacious term which
can stand in for all sorts of analytical concepts, to the extent that it has lost
much of its signifying value. It is not my aim to give a comprehensive overview
of the sprawling debate on the use and different understandings of identity by
the numerous academic disciplines which utilize it. Rather, I would like to point
to some relevant definitions proposed by different theorists which will help to
locate the term in the context relevant to this enquiry.
Firstly, Paul Ricoeur provides a useful entry point into how one might
understand a communal identity. Identity, he writes, is made up “to a large
extent” of “identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in
which the person or the community recognizes itself.” 14 For, as he points out:
“[r]ecognizing oneself in contributes to recognizing oneself by” (p. 121). Thus,
any given community, in this case the European one, recognizes itself as such
a community by identifying with values, norms, and ideals that they make out as
distinctively their own.
Secondly, these self-ascribed values and norms are based in large part
on historical narratives which serve as a guide to express ambitions and
projections for the future. Identity can be therefore understood in what Paul
Gifford has formulated, in allusion to Ricoeur’s theory of “narrative identity”, as
the “articulation of project and memory.”15 He notes: “‘I’ am, ‘we’ are”, is
created, “at the point where a projected future is articulated in terms of a
13 It is important to clarify that while my concern is ultimately with the question of a European,
not EU identity, discussions about European identity are initiated by the political developments
of the European Union. In other words, it is by and large the political developments of the EU
which set the agenda for discussions about European identity today. Thus, without intending to
conflate the obvious distinction between the two terms, they are often used in close correlation
with each other.
14 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Personal Identity and Narrative Identity’, in Oneself as Another (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 113-140 (p. 121).
15 Paul Gifford, ‘Conclusion: Dialogue on the “Common Era”’, in 2000 Years and Beyond: Faith,
Identity and the ‘Common Era’, ed. by Paul Gifford, et al (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 147-
191 (p. 147).
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narrativized past” (p. 147). Thus the expression of an identity occurs when such
a narrativized past is tied to the present and used to project a common future.
The intellectual discourses especially, which are of concern here, rely on
creating such a connection between the “narrativized” past, the present, and a
“projected” future in order to establish a sense of a continuous European
identity.
Thirdly, identity relies on creating a sense of “sameness” and common
belonging which a group establishes mostly by designating an “Other”. Creating
inner cohesion by demarcating and separating “us” from “them” is of course one
of the recurrent elements involved in identity formation and is achieved,
according to Robert Frank, in the following way.
L’identité d’un groupe est faite des traits communs qui font que les
membres de ce groupe se sentent ‘mêmes’. Bien que distincts, ils se
sentent semblables, dans la mesure où ils s’opposent aux ‘autres’.
L’identité européenne est donc une conscience d’être Européen, par
opposition à ceux qui ne le sont pas, une conscience de similitude, un
sentiment d’appartenance.16
The fourth point, which follows from the previous ones, is that European
identity is something to be actively and self-consciously designed and created.
In Robert Frank’s view it is not enough to simply be European, one must be
aware that Europe needs to be made: “La conscience européenne […] est
conscience de la nécessité de faire l’Europe” (p. 134). René Girault identifies
the individual components involved in the process of “making Europe”: ”Il
faudrait valoriser les convergences entre les cultures européennes, entre les
histoires nationales, souligner les solidarités économiques et sociales qui
existent entre des peuples européens.”17 Thus the available traits of group
identification to which intellectuals have recourse, such as an imagined past,
must be harnessed, convergences need to be emphasised and values need to
be defined and valorised in order to mobilize a European identity. Klaus Eder
has therefore pointed out somewhat cynically that not history in itself, but to
16 Robert Frank, ‘Présentation’, in Identité et Conscience Européennes au XXe Siècle, ed. by
René Girault (Paris: Hachette Livre, 1994), pp. 133-135 (pp. 133-134).
17 René Girault, ‘Les trois sources de l’identité et de la conscience Européennes au XXe siècle’,
in Identité et Conscience (see Girault, above), pp. 193-205 (p. 199).
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“falsely invent history as a construction by intellectuals is the basis of a shared
collective identity.”18
This awareness over the “invented nature” of European history separates
it, according to Hans Jörg Trenz, from “traditional identity discourses” such as
national identities “which have to repress the contingency of its underlying
concepts”.19 In the case of European identity, attempt is no longer made to hide
the “invented nature of tradition”, which Eric Hobsbawm’s and Benedict
Anderson’s works have identified as the crucial mechanism of shaping national
identities since the nineteenth century.20 As Hobsbawm has emphasized: “the
‘nation’ was not a spontaneous growth but an artefact [...]. It had actually to be
constructed” (p. 117). He describes the immense efforts that went into
fashioning and disseminating national myths and national histories through
state-educated schooling, reliance on new forms of mass communication, as
well as literature, designed to unify and mould a sense of national
consciousness in the citizens. This construction also took place through “the
emergence of more or less large groups of cadres dedicated to the ‘national
idea’, publishing national journals and other literature, organising national
societies, attempting to establish educational and cultural institutions” (p. 115).
Anderson’s Imagined Communities specifically stresses the importance of the
invention of modern printing presses and distribution networks for newspapers,
journals, books and pamphlets which allowed for the dissemination of print
material and allowed the subsequent enculturation of citizens into an “imagined
community” of the nation to become so successful.
According to the influential sociologist Anthony Giddens, the rise of the
print culture and the increasing reliance on “mediated experience”21 is also
partly responsible for the state of “self-reflexive modernity”, which marks
18 Klaus Eder, ‘Integration through Culture: The Paradox of the Search for a European Identity’,
in European Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects, ed. by Klaus
Eder and Bernhard Giesen (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 222-269 (p. 226).
19 Hans Jörg Trenz, ‘”Quo vadis Europe?” Quality newspapers struggling for European unity’,
Paper presented at the Workshop ‘One EU- Many Publics?’ (Stirling, 5-6 February 2004), pp. 1-
22.
20 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London: Abacus, 1975, repr. 1999); Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev.
and Extended edn. (London: Verso, 1991).
21 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 4.
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modern societies today. The idea that self-reflexivity is a distinctly modern
phenomenon has been questioned by sociologists such as Richard Jenkins and
Kath Woodward, who have remarked that Giddens’s claim “may tell us more
about contemporary self-indulgence and introspection, than about historical
detail”.22 After all, Jenkins remarks, throughout history we can find a “venerable
philosophical discourse about identity”, as well as “variety of religious and legal
traditions which are recognisably reflexive about identity”.23 That said,
Giddens’s claims remain an influential and often used axiom for the process of
identity formation. He writes:
[i]n the post-traditional order of modernity, and against the backdrop of
new forms of mediated experience, self-identity becomes a reflexively
organised behaviour. The reflexive project of the self, which consists in
the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical
narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered
through abstract systems. (p. 5)
Thus understood, European identity has no recourse to a single “unreflected”
narrative, an uncontested tradition or a self-evident founding myth, which was
so relevant to the national identity formation. The very proposition that values,
cultural traditions or characteristics are a seemingly natural and pre-ordained
part of communal identity are in Eder’s view an “atavistic” notion (‘Integration
through Culture’, p. 230). European identity can unfold only on the premise that
it is a continuous exercise in invention and self-reflection. Hence, identity
studies in the European context, as I have indicated above, stress the notion
that identities are nothing but a representational construct, dependent on
theoretical modelling and discursive manipulation while being less concerned
with exploring the possible, “objective” commonalities on which these
representations are based. The historian J.G.A Pocock has summed up this
22 Kath Woodward, Understanding Identity (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 2.
23 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (Routledge: London, 1996), p. 9. For a detailed exploration of
philosophical and religious approaches to the notion of identity see the book by Charles Taylor
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (CUP: Cambridge, 1989), which
explores the “making” of identity through a historical-philosophical lens.
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observation in the rather tart remark that “there is a habit at present of putting
the words ‘the invention of’ before the name of anything we want to discuss.”24
With reference to European identity studies this means that the concern
is not so much to explore whether European identity is “invented”, but to ask
why and for what purposes we choose to “invent” a particular sense of identity,
and to analyse the intermediary processes of language and discourse by which
- to use the term favoured by social and political scientists today - such an
identity is “constructed”. It has been formulated by the theorists Christiansen,
Jorgensen and Wiener as follows: “[i]f the study of identity formation is accepted
as a crucial component of constructivist research, the role of language and of
discourse becomes crucial”.25 Discourse is crucial because it is herein that
identities are seen to be expressed and developed in a cohesive and systematic
manner. Habermas, too, stressed this point in a 1974 speech, tellingly entitled
‘Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?’, in which he noted that
identity can only take shape in the form of a “discursive and experimental”
process and that “[c]ollective identity can only be grounded in […]
communication processes by which identity formation becomes a continuous
learning process.”26
Identity is therefore conceived not as passive identification with values,
norms and ideals but as something actively determined through “‘categories of
ascription and identification’”27 by the actors themselves. Michael Billig suggests
24 J.G.A Pocock, ‘Some Europes in Their History’, in The Idea of Europe (see Pagden, above),
pp. 55-71 (p. 55).
25 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, ‘The Social Construction of
Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (4) (1999), 528-544 (p. 541). The initial theoretical
link between communication processes and identity formation has been systematically
established as early as 1953 in Karl Deutsch’s study Nationalism and Social Communication.
Deutsch sought to establish through a quantitative study that the level of communication
processes that take place in the media of a national community bears a direct correlation to the
sense of social cohesion, understanding and trust amongst the members of such a community.
Although Deutsch’s work was in the first instance a study of nationalism and does not yet
operate with the term “identities”, his study has become a seminal and influential work in the
field. See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the
Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T Press, 1953, repr. 1978).
26 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?’, Telos, 19 (1974), 91-
103 (p. 99).
27 Fredrik Barth, ‘Introduction’, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of
Culture Difference (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), pp. 9-38, quoted here from Siân Jones,
‘Discourses of Identity in the Interpretation of the Past’, in Cultural Identity and Archaeology:
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that in order to study identity “investigators should examine how people make
claims about themselves – the groups to which they claim to belong and those
to which they claim not to belong.”28
Identity is not understood as a latent psychological state but rather is
revealed in the manner in which people speak or write about themselves: the
groups to “which they claim to belong to”, as mentioned above, the values they
identify with, the ideals that they aim to project, their perceptions of the past and
the aspirations of the future. It is perceived as something to be expressed,
formed and staged, not pre-given and ordained. Identity is understood as being
contingent and preliminary, not fixed and solid; the outcome of communication
processes and discursive practices, not a wordless common understanding. In
short, it is something that is not measurable through one particular instantiation,
but can be understood as “anonymous, unnoticed permeation of our ways of
thinking and talking and making sense of the social world” (Brubaker and
Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, p. 16).
2.2.1 European Identity in the Public Sphere
Having established these premises, I will relate the question of European
identity back to the public sphere to see why, as the previous chapter has
suggested, the latter is considered such a relevant locus for a process of
European identity formation. Two points are noteworthy here. Firstly, and
crucially, the procedural aspects of debate, discussion and self-critique relate
closely to the ways in which European identity is seen to develop: not on the
basis of spontaneous, natural emotions, but as the result of deliberative
processes which could “provide the basis for European identity as a reflexive
project.”29 The model of the EPS with all the inbuilt “safety-measures” relating to
the construction and expression of European identity in the form of rational
The Construction of European Communities, ed. by Paul Graves-Brown, Siân Jones and Clive
Gamble (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 62-81.
28 Michael Billig, ‘From Code to Utterances: Cultural Studies, Discourse and Psychology’, in
Cultural Studies in Question, ed. by Marjorie Ferguson, Peter Golding (London: Sage
Publications, 1997), pp. 205-227 (p. 208).
29 Risto Heiskala, ‘Our Time: Europe in the Age of Global Networks and Flowing Identities’, in
Will Europe Work? Integration, Employment and the Social Order (see Kohli, Novak, above),
pp. 111-127 (p. 124).
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deliberation and the potential for self-reflection, rather than potentially
unchecked allegiances, therefore recommends it as a desirable locus for a self-
reflexive, mutually agreed “constructed” European identity.
This understanding is implicit in Furio Cerutti’s definition of identity,
which, he points out, is
not something that can be established from outside the group, […] it must
be felt as such in a more or less clear manner by the group’s members,
who engage in private exchange and public debate about how to
determine those values and to modify them when circumstances have
changed and require a change of consciousness.30
Along these same lines Calhoun and Fraser have restated the belief in the
centrality of the public sphere for identity formation, since “[i]t is crucial to create
public space within which people may engage each other in discourse – not just
to make decisions, but to […] make and remake their own identities.”31 And
Fraser notes that in her view “public discursive arenas are among the most
important and underrecognized sites in which social identities are constructed,
deconstructed, and reconstructed.”32
An even more outspoken champion of the centrality of the public sphere
is Klaus Eder, who alleges that communication within the public sphere has
replaced the role of the state or religion in generating cultural meaning and,
indeed, a sense of one’s own identity. In his view, intercultural communication
within Europe provides the defining platform from which a shared understanding
can emerge and a (contingent) self-reflexive identity can be staged and
communicated (‘Integration through Culture’, pp. 231-234).
A second reason for the popularity of the European public sphere model for
European identity formation lies in its theoretical ability to contain and integrate
a diversity of voices, rather than to give preference to one dominant model. This
point is especially pertinent in the context of Europe’s diverse cultural
30 Furio Cerutti, ‘Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction’, in A Soul for
Europe, ed. by Furio Cerutti, Enno Rudolph (Leuven, Stirling: Peeters, 2001), pp. 1-31 (p. 4).
31 Craig Calhoun, ‘Nationalism, Political Community and the Representation of Society: Or, Why
Feeling at Home is not a Substitute Public Space’, European Journal of Social Theory, 2 (2)
(1999), 217-231 (p. 228).
32 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, in Habermas and the Public Sphere (see
Calhoun, above), pp. 109-143 (p. 140, Footnote 24).
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background which supports the idea that no single European identity exists,
merely the sum of multiple, partly overlapping and sometimes conflicting identity
models. As the following section will demonstrate, this is not only current
academic orthodoxy, but also “a recurrent theme of European religious,
philosophical and political thought”.33 What is more, it is the officially sanctioned
policy of the European Union, whose cultural policy bears the slogan “Unity in
Diversity”.34 Craig Calhoun argues convincingly that a public sphere on the
European level allows for these diverse voices to find expression.
Public discourse depends on articulating differences - crucially
differences of opinion; potentially but not necessarily also differences of
group identity. […] What we know as ‘public’ discourse is that in which
ideas, opinions and identities are made clear and subjected to more or
less open discussion – ideally, perhaps, to rational-critical discussion.35
In other words, the debate taking place in the public sphere arises on the basis
of heterogeneous but equally valid opinions between participants, rather than
assuming an uncritical commonality between them. Thus, the virtual space of
the public sphere allows for the fruitful expression of matters as complex,
multiple and potentially conflictual as European identity, since it is a space that
does not presume sameness but allows for, and welcomes differences. The
idea that diverse discourses are engaged in a debate with each other as equals,
I would argue, corresponds to the European aspiration not to privilege one
dominant culture, but to create a space in which the European cultures can
practice their creed of “Unity in Diversity”.
Whether this understanding of identity formation in a public sphere as
outlined above does in fact adequately capture the processes evident in the
journals, is the focus of this study.
33 Hans Jörg Trenz, ‘”Quo vadis Europe?” Quality newspapers struggling for European unity’,
Paper presented at the Workshop ‘One EU- Many Publics?’ (Stirling, 5-6 February 2004), pp. 1-
22 (p.17).
34 See Melissa Pantel, ‘Unity-in-Diversity. Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy’, in Legitimacy and
the EU: The Contested Polity, ed. by Thomas Banchoff, Mitchell P. Smith (London: Routledge,
1999), pp. 46-66.
35 Craig Calhoun, ‘Nationalism, Political Community and the Representation of Society: Or, Why
Feeling at Home is not a Substitute Public Space’, European Journal of Social Theory, 2 (2)
(1999), 217-231 (p. 222)
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2.3 European Identity as Political Ideology and Philosophical Ideal
2.3.1 Europe’s Contested Historical Sources
The second part of this chapter indicates some of the historical sources of
European identity in order to contextualize the references and starting points of
discussion as they occur in the journals. Moreover, it will begin to shed some
light on the question as to “why” and for “what purposes” certain models of
identities are being requisitioned in these discourses.
There have been many attempts to define the historical origins and
values in which Europeans “recognize themselves”, which involve competing
claims about what kind of historical narrative should be told and highlighted.
Numerous interpretations are offered, for example, about the mechanisms by
which a convergence or ‘Europeanization’ of the continent is said to have come
about. Historians point with different emphasis to the development of trade and
commercial networks,36 intellectual and artistic exchanges,37 as well as to the
history of conquests and wars as catalysts for convergence.
Take the account by Anthony Pagden, who points to humanistic
principles, civilisational progress, and the non-coercive forces of trade and the
arts as having shaped the Europe of today. He mentions the great commercial
trade routes of Europe which led to the establishment of political unions and
resulted in a shared political culture. Moreover, he writes, Europe has been
since the eighteenth century increasingly committed to a life of civility and the
liberal arts. The Enlightenment brought about guarantees of individual
autonomy, individual property rights and secularization. Pagden concludes that
today Europe stands as a guarantor for peace and human rights in the
international community. While he concedes that “Europeans have a shared
history of antagonisms to overcome” (‘Introduction’, p. 20) and have been “one
of the most belligerent groups of people” (p. 14), he identifies the “perennial
36 The emphasis on trading routes and centres of commerce as places of European exchange
and understanding is explored in Ferdinand Seibt, Die Begründung Europas: Ein
Zwischenbericht über die letzten tausend Jahre (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 2005).
37 For an account of how European art forms have cross-fertilized each other and spread over
the continent see Fernand Braudel, ‘Unity in Europe’, in A History of Civilizations, pp. 399-427.
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quest for peace” (p. 14) as the victorious and ultimately redeeming aspect of
European identity.
A different perspective is offered by philosopher Peter Sloterdijk who
asserts that the catalyst for all the cultural and political processes that led to the
“Europeanization” of the continent were the conquests of changing European
empires with their drive to claim, colonise, influence and transform their
conquests.38 In his view the Roman Empire proved to be the leading model for
all subsequent empires of imposing power and thus unifying what is Europe
today. These conquests included acts of “transference” (p. 34), as the
imposition of unified political and administrative structures on hitherto disparate
regions led to a convergence of experiences. In other words, Europe was not
unified through acts of intellectual exchange or ideas but through the driving
forces of coercion and conquest.
Yet, as Yasemin Soysal points out in her study of the depiction of
European history in contemporary school textbooks, even acts of conquests
and wars can be construed as occasions for dialogue, conflict resolution and
intercultural understanding rather than as sheer displays of power. She notes
that “the Crusades are taught not simply as holy wars and conquests but as
occasions for cultural exchange and learning between Europeans and other
civilizations”.39
These competing views and interpretations are not always mutually
exclusive, but since these narratives also offer a window onto the current self-
perception of Europe, accusations of conducting a “politics of history” are
inevitable when the positive and heroic European civilisational ideals of
enlightened humanism and intercultural exchange are highlighted. Historian
Mark Mazower points out that the divisions, cleavages and ruptures, as well as
Europe’s history of wars and other “darker” aspects including colonialism,
imperialism, and racism belong to this history just as much, but are too often
38 Peter Sloterdijk, Falls Europa erwacht (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 32-35.
39 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, ‘Locating Europe’, in European Societies, 4 (3) (2002), 265-284 (p.
275). For a further discussion on current teaching of European history especially in schools, see
Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, (see Beck, Grande, above), pp. 164-
168.
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neglected or conveniently omitted. Both factors have to be given their due merit,
he notes, especially when considering the more recent European history.
The intellectual tradition which identifies Europe with the cause of liberty
and freedom goes back many centuries. But […] it is hard to deny that
what has shaped Europe in this century is not a gradual convergence of
thought and feeling, but on the contrary a series of violent clashes
between antagonistic New Orders.40
Any attempt to tell a narrative of European history as the basis of its identity
today is therefore invariably fraught and contested. Some of the historical
narratives, which as the following chapters will show feature in Esprit and
Merkur and to a lesser degree in NLR, can be adumbrated as follows.41
Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem are the place names that Paul Valéry evoked in
his essay ‘La crise de l’Esprit’42 to denote the cultural, political and civilisational
influences that have shaped Europe. He cites Roman influence as providing a
model for our understanding of law and an organised state; Greek influence as
responsible for the virtues of intelligence, clarity, intellectual rigour and
discipline, as well as the creation of science, and, finally, the spread of
Christianity as providing a sense of morality. The blending of the Graeco–
Roman civilization is thus responsible for a Europe based on a common system
of law which is then moulded by a common religion into the European
“civilisation”.43 This “three sources” doctrine was hugely influential amongst
intellectuals and advocates for a united Europe during the First World War; the
perhaps most politically engaged figure being the Count Richard Coudenhove-
Kalergi, who also actively lobbied for a “United Europe”.44 It remains a relevant
40 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 1998), p.
403.
41 For a comprehensive historical overview of intellectual constructs of Europe see Norman
Davies, ‘Introduction’, in Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997). For a schematic overview
on contemporary European identity concepts, see Theodora Kostakopoulou, Citizenship,
Identity and Immigration in the European Union. Between Past and Future (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2001).
42 Paul Valéry, ‘La crise de l’Esprit’, Variété I (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), pp. 9-33.
43 See Gérard-Francois Dumont, Anselm Zurfluh, Die Identität Europas: Werte für eine
gemeinsame Zukunft (Schaffhausen: Novalis, 2001), p. 16.
44 Coudenhove-Kalergi was also the driving force behind a monthly cultural journal Paneuropa,
in which the idea of a “United Europe” was promulgated. See Daniel C. Villanueva, ‘Richard von
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entry point from which to explore European history, and to understand the
legacies which have shaped it until today.
For example, Anthony Pagden has pointed to Christianity as providing
the dominant mark on the development of Europe that outlasted “the collapse of
the political structures of the Graeco-Roman world”.45 Similarly, the late Hugh
Seton- Watson has pointed out that Christendom is inseparably intertwined with
the notion of Europe, since “the main strands in European culture have come
through Christendom, from Hellas, Rome, Persia and the Germanic north as
well as from Christianity itself” (‘What is Europe, Where is Europe?’, p. 16).
Importantly, these three sources have also provided the justification for the
numerous instances of “othering” on grounds of religion throughout the
centuries. At various, repeated points in time, regions such as the Balkans,
Russia and Turkey, found themselves designated as the non-European
“barbarians” or “infidels” (p. 10).
While Christianity provided one of the unifying ideals, it was also
responsible for major sources of tension and splits within Europe, between
Roman Catholicism and the Greek Orthodox Church, as well the separation of
areas under Ottoman Muslim rule, and a split into a predominantly Protestant
Northern Europe and a Catholic-dominated Southern Europe. Norman Davies
notes that the term “Europe” derived, in fact, from the concept of ‘Christendom’.
In the wake of the wars of religion, and crucially in the early phase of the
Enlightenment, Davies observes “it became an embarrassment for the divided
community of nations to be reminded of their common Christian identity”
(Europe, p. 7). The concept ‘Europe’ at this point fulfilled the need for a more
secular, more neutral designation and “gradually supplanted Christendom as
the cultural frame of reference”.46
Even the Enlightenment period, during which Europe was transformed
from a predominantly, religious order into a largely secular one, can be
understood, John Gray argues, as an offprint off the very Christian culture it
Coudenhove-Kalergi's "Pan-Europa" as the Elusive "Object of Longing"’, Rocky Mountain
Review of Languages and Literature, 59 (2) (2005), pp. 67-80.
45 Anthony Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’, in The Idea of Europe (see Pagden, above),
pp. 33-55 (p. 35).
46 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 30.
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aimed to outgrow. In the Enlightenment’s emphatic emphasis on the capacity of
knowledge, reason and the appliance of science to emancipate humanity, Gray
sees “a promise of salvation that is a secular version of Christianity’s”.47
Consequently, the “self-image of Enlightenment as a universal movement”
could in fact be more adequately described “as a secular version of a Western
religion” (p. 50). Yet it is the Enlightenment’s purported universal validity claim
which provides much of its contested legacy today. In these interpretations the
Enlightenment is credited with positive developments, social progress, political
liberalism, the notion of power based on reason rather than will (which informs
of course also Habermas’s account of the public sphere); and the cherished
ideals enshrined by the French Revolution of equality, liberty and fraternity. All
these are seen to owe their intellectual debt to the Enlightenment and are
qualified as universal, rather than distinctly “European” values.
However, this one-sided view of the Enlightenment has of course been
dented and subverted by those experiences of the twentieth century symbolized
in the names of “Verdun and Auschwitz”, which put to an end the era of
progress and hope for the “moral betterment of humanity”.48 In the wake of
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s seminal work Dialectic of Enlightenment,49 the
Enlightenment was credited not only with progress and emancipation, but also
responsible for developments of nationalism, imperialism and totalitarianism.
Simply put, processes of terror and emancipation were seen as two sides of the
same coin.
Thus whilst the Enlightenment remains a relevant point of reference, one
can discern amongst intellectuals informed by the “descent into barbarism” a
cautious and mindful attitude towards invoking Enlightenment ideals for the
purpose of formulating a progressive European identity. For example, historian
Konrad Jarausch points out, that a European framework should be construed as
a “Spannungsfeld zwischen befreienden, zivilisatorischen Aspirationen und
47 John Gray, ‘Enlightenment Humanism as a Relic of Christian Monotheism’, in 2000 Years and
Beyond (see Gifford, above), pp. 35-50 (p. 37).
48 Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Progress and Abyss: Remembering the Future of the Modern World’, in
2000 Years and Beyond (see Gifford, above), pp. 16-34 (p. 22).
49 Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, transl. by John Cumming, 2nd
edn. (London: Verso, 1986).
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schrecklichen Verbrechen”.50 Habermas, too, points out that any successful
European identity must be based on the “Fähigkeit zur selbstkritischen
Auseinandersetzung mit ‘bellizistischer Vergangenheit’”.51 In the same vein, the
Swiss intellectual Adolf Muschg, rather than invoking the values of the
Enlightenment unconditionally or triumphantly, appeals to reason and self-
critique as the only available defence against the seeds of self-destruction that
these values potentially entail. He points out warily that a productive self-doubt
and continuous critique have been and must remain part of the guiding
principles of European dialogue and identity formation.52 Note also how this
hesitation and ambivalence about European identity formation continues until
this day. In an editorial published in 2006 in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the
Swedish journalists Rolf Gustavsson and Richard Schwartz urge caution
towards any idea of an integrated European identity which in their view is a
dangerous idea
weil die Vorstellung eines einigen Europa –eine Art Vereinigten Staaten
von Europa – auf der Idee einer zu vollendenden Utopie beruht und jede
Utopie zum Totalitarismus neigt. Europa hat noch einige Hypotheken
abzutragen, die es sich durch seine Versuche erworben hat, Utopien zu
verwirklichen, auch wenn die Versuche längst kompromittiert sind; es ist
nicht allzu lange her, dass Hitler und Stalin ein einiges Europa schaffen
wollten.53
2.3.2 Current European Identity Models
The experience of totalitarianism and the Holocaust have not only shaped the
attitudes towards the ideal of moral progress, but are beginning to emerge -
seemingly paradoxically - as the basis of a common European framework of
remembrance. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia observes that “wars themselves
were a dividing factor; the interpretation of the wars by the Europeanists,
50 Konrad Jarausch, ‘Zeitgeschichte zwischen Nation und Europa. Eine transnationale
Herausforderung’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 39 (2004), 3-10 (p. 10).
51 As noted by Jens Hacke, ‘Wir-Gefühle: Repräsentationsformen kollektiver Identität bei Jürgen
Habermas’, Mittelweg 36, 16 (2008-2009), 12-32 (p. 26).
52 See Adolf Muschg, Was ist europäisch? Reden für einen gastlichen Erdteil (Munich: Beck,
2005).
53 Rolf Gustavsson, Richard Schwartz, ’Die Unvollendete: Geduld mit Europa!’, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 12 January 2006, p. 11.
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however, has become a supremely unifying factor”.54 Consider on this point this
carefully-worded question: “les guerres de notre siècle n’ont elles pas contribué
aussi, du fait des expériences similaires vécues pendant ces instants tragiques,
à l’émergence d’une conscience voire d’une identité des Européens?”.55
The extent to which one can – or indeed should – shape a common
identity out of these experiences, especially the Second World War, is of course
contested since it opens up many grey zones over the extent of resistance and
collaboration in the European countries during that time. Tony Judt has argued
that, immediately after the war, European countries created their own myths, in
which they presented themselves without fail as “victims” of German aggression
and deliberately suppressed the extent of collaboration and collusion that had
taken place.56 A resistance myth emerged that was built on the desire not only
to move forward but to conform to the pressure from the Allies, in which the
need to maintain the myth of an “ethically respectable past” (p. 314) was
imperative. Judt maintains that this “Vichy Syndrome” can be applied by and
large to most European countries – Great Britain excluded. With the collapse of
the Eastern Bloc, however, old certainties have given way to new, more
complex interpretations that undermine these impeccable myths of resistance
and victimhood.
Of course, national collective memories remain strong, but the Second
World War and especially the Holocaust are arguably emerging as defining
reference points of the European twentieth century experience. Ulrich Beck, for
example, argues that it is imperative to work through the experiences of
dictatorship, of concentration camps and gulags into a “European common
framework of remembrance” (Das kosmopolitische Europa, p. 203). Others go
so far as to suggest that the “Europeanization” of the memory of the twentieth
54 Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, ‘European Nationalism and European Union’, in The Idea of
Europe (see Pagden, above), pp. 171-190 (p. 179).
55 Robert Frank, Antoine Fleury, ‘Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire des Européens: Leur
effet sur leur conscience d’être Européen’, in Identité et Conscience Européennes (see Girault,
above), pp. 149-155 (p. 149).
56 Tony Judt, ‘The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe’, in The
Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath, ed. by István Deák, Jan T.
Gross and Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 293-325. On the
ambivalent role of the Holocaust in modern European memory see also ‘The House of the
Dead: An Essay on Modern European Memory’, in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945
(London: William Heinemann, 2005), pp. 803-831.
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century is a development with “enormous potential” that could serve to “de-
essentialise the concept of national identity”.57
Others contend that such a historically based identity presents a potentially
divisive, rather than a cohesive force, and advocate that a modern European
identity should be based instead on ‘civic’ principles. Habermas is the most
prominent of the numerous political and social scientists who advocate a
European civic identity based on “constitutional patriotism”,58 which entails an
allegiance to a common European political culture based on an international
rule of law, respect for human rights and commitment to democratic practices.
Such a civic understanding of Europe, Habermas maintains, is already partly in
existence and could thus become the basis for a new sense of European
identity which could be further underpinned by the introduction of a European
citizenship59 in order to render such an identity more tangible and less abstract.
Sceptics point out that these civic principles are built purely on
“postnational and liberal values”,60 which need not necessarily correspond to
the views of the large majority of Europeans. Equally, one must wonder whether
these values – democracy, human rights, and the rule of law – are not in fact
coterminous with more generally “Western” values. Yet this model is an attempt
to capture and identify civic values as the basis for a European identity, which
would conveniently strengthen support for a political agenda of establishing a
postnational form of governance that has, in the view of its proponents, left
behind the potentially divisive cultural and historical baggage of the nation
states.
57 Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, ‘Apologias for the Nation-State in
Western Europe since 1800’ in Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800, ed. by
Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 3-15 (p.
13).
58 See Jürgen Habermas‚ ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, NLR, 11 (2001), 5-26.
59 For a discussion on European citizenship see: Gerard Delanty, ‘Conclusion: Towards Post-
National Citizenship’, in Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (see Delanty, above), pp. 156-
163.
60 Thomas Risse, ‘European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have we Learned’, in
Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, ed. by Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas
Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefields, 2004), pp. 249-271 (p. 257).
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Yet another model is based on the theme of social solidarity as the central plank
of a European identity which would foster a shared feeling of Gemeinschaft, of
collectivity amongst Europeans. As René Girault notes “se sentir Européen,
c’est se sentir solidaire des autres Européens” (Identité et Conscience, p. 204).
This model, advocated primarily by some thinkers of the political Left in Europe,
proposes social solidarity as a means to overcome economic inequalities. Since
the currently dominant free-market and deregulationist economic policies have
led to increasing income gaps and levels of social protection within Europe,
European-wide rather than nation-wide redistribution policies and welfare
mechanisms are required, in order to provide the basis of a shared sense of
community based on collective responsibilities and duties of social justice,
rather than merely on a shared sense of consumerism.61 As the
abovementioned Girault notes: “[l]a société de consommation européenne ne
suscite pas encore une conscience européenne” (‘Les trois sources de
l’identité’, p. 205). Thus, a European identity would be based upon fostering a
Europe-wide social solidarity, as this is more likely to command emotional
legitimacy and to instil an enduring commitment than the vapid promises of a
common market.
The notion of solidarity is also crucial to a model of European identity
formulated primarily as an acknowledgement and recognition of the “Other”.
Since 1989 especially the encounter with the “Other” has proved a renewed
challenge to Europe’s self-image. Europe’s initial reluctance or inability to
incorporate Eastern European experiences into a common European identity
was, according to Delanty, the first in a line of heavy-handed encounters with
the “Other” (Inventing Europe, pp. 130-156). In recent years, this has been
61 Habermas has written extensively on the topic of social solidarity and the need for
redistributive policies on a European scale amongst others in ‘The European Nation-State and
the Pressures of Globalization’, NLR, 35 (1999), 45-60; ‘Der europäische Nationalstaat – Zu
Vergangenheit und Zukunft von Souveränität und Staatsbügerschaft’, in Die Einbeziehung des
Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996), pp. 128-154. See
also Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande, ‘Ungleichheit und Anerkennung: Gesamteuropäische Konflikte
und ihre politische Dynamik’, in Das kosmopolitische Europa (see Beck, Grande, above), pp.
258-298, and in Étienne Balibar, ‘Europe: Vanishing Mediator’, in We, the People of Europe:
Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans. by James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004), pp. 203-237.
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supplanted by the concern of how to react to the presence of around fifteen
million Muslims living in the European Union.62 Their religious and cultural
otherness is perceived as a test of a purportedly secular, progressive, liberal
mainstream European identity. “For over a thousand years“, Delanty writes,
“Europe was shaped by Christianity, now the question is whether it will be able
to absorb an Islamic identity“ (Inventing Europe, p. 140).
Since an overarching synthesis of European identity is lacking, the
recognition and acknowledgement of different cultural identities is put forward
as the binding common denominator. After all, it is proposed, European identity
does not inevitably “entail an ideological crusade against the other” (Cerutti,
‘Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans, p. 6). Rather, “[t]he
acknowledgment of differences, the reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in
her otherness – can also become a feature of a common identity”, suggest
Habermas and Derrida.63 This cosmopolitan ideal of recognising and respecting
the “Other” has been developed amongst others by Étienne Balibar and
Jacques Derrida. The latter insists that it is in fact Europe’s duty to welcome
foreigners “in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their
alterity”.64 The acceptance of difference is phrased by Derrida as a moral duty,
which could provide a common moral purpose for Europeans and define their
identity. The intellectual/philosophical discourse that develops a vision of a
cosmopolitan solidarity maintains that the acknowledgement of the Other is the
only viable way of affirming a sense of cultural identity that is “not based on
exclusion or on a contrast with others” (Passerini, ‘From the Ironies of Identity’,
p. 208). Rather, the acknowledgement of difference is perceived as an essential
requirement for a shared sense of mutual recognition and cohesion. If
Europeans can reach a consensus on the recognition of the Other, this premise
can become the basis of a European identity that values multiplicity and
accommodates the particularities of different cultures over the superiority of one
62 This is the number given by Tony Judt in Postwar, p. 741.
63 Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together Plea
for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe’, in Old Europe New Europe Core
Europe (see Levy, above), pp. 3-14 (p. 9).
64 See Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe, and Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading:
Reflections on today’s Europe, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
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dominant culture. Such an understanding depends of course on a high degree
of ethical abstraction; hence it is questionable to what extent it would provide a
viable, broadly accepted base for European identity.
2.3.3 “Intractable Disunity”?
While historical events and their interpretations continue to shape and inform
discussions of European identity, and while numerous models of how to
formulate such an identity today have been put forward, in the final analysis, no
dominant, commanding ideal or framework is seen to exist. Edgar Morin
contends that it would be preferable to abandon “toute idée d’une essence ou
substance européenne première, chasser l’idée d’une réalité européenne qui
précède la division et l’antagonisme. Il faut au contraire l’y inscrire” (Penser
l’Europe, p. 27).
Thus, European history and ideals are caught up in conflicting pathways
that emerge from the discrepancies between historical realities and intellectual
ideals; from the dynamics of conquest and empires against the dynamics of
exchange and interaction; from the advances of science, progress and
Enlightenment to a state of all-out war; and from cosmopolitan visions of
inclusion to fearful and regressive encounters with the Other. Arguably, these
conflicting currents and countercurrents and the constant destruction and
remaking of European values persist to this day, to the point that Delanty has
suggested that it “may quite well transpire that intractable disunity is the
condition for a European identity” (Inventing Europe, p. vii).
Davies also concludes that “Europe has had no unifying ideal; historians
cannot pretend otherwise” (Europe, p. 35). Hence, the existing models of
European identity outlined above should not be understood as descriptive
models, but as encompassing templates for political blueprints (social solidarity)
relevant to our age, philosophical ideals (the cosmopolitan recognition of
Otherness), or utopian visions of a Golden Age of Europe defined by Greek and
Roman cultural legacy. In different times and throughout history, Europe has
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served other concepts or purposes.65 Davies succinctly points out that the term
“Europe” has been
the product of complex exercises in ideology, of countless identity trips,
of sophisticated essays in cultural propaganda. It can be defined by its
advocates in almost any way that they think fit. Its elastic geography has
been inspired by the distribution of religions, by the demands of
liberalism and of imperialism, by the unequal progress of modernization,
by the divisive effects of world wars and of the Russian Revolution, and
by the self-centred visions of French philosophes, of Prussian historians,
and of British and American statesmen and educators [….]. On the brink
of the twenty-first century, one is entitled to ask in whose interests it may
be used in the future (Europe, p. 25).
This statement serves as a useful outlook to the discussion of the journals in the
following chapters: namely, that in all the debates about European identity we
must query which ideals or visions are being propagated, but also remain
mindful to what purpose and in “whose interest” they are being promulgated.
In this chapter, my aim was to outline current definitions of European identity,
and to outline the procedural aspects of deliberation and exchange that take
place in the public sphere as central to the articulation of European identity.
Subsequently, I provided some historical reference points relevant to European
identity models, which are nevertheless partial and based on selective,
invariably contested European values. Therefore, models of European identity
should best be understood as projections or as expressing ulterior political and
philosophical aspirations. Thus I have laid out the methodological framework of
the public sphere and clarified the conceptual and terminological emergence of
European identity in postwar Europe, together with the relevant theoretical
65 Jörg Requate has for example coined the term of Europe as an “appellative Instanz” – an
imaginary authority, to which intellectuals or persecuted religious or political refugees appealed
to in order to raise support for their political causes. He convincingly argues that throughout
history, regional or separatist movements called upon Europe as a mediator for struggles
between local and national interests or to attach more credence and importance to a regional
struggle. See Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18.
Jahrhundert, ed. by Jörg Requate, Martin Schulze Wessel (Frankfurt: Campus, 2002), and in
Ludger Klein, Christian Lahusen, ‘Identitäts und Gemeinschaftsbezüge als Herausforderung
europäischer Integration’, in Bürgschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa, ed. by A.
Klein, et al (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2003), pp. 251-257.
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approaches, and some historical sources and intellectual currents which the
term encapsulates.
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Chapter 3
Indicators of “Europeanization”? The Journals in Overview
3.1 Thematic Composition of the Journals
This chapter will provide some quantitative data on Esprit, NLR and Merkur
during the periods of 1989-92 and a decade later 2003-06. The aim is to gain a
systematic overview of the journals and to identify trends about European-
related articles. Specifically, the chapter seeks to assess to what extent the
journals use republished or commissioned articles from other European
countries in order to gauge whether the publications put the idea of a “textual
exchange” - requisite to a public sphere - into recognisable practice. Finally, this
chapter introduces some of the recurrent themes and main concerns of each
journal which will be analysed in more detail in relation to the question of
European identity in the subsequent textual analysis.
A bird’s-eye view of the thematic composition of each journal provides an initial
measure of the relative prominence of European-related articles. To this
purpose, each article between 1989-1992 and 2003-2006 was counted (see
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 below for the number of articles per journal) and
categorized according to one of the following thematic headings.
- European Politics
- International Politics
- Domestic Politics
- Culture
- Literature
- Theory
- History
- Science
- Economics
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- Religion / Theology
- Media
Table 1.1 Articles per Year and per Journal
1989-92 2003-06
Table 1.2 Mean Numbers of Articles per Issue
1989-92 2003-06
The length of the articles varies considerably in all of the journals, from six
pages up to 20-30 pages. Not included in this count are editorials and shorter
commentary pieces from Esprit’s “Journal” section. NLR’s significantly lower
article count is due to the journal’s bimonthly publication, whereas both Esprit
and Merkur publish eleven issues annually (Esprit publishes one double-issue
in the July-August months, and Merkur over the September-October period). In
Year Esprit NLR Merkur
1989
133 43 127
1990
126 47 143
1991
121 48 143
1992
108 53 132
Total 488 191 545
Year Esprit NLR Merkur
2003
146 57 156
2004
137 54 153
2005
159 52 152
2006
146 55 149
Total 588 218 610
Year Esprit NLR Merkur
1989
13.1 7.1 11.7
1990
13.8 7.8 13.0
1991
12.1 8.0 13.0
1992 10.3 8.8 12.0
Total 12.3 7.9 12.4
Year Esprit NLR Merkur
2003
12.1 9.5 13.0
2004
11.1 9.0 13.9
2005
13.2 8.6 13.8
2006 12.1 9.1 13.5
Total 12.1 9 13.5
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addition, NLR also publishes fewer articles in each issue (between 7.9 to 9
articles), compared to Esprit and Merkur (12.3 to 13.5 articles per issue). The
thematic distribution of the journals is presented in the figures below.
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Figure 1. Composition of themes in the journals: 1989-92 and 2003-06
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1.2 NLR
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1.3
MERKUR
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These figures confirm to a degree points already made in the introduction about
the profile of the journals. Merkur, for example, is to a much larger extent
concerned with literature, culture and history than its French and British
counterparts, while NLR and Merkur have a greater interest in theoretical
questions than Esprit. Unsurprisingly, given its ideological slant, NLR features
more articles on economic themes than the other journals. Although economic
discussions can also be found in the pages of Esprit, these discussions are
usually embedded in political texts and do not merit a category of their own. By
the same token, articles on the theme of religion and theology are prominent in
Esprit (six percent), but non-existent in either Merkur or NLR.
During 2003-06, Esprit publishes far fewer articles on culture and
literature than it did in 1989-92 in favour of more theoretical, often
philosophically-oriented articles; and there is a slight increase (two percent) in
articles dealing with religious or theological themes. Merkur’s theoretical and
literary concerns give way somewhat to many more political articles, of which I
will say more below. The biggest change in the overall composition of the
journal NLR is evident in relation to texts concerned with literature and culture
(an increase of ten and six percent respectively). This partly reflects a change in
editor from Robin Blackburn in 1992 to Susan Watkins in 2003-04, but also a
conscious decision towards a renewed focus on literary and cultural criticism,
which Perry Anderson spelled out as one of the new intellectual preoccupations
of the journal in a mission statement for the journal’s relaunch in 2000. 1
Esprit runs the most European articles during 1989-92 with 14 percent of
its articles on the topic. These are similar to NLR’s share of 13 percent, while
Merkur publishes by far the fewest articles about Europe. By comparison,
domestic politics account for six percent of the articles in Merkur and NLR, and
for 10 percent in Esprit. International coverage is strongest in NLR (22 per
cent), followed by Esprit with 17 percent and only three percent in Merkur.
Simply put, Esprit emerges as the most Europe-orientated publication of the
three journals; NLR is in the first place dedicated to international coverage and
1 Perry Anderson, ‘Renewals’, NLR, 1 (2000), 5-24.
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ranks domestic concerns much lower, while Merkur is more engaged with
domestic politics than with either Europe or the world at large during this period.
In 2003-06, Merkur increases its share of political articles by a large
amount, and European articles rise from three to seven percent, while its
international coverage rises from three to twelve percent. One of the main
factors behind this increase is, as we will see later on, the intense focus on the
US-led Iraq invasion in 2003. Thus, while the figures suggest that an increasing
focus on Europe takes place in Merkur – as Chapter Five will also highlight –
this rise takes place in line with an overall increase in political and international
articles.
At the same time, NLR’s interest in Europe and in domestic politics
diminishes (from 13 to eight percent and from seven to two percent), while its
already weighty international politics section increases from 22 to 32 percent.
This is consistent with NLR’s profile as an ever more international, rather than
primarily British publication.
Domestic politics remain important to Esprit during 2003-06 (nine
percent), and are now roughly on par with Merkur on domestic politics (eleven
percent). There is a drop in the amount of European Politics articles from 14 to
ten percent, but one must point out that Esprit publishes more theoretical and
philosophical discussions about Europe at this time which is not immediately
reflected in these numbers. As will become apparent in Chapter Five, Esprit’s
engagement with questions of European values and ethics increase in
relevance alongside politically informed discussions. Thus, although the political
articles related to Europe decrease during this time, the engagement with
Europe remains strong in more philosophically accented discussions.
3.2 Sample Articles
In total, 94 articles from the years 1989-92 and 117 articles from 2003-06 were
selected as the basis for the qualitative analysis in the following chapters.2 The
2 This includes some editorial articles from NLR and Esprit, as well as some shorter Esprit
articles from the journal’s ‘Journal’ section. See the chronological list of primary sources in the
bibliography for the complete list of articles.
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sample articles were chosen on the grounds that they must contain some form
of evaluative or argumentative treatment of Europe or the EU; in other words,
some framing of Europe in either a geopolitical, political, historical or identitarian
context. The sample includes not only articles that deal with Europe directly,
since this would result in a very limited account of the discussion, but also
included, with the intent to attain a more rounded picture, articles with an initially
different frame of reference: for example, a discussion of domestic politics that
leads onto a discussion of these concerns in a European context. In order to
show, from which initial frame of reference “Europe” was discussed, the articles
were categorized according to one of the following three rubrics:
a) Articles with an outright “European” theme;
b) Articles discussing primarily national issues but with reference to the
European framework;
c) Articles which discuss issues from a mostly theoretical or international
perspective that also make reference to European issues.
The first group includes articles such as ‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des
Douze’, ‘Überlegungen zur Europäischen Friedensordnung’, or ‘What’s Wrong
with Europe?’.3 The second rubric includes articles such as ‘The Ruins of
Westminster’ which discusses the crisis of British political life but includes
copious references to Britain’s future in the European Union; Merkur’s article
from 1990, ‘Zwei Staaten oder Einheit? Der dritte Weg als Fortsetzung des
deutschen Sonderweges’, which discusses the merits and risks of German
reunification, but also sketches out Germany’s future in Europe; and Esprit’s
article, ‘Sur les craintes françaises d’une Europe espace’, which engages with
primarily French attitudes and worries about European enlargement after the
2004 accession.4 The third rubric is represented by those articles which
approach a discussion about Europe from an initially theoretical perspective –
such as ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une identité postnationale?’ – or discuss it from an
3 Élie Cohen, ‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des Douze’, Esprit, 160 (1990), 57-75; Ernst-Otto
Czempiel, ‘Überlegungen zur Europäischen Friedensordnung’, Merkur, 505 (1991), 305-318;
Andrea Boltho, ‘What’s Wrong with Europe?’, NLR, 19 (2003), 5-27.
4 Robin Blackburn, ‘The Ruins of Westminster’, NLR, 191 (1992), 5-35; Ulrich Oevermann, ‘Zwei
Staaten oder Einheit? Der dritte Weg als Fortsetzung des deutschen Sonderweges’, Merkur,
492 (1990), 91-107; Christian Lequesne, ‘Sur les craintes françaises d’une Europe espace’,
Esprit, 322 (2005), 28-35.
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international framework, for example ‘Europa gegen Amerika. Entsteht die neue
Supermacht in der Alten Welt?’.5 The following tables provide a breakdown of
the sample articles according to these three rubrics and will establish which
‘entry point’ into Europe is most prevalent.
Table 2. Sample Articles According to Framework
3.1 ESPRIT 1989-92
ESPRIT 2003-06
5 Jean Marc Ferry, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une identité postnationale?’, Esprit, 164 (1990), 80-91; Tony
Judt, ‘Europa gegen Amerika. Entsteht die neue Supermacht in der Alten Welt?’, Merkur, 673
(2005), 375-387.
Esprit Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
Journal Editorial
1989 8 5 1 2 4 2
1990 14 3 6 5 4 2
1991 10 8 1 1 0 0
1992 9 5 2 2 4 0
Total 41 21 10 10 12 4
Esprit Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
Journal Editorial
2003 19 14 0 5 3 3
2004 17 13 1 3 2 1
2005 5 2 2 1 5 3
2006 13 8 3 2 1 2
Total 54 37 6 11 11 9
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3.2 NLR 1989-92
NLR 2003-06
3.3 MERKUR 1989-92
NLR Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
Editorial
1989 6 2 0 4 4
1990 7 2 0 5 3
1991 5 3 0 2 1
1992 6 2 1 3 1
Total 24 9 1 14 9
NLR Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
Editorial
2003 5 2 0 3 0
2004 4 2 0 2 0
2005 7 5 0 2 0
2006 4 3 0 1 0
Total 20 12 0 8 0
Merkur Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
1989 3 2 1 0
1990 11 2 6 3
1991 6 5 1 0
1992 9 7 1 1
Total 29 16 9 4
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MERKUR 2003-06
During 1989-92, slightly more than half of the sampled articles in each journal
operate within a European framework. However, the number of the articles
varies from year to year and does not follow a recognisable upward or
downward trend. In Esprit, the number of these articles remains relatively
constant over the years while NLR’s coverage of Europe peaks in 1990, only to
decline again in 1991. Only Merkur shows a quantitative increase which could
be cautiously interpreted as a shift from an indirect towards a more direct
engagement with European topics in the journal, yet “national issues” remain a
relevant entry point for a discussion of European issues. The reason, one can
surmise, is the imminent German reunification, a topic which accounts for
numerous articles and explains the predictably more inward-looking perspective
than in other journals during 1989-92.6 NLR, on the other hand, shows only a
marginal interest in discussions of Britain and Europe, compared to the much
more salient international framework. Esprit’s concern with Europe is more
even-handed and apparent in all three rubrics, suggesting that the issue is
pertinent throughout the period in question.
Significantly, all journals in the period increase their share of articles with
a European framework during 2003-06. Most striking is Merkur’s dramatic
decrease of articles with a national framework in favour of a much more
international outlook. In fact, the number rises to roughly 70 percent in Merkur
6 Discussed in articles such as: Ulrich Oevermann, ‘Zwei Staaten oder Einheit? Der dritte Weg
als Fortsetzung des deutschen Sonderweges’, Merkur, 492 (1990), 91-107; Karl Heinz Bohrer,
‘Und die Erinnerung der beiden Halbnationen’, Merkur, 493 (1990), 183-189.
Merkur Number of
Articles
European
Framework
National
Framework
International
Framework
2003 11 7 0 4
2004 9 5 0 4
2005 12 8 1 3
2006 11 10 1 0
Total 43 30 2 11
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and Esprit (68 percent for Esprit, 69 percent for Merkur) and to almost 60
percent in NLR. In contrast, none of the sampled articles from NLR during 2003-
06 discuss Europe within a national perspective. However, the national prism
remains strong in Esprit due in parts to heightened introspection after the
French No-Vote to the Constitutional Treaty, which account for numerous
articles on France’s role in the EU.7
If Europe is becoming increasingly the primary focus of the articles, one
might cautiously suggest that Europe has become more of a discernible and
relevant entity in its own right and less dependent on an initially national prism.
However, while a European framework is increasingly the primary point of
reference, one must also note that the number of relevant sample articles in
NLR actually decreases from 11.5 percent in 1989-92 to only 6.8 percent in
2003-06. Hence, while one can observe an increase in coverage on European
themes in the French and German publications, NLR’s overall number of
articles on Europe actually declines.
3.3 Authorship
The specific role of the journals in creating a transnational public space through
the introduction of foreign texts and authors is directly addressed by the journals
to a limited degree, if discussed at all. To NLR, the theme is of no relevance
and does not feature in any of its articles. For Merkur, the notion that textual
and intellectual exchange leaves much to be desired is “problematized” just
once, in an article from 1991 by Merkur’s editor Karl Heinz Bohrer. His piece,
aptly entitled “Europrovinzialismus”,8 explores the lack of exchange, particularly
in relation to French-German and German-British intellectual relations, and
concludes that a mentality of intellectual provincialism prevails within Europe,
which stifles intellectual openness and curiosity. Bohrer notes that the term non-
existent -“nichtexistierend” (p. 1046) - would probably correctly describe the
7 See the following articles by Marc Olivier Padis: ‘Une France sans vision de l’Europe?’, Esprit,
314 (2005), 6-13; ‘La France insulaire’, Esprit, 316 (2005), 47-53; ‘Le traité constitutionnel
passe, les questions restent’, Esprit, 326 (2006), 100-105.
8 Karl-Heinz Bohrer, ‘Provinzialismus (VI) Europrovinzialismus’, Merkur, 512 (1991), 1059-1068.
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state of German-French relations. These insights notwithstanding, Merkur
seems hardly compelled to pursue an intensification of intellectual exchange
within its own pages, as we will see below.
Esprit, though, does address the issue more forthrightly and pursues a
more proactive engagement than the other journals. For example, one of
Esprit’s “dossiers” from the December 1989 issue is the result of a collaboration
between Esprit and the bimonthly Italian cultural journal MicroMega, in which
contributors of this journal had produced a dossier about Italy, written by Italians
and subsequently translated into French, while Esprit’s authors had produced a
dossier about France that formed part of a MicroMega issue.9 In Esprit’s
foreword to the dossier, the European, rather than the bilateral dimension of this
exchange is explicitly foregrounded.
L’Europe culturelle consiste trop souvent à organiser des rencontres et
des colloques où l’on parle avec plus ou moins de bonheur de l’Europe
culturelle à venir. Conscients du poids de nos habitudes et des traditions
nationales, soucieux de ne pas nous précipiter, il est apparu opportun de
prendre le temps d’une meilleure connaissance réciproque […].10
Clearly, for Esprit the collaboration with other journals through texts and
translations is one way of giving shape to the desired “meilleure connaissance
réciproque”. Yet such a highly planned and organized form of textual exchange
in the form of an entire dossier between journals remains the exception; usually,
it is limited to individual articles.
As an indication of the level of textual exchange in the journals, the
tables below show how many articles are written by foreign authors from other
publications. However, one proviso must be made here, since the task of
determining who is “foreign” involves assigning a nationality to the authors in
these journals, who largely derive from a country’s intelligentsia, its literary
circles, or academia, and who, in several instances, have cosmopolitan
pedigrees and therefore publish, write or teach in more than one language. The
example of one regular Merkur contributor, Lord Ralph Dahrendorf, serves as
an illustration of this point. A German-born and German-educated sociologist
9 Dossier, ‘L’Italie derrière ses mythes’, Esprit, 157 (1989), 5-63.
10 ‘Sommaire’, Esprit, 157 (1989), 1-4 (p. 1).
95
and philosopher, once a member of the German parliament and Commissioner
in the European Commission in Brussels, he adopted British citizenship,
currently sits in the House of Lords and is affiliated with St Antony’s College,
Oxford, and the LSE. In his function as regular contributor to Merkur, he is a
frequent commentator on German politics and European issues. This begs the
question whether he is actually British, as his adopted citizenship would tell us,
or German, since he was born and raised there and maintains ties to Merkur. In
this context, the authors were categorized according to the cultural and
linguistic environment in which they now predominantly write, rather than solely
on the basis of their country of origin; however, the distinctions between
“national” and “non-national” authors are arguably more complex and subjective
than these numbers suggest. With this qualification in mind, some general
trends and observations about the journal’s exposure to foreign viewpoints
might still be discerned.
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Table 3. Percentage of Articles by Foreign Authors
4.1 ESPRIT 1989-92 2003-06
4.2 NLR 1989-92 2003-06
4.3 MERKUR 1989-92 2003-06
Esprit Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
1989
133 23 17.2
1990
126 16 12.6
1991
121 22 18.1
1992
108 21 19.4
16.8 Mean
Esprit Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
2003
146 25 17.1
2004
137 17 12.4
2005
159 16 10.4
2006
146 11 7.5
11.8 Mean
NLR Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
1989
43 14 32.5
1990
47 19 40.4
1991
48 24 50
1992
53 23 43.3
41.5 Mean
NLR Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
2003
57 34 59.6
2004
54 35 64.8
2005
52 32 61.3
2006
55 26 47.2
58.2 Mean
Merkur
Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
1989
127 8 6.2
1990
143 5 3.4
1991
143 6 4.1
1992
132 17 5.3
4.7 Mean
Merkur
Total
Number
of
Articles
Articles
Written by
Foreign
Authors
Percentage
2003
156 21 13
2004
153 13 8.4
2005
152 14 9.2
2006
149 9 6.0
9.5 Mean
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NLR consistently rates as the most international publication with a mean of 41.5
percent foreign authors during 1989-92, and this number increases to well
above half its writers during 2003-06. However, these numbers reflect a trend
towards an ever increasing international, but not European profile, since a large
share of its foreign writers are Americans. Again, this is concomitant with NLR’s
avowed “Internationalization”, which Perry Anderson spelled out in ‘Renewals’
from 2000: “for better or worse […] its [NLR’s] writers have continued to come
essentially from its homelands. This we would like to change. The time should
come when the contributors to NLR are as extra-Atlantic as its contents” (p. 24).
By 2003-2006, NLR has put this into effect; as the table shows, well over half of
its contributors are from abroad at this point in time.
Overall, Merkur is most closed off to foreign writers, but there is an
observable increase from a slim 4.7 percent to 9.5 per cent in 2003-06, which is
consistent with its greater share of European and international articles during
this time.
By contrast, Esprit reverses this trend and shows a decline in the number
of foreign contributors, from 16.8 percent to just below 12 percent. One reason
for this is that Esprit spends more time discussing matters closer to home,
chiefly the “French malaise” after the No-Vote in the Constitutional Referendum.
Secondly, as mentioned before, Esprit - unlike Merkur - publishes more articles
on philosophical and theoretical matters during 2003-06, in which it relies on
primarily French writers and intellectuals. One can infer, therefore, that although
the level of European articles increases between 1989 and 2006, this does not
translate into an increase in representation of voices from abroad.
3.4 Reprinted and Commissioned Foreign Articles
Following this general overview, I would like to focus more closely on how many
of the sample articles are republished and/or translated texts from other
publications or originally commissioned texts, as this will provide a more
accurate picture of the form of exchange undertaken.
Republished and/or translated texts are defined in this context as reprints
from daily newspapers or transcripts from conference speeches which the
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journals, especially NLR, draw on. This form of exchange is based on contact
between the respective editorial staff of the publications (or, in the case of
conference papers presumably with the speaker directly), and consists of
obtaining copyright and permission to translate and reprint articles. The editorial
input required consists then of translating and editing for the in-house style of
the journal in question. In a few instances such articles are preceded by a new
introduction, but in the vast majority of cases they are simply inserted into the
journal and the reference to the original place of publication is given only in a
footnote or at the end of the article.
Original contributions by foreign authors, however, depend on an existing
network between the journal’s editorial staff and an available pool of freelance
authors from which these texts are commissioned. What is more important,
these texts allow for a different dimension of incorporating foreign viewpoints
and perspectives.
Consider for example two texts from two 1989 issues of Esprit. One is
the article ‘L’Ostpolitik Française’ by Ingo Kolboom,11 originally published in the
German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 1 March 1989 and
reprinted and translated in Esprit’s June issue of the same year. The article is
presented without any introductory reference to the source of the article and
only a small reference to the original place of publication of the article given at
its end. In the text, Kolboom compares and contrasts German and French
policies towards Eastern Europe and concludes with the need to overcome the
political division between Eastern and Western Europe, a view in line with
Esprit’s concern at the time.
The other article, also from 1989, is ‘Incertitudes Polonaises’,12 and takes
the form of an interview between Esprit’s editors and Polish political scientist
Aleksander Smolar. Smolar is working at the CNRS (Centre national de la
recherche scientifique) and, during Poland’s transition period, acted as advisor
to the first post-communist prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Currently he is
11 Ingo Kolboom, ‘L’Ostpolitik Française, Esprit, 151 (1989), 121-124, translated from ‘Vorreiter,
Mahner, Bremser – und nun? Französische Ostpolitik von de Gaulle und Adenauer zu Mitterand
und Kohl’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 March 1989.
12 Aleksander Smolar, ‘Incertitudes polonaises: Entretien avec Aleksander Smolar’, Esprit, 157
(1989), 100-104.
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Chairman of the Stefan Batory Foundation, a political forum for Polish Western-
orientated intellectuals established in 1988 by the American financier and
philanthropist George Soros.13 In the interview, Smolar provides an account of
Poland’s transition towards capitalism from an economic, political and historical
perspective and offers a prognosis about the development of democracy in his
home country, which he – as a professor of political science in Paris and
attuned to French debates and cultural contexts – recounts here for Esprit’s
readership. His account of Polish history and of the current political transition
serves to make the case for Poland as an inalienable part of European
traditions to which it can now finally return; the deserved “retour à l’Europe” (p.
104). Smolar’s desire to overcome divisions between Eastern and Western
Europe, and to inscribe Eastern Europe as part of the whole of Europe, is not
unlike Kolboom’s argument, yet the texts reveal different ways in which these
views can be interpolated into the journals.
While the reprinting of an article published elsewhere can expose the
readership to potentially unfamiliar viewpoints, and implant “foreign” arguments
in national contexts, commissioned articles arguably leave more room for
another level of engagement and exchange of views. Contributors such as
Smolar can negotiate between French and Polish cultural contexts and frame
arguments for the readership in ways that will resonate with their own cultural
references and markers. Note that when he outlines the process of the
democratisation of Polish society, he refers to the French thinker Alexis de
Tocqueville to do so. He explains: “[l]a démocratisation de la société dans un
sens tocquevillien, qui s’effectue depuis la guerre, est également un facteur
favorable à la démocratie puisque la société est dominée par la culture de la
classe moyenne” (p. 104). Similarly, an article by an Austrian political scientist
of Polish descent on the democratic movements in Poland and Hungary asserts
that the inspiration for all Eastern European reform movements were French,
and by extension “European”, ideas: “Les ‘idées européennes’ des droits de
l’homme et du citoyen, nées de la Révolution française, sont le facteur commun
13Source: Stefan Batory Foundation Homepage
<http://www.batory.org.pl/english/about/activity.htm> [accessed 2 March 2007].
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à tous ces mouvements de réformes.”14 In these instances, the reference to
Tocqueville and to the French Revolution provide Esprit’s readership with an
instantly recognisable and meaningful reference for comparison.
Thus, commissioned articles provide an opportunity for the transposition
of arguments and ideas into different frameworks by those authors who can
navigate between different cultural contexts. Arguably, this rearticulation and
rephrasing of arguments enlivens discursive contact and an exchange of
viewpoints. Even if commissioned articles are an indicator of a more active
involvement, the translation and reprinting of articles from other publications
also displays the degree to which the journals are receptive to facilitating textual
exchange outside their own realm.
The following tables are based on the sample articles and show how
many commissioned or republished articles the journals print within their pages.
14 Andreas Pribersky, ‘L’identité nationale des mouvements démocratiques en Hongrie et en
Pologne’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 97-106 (p. 97).
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Table 5. Foreign Authorship in the Sample Articles
5.1 ESPRIT 1989-1992 2003-06
5.3 NLR 1989-1992 2003-06
5.3 MERKUR 1989-1992 2003-06
Esprit
Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
1989
8 2 2
1990
14 2 5
1991
10 0 1
1992
9 0 2
Total 41 4 10
Esprit
Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
2003
19 0 3
2004
17 0 2
2005
5 1 0
2006
13 2 1
Total 54 3 6
NLR
Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
1989
6 1 1
1990
7 1 1
1991
5 2 0
1992
6 0 2
Total 24 4 4
NLR
Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
2003
5 1 3
2004
4 0 2
2005
7 0 3
2006
4 0 1
Total 20 1 9
Merkur Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
1989
3 0 0
1990
11 2 0
1991
6 0 0
1992
9 2 0
Total 29 4 0
Merkur Articles
Reprinted/
Translated
Articles
Commissioned
Articles
2003
11 1 3
2004
9 1 0
2005
12 1 2
2006
11 0 0
Total 43 3 5
102
During 1989-92, Esprit leads the way in originally commissioned articles (23
percent of the sample articles), followed by NLR (12.5 percent) while Merkur
does not feature any such articles but relies instead only on translated articles
previously published elsewhere. Once more one can deduce that Esprit
emerges as most receptive to views from abroad, NLR takes the middle ground,
while Merkur seems least concerned with facilitating this form of textual
exchange.
Further, the origin of the source texts, especially during 1989-92, points to
sources from outside, rather than from within Europe. NLR does not reprint from
other publications directly but uses transcripts from conference papers at
international conferences in Latin America and the United States and, to a
lesser degree, Europe.15 It is revealing that Esprit makes use of only one article
from a German publication - a reprint from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung -
and one text originally given as a conference paper. The other two translated
articles are from arguably the best known intellectual journal, the New York
Review of Books.16 Similarly, Merkur also only translates one article from the
French Le Monde, but largely relies on US publications for its reprinted texts.17
However, the numbers alone say little on which topics foreign writers are
given a voice. A closer look at the topics on which they write is also revealing,
though. For example, NLR features most commissions from foreign writers
15 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead’, in NLR, 183 (1990), 50-62, originally
delivered as a paper at the colloquium ‘Ideology and Psychoanalysis’, University of California
(San Diego, 28 April 1990); Étienne Balibar, ‘Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and
Politics in Europe today’, NLR, 186 (1991), 5-20, originally delivered as a speech at the
congress on ‘Migration and Racism (Hamburg, 27-30 September 1990); Lucy Magri, ‘The
European Left between Crisis and Refoundation’, NLR, 189 (1991), 5-19, originally delivered as
a lecture on a seminar convened by the Instituto Cajamar and the Workers Party (São Paulo, 14
September 1991).
16 See above Ingo Kolboom, ‘L’Ostpolitik Française’, and János Kis, ‘Le défi de la démocratie en
Europe de l’Est’, Esprit, 156 (1989), 44-48, originally delivered as a paper at a conference to the
National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, May 1989); Fritz Stern, ‘L’Europe vue
d’outre-Atlantique’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 82-90, originally published in New York Review of Books,
7 December 1989; Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Dix considérations sur la nouvelle Europe’, Esprit, 163
(1990), 113-117; originally published in New York Review of Books, 14 June 1990.
17 Serge-Christophe Kolm, ‘Teutomanie und Pascals Wette - Zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung’,
Merkur, 494, (1990), 345-350, originally published in Le Monde, 21 February 1991; J.H. Elliott,
‘Eine Welt. Verhängnis und Vermächtnis der europäischen Expansion’, Merkur, 517 (1992),
308-319, originally published in Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration: Catalogue of an
Exhibition of the National Gallery of Art, Washington; Daniel Bell, ‘Einige Ausblicke ins 21.
Jahrhundert’, Merkur, 500 (1990), 965-972, originally published in Dissent, Spring 1990.
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during 1989-92 in relation to the then ongoing Maastricht debate. In the view of
the journal, the rejection of Maastricht would herald Europe’s move towards a
social, worker-friendly Europe, while its approval would bring about a Europe in
which selfish, big-business interests determine the agenda. Unsurprisingly, NLR
relies in this instance not only on British voices but on European authors drawn
from locales such Denmark, Italy and Sweden in order to lend credibility and
rally support against its opposition to the treaty.18
In Esprit, the revolutions of 1989 provide the canvas for the making of a
truly European event, and, accordingly, the journal attempts to present views
from abroad in order to evaluate and provide context. Of the ten articles by
foreign contributors, five alone were published in 1990, when the bulk of its
articles on 1989 appeared and are written by mostly Eastern Europeans or
Germans on the subject of reunification.19 Further proof of this interest in the
topic appears in the form of a dossier entitled “Journal de l’Est”,20 in which
Esprit publishes texts by mainly French journalists, who were sent out as a part
of their journalism training to Eastern European cities in order to research and
write about the social and economic developments in those countries – about
the state of the press in Hungary, say, or the new entrepreneurs in Poland –
and to present these to Esprit’s readership.
However, by 1991-92 the number of foreign or republished articles on
Europe declines sharply in Esprit. Although its focus does not move away from
Europe as a whole, French authors are now producing the main bulk of texts
connected to discussions of Eastern Europe, as the initial enthusiasm and
celebratory tone is quickly replaced by more fretful and cautious voices from
French intellectual circles. The same goes for a discussion of the Maastricht
18 Expressed in articles such as Lucy Magri, ‘The European Left between Crisis and
Refoundation’, NLR, 189 (1991), 5-19; Göran Therborn, ‘The Life and Times of Socialism’, NLR,
194 (1991), 17-33; Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘The Danish No to Maastricht’, NLR, 195 (1992), 97-
102.
19 See the aforementioned article by Andreas Pribersky, ‘L’identité nationale des mouvements
démocratiques’, as well as François Fejtö, ‘Itinéraire personnel. De Budapest à Paris et de Paris
à Budapest: Entretien avec François Fejtö’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 51-58; Rudolf von Thadden,
‘L’Allemagne malgré elle’, Esprit, 160 (1990), 47-56; Lothar Baier, ‘Contre la réunification’,
Esprit, 159 (1990), 65-68.
20 Dossier, ‘Journal de l’Est’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 107-129.
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treaty in a dossier ‘Questions d’après Maastricht’.21 It includes only one
interview with William Pfaff, an American columnist for the International Herald
Tribune, entitled ‘Maastricht/États-unis et retour’,22 to provide the outsider’s
perspective, but it is otherwise entirely written by French authors. So even
though Esprit leads the way in terms of foreign contributions, it does not
systematically include foreign voices in proportional measure on each topic.
During 2003-06, the distribution of foreign writers is again clustered
around particular themes. NLR’s commissioned texts from this time pertain to
exclusively French issues such as the No-Vote, the debate about the headscarf
ban in French schools, and the 2005 riots in the banlieues of Paris.23 But while
there is a larger than usual interest in France, for reasons which we will discuss
in the following chapters, hardly any texts on other European issues or
countries are present, with the exception of one text by a Turkish author on the
possible accession of Turkey to the EU.24
In Merkur, American writers feature prominently because the journal, by
contrast to most German and European publications, staunchly supported the
US-led invasion in Iraq. Hence, republished texts from American journals such
as the New York Review of Books or Dissent are used in this instance to voice
the critique of Europe’s indecisiveness in the run-up to the Iraq War.25 However,
Merkur also includes more commissioned texts from the new European member
states. One Polish contributor, for example, frequently publishes texts on the
Eastern European perspective towards Europe, indicating that the role and
relevance of the former Eastern bloc countries in Europe is more widely
21 Dossier, ‘Questions d’après Maastricht’, Esprit, 186 (1992), 5-84.
22 William Pfaff, ‘Maastricht/États-unis et retour’, Esprit, 186 (1992), 5-13.
23 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Holy Europe’, NLR, 33 (2005), 24-26 and ‘Pyres of Autumn’, NLR, 37
(2006), 5-8; Bernard Cassen, ‘ATTAC against the Treaty’, NLR, 31 (2005), 27-36; Emmanuel
Terray, ‘Headscarf Hysteria’, NLR, 25 (2004), 118-28.
24 Çağlar Keyder, ‘The Turkish Bell Jar’, NLR, 28 (2004), 65-84.
25 Russell Berman, ‘Demokratischer Krieg, repressiver Frieden. Über den real existierenden
Antiamerikanismus’, Merkur, 651 (2003), 570-583; Walter Laqueur, ‘Europa im 21.Jahrhundert’,
Merkur, 676 (2005), 653-666. On the same topic see also Tony Judt, ‘Was wir zu verlieren
haben: Über das amerikanisch-europäische Zerwürfnis’, Merkur, 649 (2003), 383-395, originally
published in New York Review of Books, 27 March 2003; Marc F. Plattner, ‘Souveränität und
Demokratie’, Merkur, 660 (2004), 281-294, originally published in Policy Review, 122 (2003/04).
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acknowledged and seriously considered. This suggests a partial overlap with
Esprit’s thematic concerns. 26
In Esprit, the origin of foreign writers during 2003-2006 is slightly more
varied than in Merkur and includes Poles, Turks and Ukrainian writers, as well
more familiar and predictable names such as Timothy Garton Ash.27 However,
contrary to Merkur, and indicative of Esprit’s attitude towards the United States
at the time, American writers are no longer represented in its articles. Where the
Iraq invasion and Europe’s position in its aftermath are discussed, these articles
are written by French contributors, seemingly confirming the idea that the level
of foreign authors depends chiefly on the topic under discussion.
3.5 Emerging Trends
Some trends which have become evident from these tables might be
summarized as follows. Firstly, Esprit consistently features the greatest number
of articles on Europe and is most strongly concerned with facilitating exchange
and including foreign authors. Esprit’s position as the most “Europeanized”
journal of the three is in line with recent large-scale, longitudinal studies on the
level of Europeanization of national newspapers, which find that “French media
are among the most Europeanized” when compared to other European
newspapers on a consistent level over an assessed period from 1982 until
2003.28 For the other journals the picture is more variegated. While Merkur is
certainly the most “national” publication of them all, the number of sample
articles and foreign authors suggests that quantitatively their interest and
reporting on Europe increases most between 1989 and 2003. Yet in NLR, the
26 See the articles by Adam Krzeminski, ‘Hauptsache nach Europa. Polnische
Modernisierungsschübe’, Merkur, 645 (2003), 36-47; ’Was macht der trojanische Esel Amerikas
im Irak?’, Merkur, 655 (2003), 1067-1072; ‘Die europäische Außenpolitik entsteht im Osten’,
Merkur, 671 (2005), 256-262.
27 Bronislaw Geremek, ‘Penser l’Europe comme communauté, Esprit Supplement , 298, (2003),
5-12; Kemal Dervis, ‘L’Europe et la Turquie: la frontière, le projet politique et l’histoire’, Esprit
Supplement, 309 (2004), 3-9; Grygoriy Nemyria, ‘L’Ukraine et l’Europe: l’histoire reprend’,
Esprit, 312 (2005), 52-64; Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Y a-t-il des fondations morales de l’Europe’,
Esprit, 326 (2005), 106-120.
28 Stefanie Sifft, et al, ‘Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European
Union from a Public Discourse Perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (1) (2007),
127-155 (p. 140).
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reverse holds true: while the journal becomes more “international” in outlook,
European articles have in general decreased in number. Hence, while there are
signs of a stronger involvement and increased interest in Merkur, Esprit’s
engagement remains roughly consistent over time, while NLR is moving in
another direction.
However, one trend common to all the journals relates to the increase in
articles with an outright European framework. As the sample articles indicate,
the topic of Europe is addressed more frequently as the main framework of
discussion, rather than as a secondary or additional framework. This may be
interpreted as a sign that Europe has become a more discernable, manifest
entity in its own right.
Finally, it was established that this does not automatically translate into a
stronger convergence and exchange between the journals or into a higher level
of participation of foreign authors. Foreign writers, it was suggested, feature
especially in order to support or to enhance credibility for certain topics. Yet on
other topics the interpretative dominance is reassigned to the journal’s own
writers. Therefore, we cannot discern a systematic concern with facilitating
more European viewpoints or with including more foreign voices during the
period examined here.29 While we can point to some evidence of increase, and
partial overlaps between Merkur and Esprit, this does not extend to NLR.
Similarly, even though the European framework becomes more prevalent, one
can not conclude that the journals as a whole have become more systematically
interlinked during the time period considered.
29 This is supported by studies, the results of which are summarized by Hans Jörg Trenz in
‘Measuring Europeanisation of Public Communication: The Question of Standards’, RECON
Online Working Paper, 2007/12
<http://reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html>
[accessed 14 December 2007].
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Chapter 4
A Common Public Sphere or the Bonding Effects of a Common Threat?
Discussion in the Journals, 1989-1992
From the general overview of the composition of the journals, this chapter will
turn its attention towards the analysis of selected articles. The ramifications of
1989 for the changing European landscape and, to a lesser extent, the
discussion about Maastricht will provide the thematic focus of this analysis of
Esprit, NLR and Merkur. The aim is to establish how the sense of a European
identity, as defined and outlined in Chapter Two, is expressed, shaped and re-
shaped in these journals. Which discursive strategies of identity formation can
we observe? What forms of “self-ascription” are taking place and which
historical or cultural values are identified as a common and defining legacy?
What political vision for contemporary Europe is espoused - and to what
purpose? Finally, which forms of exclusion of the Other are evident? In
conjunction with the subsequent chapter, the overall aim is to evaluate to what
extent the framework of the EPS is relevant and necessary to potentially
common, shared articulations of a European identity. It was established earlier
that, within a public sphere, participants would not necessarily have to agree on
all events and issues, but rather share an understanding, about the same
“criteria of relevance” as proposed by Risse. The question to what extent these
common criteria are apparent in the journal discussions about Europe will
provide the guiding focus of this analysis.
4.1 Esprit
4.1.1 Esprit’s European Agenda
Esprit’s interpretations of the events of 1989 have to be understood in the
context of its broader agenda for Europe. A text by Paul Thibaud, one of Esprit’s
Europe editors, entitled “L’Europe et la crise des valeurs politiques”,1 touches
upon many topics that will become leitmotifs and issues of contention in Esprit’s
1 Paul Thibaud, ‘L’Europe et la crise des valeurs politiques’, Esprit, 146 (1989), 34-44.
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articles throughout the four-year period. In the following, I would like to briefly
introduce the argumentative framework for much of Esprit’s Europe analysis
about “rehistoricizing” and “repoliticizing” Europe. These positions, the following
analysis will also show, are derived in parts from a specifically French cultural
identity background.
Thibaud’s article maintains that the Europe of today was forged out and
is still determined by the traumas of the Second World War. These experiences
constitute the ultima ratio for the existence of European cooperation today and
explain why Europe has a moral obligation to harness the “mauvais instincts
collectifs” (p. 35), such as nationalism and racism, that exist everywhere in the
world. In other words, Europe’s catastrophic history provides it with a
compelling moral imperative to uphold democratic and pacifist ideals
everywhere and to act as a force for good. In order to fulfil this role, the article
maintains that Europe must first come to terms with its past and effectively
“s’émanciper du passé” (p. 35). Only then can Europe’s role, which as yet is
regrettably slippery and uncertain, be defined more clearly. As Thibaud sees it:
“l’Europe est aujourd’hui un impératif mais elle continue d’échapper à notre
prise” (p. 34). This deficit can be remedied, he explains, only by a shift in
attitudes from the current fixation on economic cooperation, to a fuller
understanding of Europe’s historical dimension.
Thibaud foresees also that in the new, “postnational” order, the primacy
of the nation state will be challenged, and that therefore “[l’] Europe est la
dernière chance des nations.”2 Consequently, it will become necessary to
inscribe Europe rather than the nation state as the centre of political legitimacy
and as the rightful expression of a democratic political order within an
international, institutional framework. According to Thibaud it is necessary that
Europe “s’inscrit dans ce processus d’institutionnalisation de l’international” (p.
35).
Thibaud’s article leaves no doubt about the fact that these developments
will bring about a qualitative change in the sense of European identities and
belongings. “D’une certain manière, en mettant les nations au défi de s’adapter
2 Ibid, quoted here from Jacques Moreau, L’Europe quand même (Paris: Syros, 1984), p. 44.
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à un monde qu’aucun empire ne peut plus prétendre dominer, le niveau
mondial et le niveau européen suscitent un renouvellement de leur identités” (p.
44), he notes. Yet this renewal of European identities will always have to be
informed by a sense of historical awareness and underlined by a commitment to
a democratic political order.
A similar view is adopted in a text from 1990 by Olivier Mongin, Esprit’s
editor-in-chief, who speaks similarly about the need to reconnect the current
understanding of Europe to a sense of “destin historique en un projet politique,
et de ne pas confondre l’Europe avec une simple intifada économique.”3 An
awareness of its “historical destiny” and a sense of Europe as a political project
– this sums up in brief the argumentative thrust that is apparent throughout the
Esprit articles, upon which rests much of the following discussion for interpreting
such events as the 1989 revolutions.
In Esprit, the question of European identity is without a doubt perceived
as something that needs to be emphasized, and valorized, a “project” in the
making, much like Girault’s understanding of identity (discussed in Chapter
Two). The following analysis will reveal the attempt to understand the new
circumstances in which Europe found itself, and to contextualize these in a
distinctly historical and political context. Over the four year period, the articles
reveal changing and sometimes conflicting ideas about the role that Eastern
Europe should play in the new European framework, and about the identity that
the new Europe could project.
Specifically, three phases in the discussion of 1989 and its aftermath can
be pinpointed. Initially the discussion focuses on articulating historically-
grounded, inclusive notions of European commonalities and values shared by
both Eastern and Western Europe. This gives way in the second phase to a
discussion about the political future of Europe, in which the newly democratized
Eastern European countries serve as a positive mirror image for the jaded
Western European democracies. In the third phase, towards 1991 and 1992,
the question of European identity is formulated more and more in terms of a
3 Olivier Mongin, ‘L’Europe et la question nationale’, Esprit, 163 (1990), 129-131 (p. 129).
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clear “us” and “them”, in which a Western progressive part of Europe is
opposed to a nationalistic regressive Eastern European part.
4.1.2 The 1989 Revolutions: Historical Europe Reunited and Reborn
The previous chapter had established that Esprit runs quantitatively far more
articles than Merkur and NLR on Eastern Europe. Although frequency should
not be automatically equated with greater significance,4 in this case it is safe to
say that Esprit attaches far more weight than other journals to the events in
Eastern Europe as a European event. Esprit’s reception is far more positive and
welcoming than the other journals. It systematically aims to embed the events in
the context of historical, political and identitarian changes for Europe - contexts,
which are developed to a much lesser extent in Merkur and NLR. For these
reasons, the treatment of Esprit will be slightly more extensive than for NLR and
Merkur.
As the revolutions unfold at a fast pace throughout Europe - from the first
free elections in Poland in June 1989, to Hungary’s opening of its border with
Austria as the first step towards the fall of the Berlin Wall in November; the
resignation of the Czech and Slovak Communist party leadership and the rise of
Václav Havel as the country’s president in November/December, right to
Ceauşescu’s execution by the Romanian military on Christmas Day 19895 -
Esprit continuously comments on their significance for the entirety of Europe. In
the view of the journal, Europe is finally developing from an artificial political
structure into an organic and cohesive entity because the “right” side of history
has obtained the upper hand. This view is based on contextualizing the events
of 1989 in a European historical narrative of freedom and liberty overcoming the
odds against repression. Two historical reference points are being evoked
specifically. The first is a comparison of 1989 to the French Revolution in 1789.
The second – and more immediately relevant – refers to the Yalta conference of
4 As pointed out by David Deacon, ‘Analysing Texts’, in Researching Communication: A
Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis, ed. by David Deacon, et al (London:
Arnold 1998), pp. 132-159 (p. 132).
5 See Tony Judt, Postwar, pp. 585-636.
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1945. “Yalta” becomes a byword for the tragic division into an Eastern and a
Western Europe.
The comparison with the French Revolution is first made in an Esprit
editorial which uses a very fierce and impassioned rhetoric to describe the
events in Eastern Europe:
la force révolutionnaire de 1789, la ‘raison dans l’histoire’ comme dirait
Hegel, s’est réalisée en 1989 à l’Est. Au nom de la liberté – et de
l’égalité! – les peuples opprimés depuis des décennies ont renversé
l’édifice vermoulu et corrompu des sociétés communistes baptisées
‘démocraties populaires’. 6
The text suggests that both revolutions were motivated by the same noble quest
for liberty and equality. The suffering of the people of Eastern Europe dignifies
their deeds, which will pave the way for a new future: “l’avenir de nouveau
ouvert pour des peuples entiers, qui ont payé plus que de raison, souvent au
prix du sang, au nom de la plus grande imposture politique, économique et
morale de l’histoire” (p. 4). And the text concludes that bearing in mind the great
historical injustices that Eastern Europe has experienced, the West must look
favourably, not condescendingly, upon the re-entry of the East into Europe. “Il
importe désormais de favoriser leur rentrée dans l’histoire européenne et
mondiale, sans condescendance” (p. 4).
The invocation of the French Revolution here provides the historical
justification for the subsequent declarations of solidarity towards Eastern
Europe and its re-entry into Europe. It also serves to emphasise the specifically
European dimension of the revolutions. 1989 is presented as a true historical
watershed, comparable in importance and relevance to 1789, pursuing the
same lofty goals that motivated the French in their quest for “liberté”, “égalité”
and “fraternité”. Hence, 1989 is understood in Esprit in some ways as a replay
of the liberal-democratic, radical promise of the French Revolution.
In the article from Esprit’s 1990 February issue, already mentioned in the
previous chapter, Andreas Pribersky proclaims:
6 Éditorial, ‘1989 à l’Est’, Esprit, 155 (1989), 3-4 (p. 4).
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[l]es ‘idées européennes’ des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, nées de la
Révolution française, sont le facteur commun à tous ces mouvements de
réformes. En effet, cette revendication des Droits de l’homme et du
citoyen, […] correspond dans les pays d’Europe centrale à une tradition
qui remonte à la propagation des idées de la Révolution française au
sein de l’Europe depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle.7
The driving forces behind the events are the ideals of the French Revolution –
ideals which have supposedly been part of the European tradition since the
eighteenth century. The references to the French Revolution and the
connotations attached present an historical anchoring point and provide the
justification for Eastern Europe’s rightful and jubilant “return” to the European
pantheon; in marked distinction to the discussion of Merkur and NLR, as we will
see later on.
The second reference point is the more recent history from 1945
onwards. The events of 1989 are put into the context of postwar events: that of
the tragic division of Europe into two different political blocs in the wake of the
Yalta accords, to which the revolutions provide the redeeming counterforce.
They embody the triumph of democratic, pan-European ideals over
communism. After all, Aleksander Smolar reminds us in his article ‘Incertitudes
polonaises’, “l’identification avec l’Europe a toujours été omniprésente”.8 On
balance, the events of Eastern Europe entail an act designed to “surmonter
Yalta”,9 according to an article by Pierre Hassner, which must be seen as the
“grande affaire de cette fin du siècle” (p. 116).
The narrative of overcoming Cold War divisions and the rightful return to
Europe is established from the outset of the revolutions in 1989 and serves to
emphasise the moral case of Eastern Europe’s return to Europe. Consider, for
instance, Fritz Stern’s analysis in an article from February 1990, ‘L’Europe vue
d’outre Atlantique’.10 Here he points to Poland as an example of a country that
has reclaimed its “true” European heritage after 40 years of communism.
7 Andreas Pribersky, ‘L’identité nationale des mouvements démocratiques en Hongrie et en
Pologne’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 97-106 (p. 97).
8 Aleksander Smolar, ‘Incertitudes polonaises: Entretien avec Aleksander Smolar’, Esprit, 157
(1989), 100-104 (p.103).
9 Pierre Hassner, ‘Vers l’Est du nouveau?’, Esprit, 148-149 (1989), 108-117 (p. 111).
10 Fritz Stern, ‘L’Europe vue d’outre-Atlantique’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 82-90.
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La Pologne, dans un grand élan national, a réclamé la liberté; les
Polonais ont revendiqué leur héritage historique comme faisant partie
intégrante de l’Europe. Ils ont réussi –jusqu’à présent – à renverser
pacifiquement quarante ans de domination communiste […] (p. 83).
The analysis is built on the conviction that there exists a definable source of
European cultural traditions and commonalities which have persisted over many
hundreds of years. The fifty-year division of the Cold War is a mere aberration
that was imposed upon people of Eastern Europe, set in motion through the
Yalta Conference that had no bearing on their true belonging and allegiance as
Europeans.
The French interest in Eastern Europe, of course, also has a long
historical pedigree and is perhaps most developed in regard to Poland, with
which France shares close cultural, political and religious ties dating back to the
eighteenth and nineteenth century. For these reasons, the interest in (Catholic)
Poland is more pronounced in Esprit, than in say the Czech Republic or
Hungary. Esprit’s particular interest in the Catholic French-Polish connection is
also evident in an article entitled ‘Quelle Europe?’ from 1990.11 The author is
the late Jean Marie Lustiger, who was born to Polish Jews in France and who
converted to Catholicism in 1940 at the age of 13. He later become Archbishop
and Cardinal of France, and throughout his career advocated interfaith
dialogue. Lustiger invokes in a fervent tone the indivisible historical unity of
Eastern and Western Europe.
L’Europe n’a jamais été brisée ni démembrée. Elle n’a jamais cessé
d’exister comme une unité culturelle et spirituelle, solidaire dans son
histoire passée, solidaire dans son présent, solidaire dans son destin et
sa vocation à l’égard des autres civilisations et des autres continents
(p.119).
Grand rhetoric is used to sketch out a picture of European unity that had to be
suppressed by Eastern Europeans under the yoke of communist regimes:
“pendant cette longue période, l’intelligentsia officielle, les dirigeants politiques
de l’Europe de l’Est ont rêvé l’Europe occidentale comme la part désirable,
enviée et censurée de leur propre identité, prisonnière du carcan de l’idéologie
marxiste” (p. 120).
11 Jean Marie Lustiger, ‘Quelle Europe?’, Esprit, 163 (1990), 117-126.
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The “propre identité” is of course the pan-European identity of Eastern
Europeans, which after having been suppressed is now allowed to re-emerge,
for “[l]e communisme est rejeté comme un corps étranger”.12 The view that
Europe is brought together by a common history and identity which have been
only temporarily disrupted by the imposition of an alien political system is also
evident in Pierre Hassner’s aforementioned article ‘Vers l’Est du nouveau’. In it,
he refers to a unspecified speech by François Mitterand, then French president,
in which Mitterand expressed a plea to “considérer la division actuelle entre les
deux parties de l’Europe comme une affaire de circonstance” (p. 110). Hassner
argues that while the division of Europe was a matter of circumstance, in other
words, a factor beyond one’s deliberate control, the reunification of Europe
presents the logical consequence of history unfolding: “l’évolution de la réalité
historique” (p. 110).
The fact that Esprit sets the events of 1989 into the framework of the last fifty
years and the overcoming of Cold War divisions is in itself neither unusual nor
special. Other journals discuss this aspect as a matter of primary significance.
What is remarkable in Esprit is the extent to which the events are so exclusively
and immediately claimed as “European” events. Esprit dedicates much less
attention to discussing the events of 1989 in the context of the changes to the
Soviet Union, but concentrates right from the beginning on them heralding the
beginning of a reunited Europe. Its articles about Eastern Europe, we have
seen above, are tinged with an infallible moral certainty about where Eastern
Europe truly belongs.
This is further reinforced by Esprit’s repeated expressions of solidarity
with Eastern Europe. While future difficulties are envisaged and the need for
patience acknowledged, there seems to be no doubt in the minds of most
authors that Eastern Europe will take its seat in the newly reformed Europe -
with a helping hand from the West. Consider, for example, this statement from
one of Esprit’s editorials: “Accroître l’interdépendance économique, culturelle de
12 Éditorial, ‘Démocratie et nationalisme’, Esprit, 154 (1989), 3-5 (p. 3).
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l’Est et de l’Ouest européens est une tâche à notre portée.”13 Note also
Hassner’s voice who acknowledges that the “route de la réconciliation
paneuropéenne comme celle de l’unité ouest-européenne est nécessairement
faite de patience et de compromis” (‘Vers l’Est du nouveau?’, p. 115). He calls
upon the readers “à développer cette nécessaire confiance qui permettra de
nouveaux développements de notre coopération et un avenir que nous ne
pouvons pas encore imaginer” (p. 115).
To sum up, Esprit relates here a compelling historical narrative that sets
Eastern Europe firmly in the tradition of “European” values and cultural affinities,
in which the last fifty years are presented as a tragic interruption of the common
historical legacy of Europe. This reunification project is seen not in terms of
political expediency, but grounded in the historical commonalities and a sense
of what Thibaud calls “fidélité européenne” (‘L’Europe et la crise’, p. 40). This
Europe, Esprit proclaims, is aware of its shared values and can point to a
common and long-standing European identity. This view is certainly an
exception, rather than the rule in the journals. In fact, Esprit is the only of the
three journals discussed here that deviates from what Norman Davies has
called an “unspoken acceptance of the division of Europe into Eastern and
Western spheres.”14 For as we shall see, this unspoken acceptance informs
much of NLR’s and Merkur’s views at the time.
4.1.3 Relaunching Europe’s Raison d’Être as a Democratic Project
Leaving the immediate aftermath of 1989 behind, Esprit shifts the focus of the
articles increasingly to the long-term political prospects of the Eastern European
countries, which inevitably means onto the prospects for democratization. In this
second phase Esprit seeks to analyse Eastern Europe as a model for a
renewed “repoliticization” or “redemocratization” of the Europe. Here, I will
consider how democracy is posited as the raison d’être for the newly reunited
Europe. Secondly, I will discuss how Esprit constructs the Eastern European
countries as a positive “mirror image” through which the jaded, over-
13 Éditorial, ‘Faut-il aider Gorbatchev?’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 3-4 (p. 4).
14 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (New York: Pimlico, 1997), p. 40.
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institutionalized Western European democracies can return to their democratic
roots. Especially in 1990-91, this sense of hope and optimism for European
political renewal prevails in the majority of Esprit’s articles. Only towards the last
phase, as we will see in the final section, is this argument being turned on its
head.
Two points are relevant in placing Eastern Europe as the beacon of
democratic renewal for the rest of Europe. The first point builds on the idea that
democracy has proved victorious over communism as a form of governance.
Democracy, moreover, is also taken as a specific European ideal and aspiration
that represents the pinnacle of enlightened, progressive European values. The
second claim relates to the procedural aspect of democracy and the role that
civil society movements and NGOs play in establishing a new democratic order.
According to Esprit, this form of civil society could become a new model for the
fatigued and overly institutionalized democracies of the West.
To begin with, the majority of articles stress how 1989 will catapult
Europe into a future rich in possibilities. Fritz Stern, for example, notes that
Europe is “à mi-chemin d’une transformation totale” (‘L’Europe vue d’outre-
Atlantique’, p. 82) which entails the destruction of old orthodoxies and
certainties in Europe at a time of “nouveaux espoirs, […] des nouvelles visions,
avec la sentiment d’un avenir divinement et dangereusement ouvert” (p. 82).
Inevitably, the end of old certainties will induce nervousness in the
Western parts of Europe, which have to awaken from their comfortable status
quo and take it upon themselves to reintegrate the Eastern European states
and in turn redefine their self-understanding. “Il y a l’inquiétude légitime à
l’Ouest sur l’accueil de cette part de l’Europe à réintégrer dans une Europe
occidentale qui se serait bien satisfaite de son douillet statu quo et qui doit
encore une fois se redéfinir […] (Éditorial, ‘1989 à l’Est’, p. 4). Europe’s need to
redefine itself and to venture into this new and open future is precipitated by the
1989 events, but is being met largely with trepidation. Yet, in Esprit’s view,
these changes should be welcomed with open arms because they represent not
only uncertainty but the chance for a democratic renewal for Europe. Moreover,
these changes will represent the victory of European democratic ideals over
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communism for which the Central/Eastern European states have purportedly
always stood. Consider again the aforementioned interview with Aleksander
Smolar and his analysis of the Polish example, a country, which, as he explains,
always had impeccable democratic credentials.
Il existe un capital politique non négligeable: cinquante ans de refus du
totalitarisme brun et rouge. Depuis le partage de la Pologne en 1939, les
Polonais rêvent de ‘normalité’, c’est-à-dire de démocratie, de l’État de
droit et enfin du retour à l’Europe (‘Incertitudes polonaises’, p. 104).
Democracy and the rule of law are equated here with the “return to Europe”,
which Poland has earned through its democratic ideals and principled stand
against totalitarianism in all shapes and forms. The question of democracy as
an ideal and as a form of governance therefore becomes one of the main
discussion points for Esprit. It becomes central not only in relation to Eastern
Europe but for the future of Europe as a whole, since: “le débat sur la nation
européenne n’est pas séparable de celui qui porte sur l’avenir de la
démocratie”.15 With the onset of new and unprecedented political realities,
Europe as a whole will have to find and assume a new role.
In this new political entity, the practice of democracy and democratic
ideals which the Eastern European countries have strengthened and revived
through their revolutions will give new impetus to a Europe which has been held
together so far mainly by economic expediency and necessity. Élie Cohen
expresses this view as follows: “l’Europe de l’Est abolir en une nuit un système
qu’on disait bâti pour l’éternité et l’Europe des Douze cesser d’être une affaire
de technocrates et marchands”.16 This is also the tenor of the early Esprit
editorials, which proclaim that “l’Europe qui devra voir le jour sera avant tout
une entité politique” (‘Démocratie et nationalisme’, p. 4). Note also how Pierre
Hassner sums up what is at stake in the Europe of the future. In his view, it is
Europe’s challenge to turn the events of 1989 into a lasting and convincing
victory for democracy in Europe: “transformer la défaite du communisme en
victoire de la démocratie.”17 Western Europe must abandon its status quo and
15 Olivier Mongin, ‘Poujadisme intellectuel?’, Esprit, 164 (1990), 91-100 (p. 96).
16 Élie Cohen, ‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des Douze’, Esprit, 160 (1990), 57-75 (p. 57).
17 Pierre Hassner, ‘Communisme impossible, démocratie improbable!’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 78-81
(p. 81).
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Eastern Europe is to become the catalyst for renewing Europe’s raison d’être. In
these instances, the events of 1989 are linked directly to the possibility of
redemocratizing Europe as a whole. Effectively, Esprit appropriates the events
in Eastern Europe in order to posit “democracy” as a unifying and lasting value
of the historically reunited Europe.
Yet what exactly should this newly politicized Europe look like? What is
distinct or different from the current democratic procedures that are already in
place in Europe? In order to answer this, we must look more closely at the
discussion about civil society as a model for new forms of democratic
legitimacy.
4.1.4 The Eastern European Mirror Image: Civil Society and Maastricht
The role and relevance of civil society groups for the 1989 revolutions was
widely discussed in the wake of the events of that year. According to the Centre
for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, “the events in central and
eastern Europe were indeed instrumental in bringing the topic of civil society to
the attention of social scientists in the West”18 for the first time. In fact, their
neglect of these developments is seen to be the reason behind the glaring
failure of the social sciences to predict the fall of communism before it occurred.
Only in the aftermath was the relevance of a civil society - in the form of
functioning NGOs, civic initiatives, and action groups for democratic societies -
emphasized and repeatedly discussed. In Esprit, however, the concern with civil
18 London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society, ‘What is Civil Society?’
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm> [accessed 9 May 2007].
Some voices did of course highlight the relevance of civil society groups in Eastern Europe
before the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989. For example, Tony Judt in ‘The Dilemmas of
Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East-Central Europe’, Eastern European Politics and
Societies, 2 (2) (1988) 185-241, critically considers the role of dissidents, intellectuals and
writers, but also the formation of single-issue civic action groups and their impact on the
unfolding political developments. Another important historian who has always stressed the
importance of these underground developments is Timothy Garton Ash in the collection of
essays, The Uses of Adversity. Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (New York: Vintage
Books, 1990). These essays were originally commissioned pieces for the New York Review of
Books and parts of it were also translated and republished in many cultural journals and
newspapers - amongst them Esprit. His analysis of the 1989 events has become hugely
influential and he has been often hailed as one of the few truly “European voices”. Esprit’s editor
Olivier Mongin for example considers Timothy Garton Ash “le meilleur journaliste européen”.
See the article ‘Le plan de Stanley Hoffmann pour la nouvelle Europe’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 91-96
(p. 91).
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society did not only begin at this stage, but was apparent throughout the 1980s.
The notion of a functioning civil society corresponds with Esprit’s aim of
redemocratizing and rejuvenating Europe because it presents an opportunity for
an overhaul of an overly technocratic style of governance that is inhibiting the
articulation of the “people’s will”. In other words, the nature of the revolutions
with their emphasis on a peaceful, sovereign citizen’s movement provides an
appealing positive model for the established democracies of the West.
Esprit frequently refers to the 1989 revolutions as the revolution of “les
peuples” (‘Démocratie et nationalisme’, p. 3) or alternatively “les citoyens”, who
have been motivated by “l’autodétermination des peuples et pour les droits du
citoyen” (Pribersky, ‘L’identité nationale’, p. 98) This quest for self-determination
and citizens’ rights is central to Esprit’s call for a new Europe. Consider, for
example, this section headline in one of Esprit’s articles, “Le printemps des
citoyens, la nouvelle Europe et le retour à l’Europe”.19 Beyond this somewhat
romanticized language of the “peuples” and the “printemps des citoyens”, there
exists, however, a more detailed account of how this popular revolution
occurred and its political implications for the rest of Europe.
This concern with the role of civil society is manifested by printing texts of
figures who were directly involved in the events of 1989, activists or dissident
intellectuals. One such example is an article by Janos Kis, ‘Le défi de la
démocratie en Europe de l’Est’,20 that presents what could be regarded a policy
outline of how the Eastern European states could guarantee a peaceful
transition to democratic states with the help of civil rights groups. The emphasis
on the role of civil society groups is also evident in other texts by Eastern
European intellectuals, such as the aforementioned Alexander Smolar, who
explains the role of the Polish Solidarity movement, and Andreas Pribersky,
who also lays out in detail the role, ideology and relevance of the Hungarian
Democratic Forum. As is to be expected, all these accounts are highly
sympathetic to the democratic opposition movements and can be seen as a
somewhat belated attempt on the part of Esprit to acknowledge the role of civil
19 Jean-Louis Morisot, ‘Le Printemps des peuples vu par Timothy Garton Ash’, Esprit, 161
(1990), 139-142 (p. 141).
20 János Kis, ‘Le défi de la démocratie en Europe de l’Est’, Esprit, 154 (1989), 44-48.
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society and civic initiatives in bringing about political self-determination through
peaceful, democratic means.
The quest for political sovereignty and democracy by the “people” in civil
society groups coincides with ideals which Esprit holds in high regard. After all,
if the events of 1989 represent a return to a historically united Europe that is
marked by a commitment to democratic values and ideals, then the rise of civil
society groups in the East indicate the possibility of steering towards a more
democratically organized European Union – or so the argument goes. Their role
becomes especially pertinent in relation to the perceived democratic deficit,
widely discussed in connection with the debates about Maastricht.
Esprit makes it plain that Western and Eastern Europe are undergoing
two contrary developments. In the article, ‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des
Douze’, the author Elie Cohen juxtaposes these developments as follows. While
one part of Europe is engaged in rewriting politics and asserting its democratic
rights, the other, wealthier part of Europe is engaged in the increasingly
inscrutable process of drawing up European directives. Cohen criticizes the
increasingly opaque power and decision-making structures within the European
Union and contrasts them to the momentous developments in Eastern Europe:
“peut-on durablement fermer la porte à l’Est pendant que l’Europe des nantis se
livrerait à des négociations Byzantines sur la 2e directive ‘Banque’?”
(‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des Douze’, p. 58).
This form of critique of the EU’s internal workings became a recurring
complaint in the other journals and also in mainstream media publications at the
time. In Esprit, the criticism of the lack of democratic participation is evident in
several texts during these years, as in the 1989 article ‘Europe: La Panne’. In
this article, the author, Louis Bouret writes in connection with the decision-
making processes of the European Union: “il est permis de se demander si la
politique du fait accompli technocratique […] n’a pas atteint ses limites.”21 The
politics of “fait accompli” entails investing new and unprecedented levels of
power and sovereignty away from the nation state and in restricting the
possibility of democratic participation. Cohen similarly interprets the treaty as a
21 Louis Bouret, ‘Europe: La Panne’, Esprit, 151 (1989), 124-125 (p. 124).
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case in which “mesures apparemment techniques supposent des abandons de
souveraineté et portent en eux une nouvelle hiérarchie des pouvoirs”
(‘Inquiétudes pour l’Europe des Douze’, p. 60).
Still, the persistent criticism of the lack of national sovereignty does not
lead to an outright renunciation of the European project. Doubts are raised and
criticism is levelled, but the faith in Europe is apparent throughout. For example,
Olivier Mongin, Esprit’s editor-in-chief, postulates in a text from 1991 that a
debate for or against Europe is outdated, since Europe is here to stay. To take
delight in its failure would be highly irresponsible. “Troublée par l’histoire, elle
[Europe] doit reconnaître ses limites, mais il est ridicule, indigne et
irresponsable de se réjouir par avance de son échec. Pour ou contre l’Europe?
Cette polémique est sournoise et régressive.”22 If Europe itself is not negotiable
- this much Esprit admits - it is, however, necessary to debate and discuss
European shortcomings and limitations, most pressingly the lack of democratic
participation and increasingly limited possibilities to exercise national
sovereignty.
It is here that the much vaunted civil society concept is introduced, as a
remedy to reinstall popular sovereignty in lieu of inscrutable directives and
remote decision-making processes. Inspired by the example of the events of
1989, Esprit’s articles and editorial pieces throughout the four-year period dwell
on the chances and possibilities of reconfiguring a democratic participation on a
Europe-wide basis. Olivier Mongin writes with certainty that: ”le respect de la
souveraineté populaire invite à imaginer que l’avenir de la démocratie passé par
l’émergence d’une culture démocratique dont les vecteurs ne seront plus
seulement ceux de la nation” (‘Poujadisme intellectuel?’, p. 97). This new
democratic culture, he asserts, will have to entail a “nouvelle action civique” (p.
97), long lost in the Western democracies. Eastern Europe, in its dignified show
of reclaiming popular sovereignty on a national basis, becomes the inspiration
for reinvigorating Europe as a democratic project at a time when the West feels
an acute sense of loss of popular sovereignty and democratic participation.
22 Olivier Mongin, ‘Une Europe sans fantasmes?’, Esprit, 176 (1991), 5-10 (p. 9).
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As before, Esprit embeds the discussion of civil society into a distinct,
namely exclusively European framework. The previous section was concerned
with explaining how Eastern Europe provides a new political raison d’être for
Europe with “democracy” becoming a unifying factor. In this section, civil society
symbolises the possibility of democratic renewal on a procedural level. In both
instances, Eastern Europe serves to fulfil a “mirror” function in which Western
Europe can return to its own democratic roots, which have been lost in the
focus on economic cooperation and institutionalism.
4.1.5 The Inversion of Roles: Eastern Europe and the Threat of
Nationalism
Thus far, this analysis has concentrated on the purported positive aspects of a
European democratic renewal based on a sense of historic unity. Esprit’s
optimism and jubilation is not maintained throughout, but in a third stage shifts
towards a distinct sense of concern regarding the lack of progress Eastern
European countries are making towards European integration. Again, this shift
in argument coincides with a general sense of disillusionment at the time
concerning the difficult transition process of the Eastern European countries. Of
concern for the present discussion is to demonstrate how an inversion of roles
between Eastern and Western Europe is taking place: rather than an inspiration
for the jaded Europe, Eastern Europe becomes a burden for the West. Now,
Western Europe emerges again as a stabilizing democratic influence at a time
when Eastern Europe’s civil society is waning and gives way to the emergence
of dangerous nationalist tendencies, rather than following the path of virtuous,
progressive democracies that Esprit has so ardently sketched out for them - as
the myth of a French “civilizing mission”23 requires.
Specifically, I would like to focus on the aspect of nationalism in order to
show how the coverage of Eastern European themes assumes a distinctly
worried and pessimistic tone. No longer is the question of European identity
23 Robert Gildea, ‘Myth, memory and policy in France since 1945’, in Memory and Power in
Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, ed. by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge:
CUP, 2002) pp. 59-75 (p. 72).
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formulated as an inclusive construction or by positing Eastern Europe as a
mirror held up to the West, but rather moves towards a Self/Other construction
in which Western Europe represents true European values while Eastern
Europe displays more regressive characteristics.
The view that the emerging democracies are possibly less stable than
hoped for and do not necessarily represent impeccable “European” - read:
enlightened and progressive democracies - is already evident in some of
Esprit’s articles by 1990. Amongst them, Fritz Stern’s article ‘L’Europe vue
d’outre-Atlantique’ succinctly illustrates the inversion of the roles that is
allocated to Eastern and Western Europe at this stage. The article deals
amongst other issues with the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe and
juxtaposes these developments with the situation in Western Europe,
specifically the forthcoming signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. He notes:
“quelques paradoxes historiques méritent d’être notés: “l’Europe de 1992
manifeste le déclin du nationalisme, pendant que les grands événements
d’Europe de l’Est annoncent la résurrection de l’orgueil national” (p. 85). Two
contrary developments, so says Stern, are taking place in Europe: while the
West enters a new phase of cooperation and essentially experiences a decline
of nationalism, the East is undergoing a resurrection of national pride and
fervour.
The causes for this dangerous nationalism - here Esprit is quite
unequivocal - lie in economic disparities between the East and West. Pierre
Hassner, one of Esprit’s cautious and admonishing voices, raises concerns
about these inequalities which will most likely lead to a rapid disillusionment in
the East. This initial discontent, he forecasts, caused by economic hardships, is
likely to be compounded by unbridled capitalism that will precipitate the arrival
of defensive, xenophobic, and anti-Western nationalist sentiments. “La dureté
des politiques d’austérité, […] et […] d’un capitalisme sauvage peuvent fort bien
produire des réactions anti-occidentales et xénophobes aboutissant à des
dictatures populiste et nationaliste” (‘Communisme impossible’, p. 80).
These fears are not exclusive to Esprit’s own French commentators but
are shared also by the analysis of the numerous “foreign” commentators
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featured in Esprit. The Hungarian historian, François Fejtö, for example,
concurs that economic disparities will give rise to undemocratic scenarios. “Le
vrai problème de l’avenir est économique. Dans ce contexte, toutes les
démagogies sont possibles.”24 Aleksander Smolar, although he speaks so
enthusiastically about Poland’s historic democratic foundations and its
allegiance to Europe, sees the danger that in the current conditions civil society
remains weak, marred by “un manque de savoir-faire social” (‘Incertitudes
polonaises’, p. 104). He also emphasises that economic uncertainties will
undermine the fabric of a fragile civil society still in search of its place.
If the root causes of this nationalism are identified as economic hardship,
it must be added that a certain degree of criticism about the West’s emphasis
on economic shock therapy for the Eastern bloc is also evident in Esprit’s own
pages. For example, Paul Thibaud remarks that “le triomphe actuellement de
l’Europe est […] d’abord un triomphe du libéralisme”,25 rather than the lasting
triumph of democracy over communism as sketched out by Pierre Hassner one
year previously. Against the backdrop of increasing disillusionment in the East
due to widening economic cleavages between East and West, Esprit does,
however, rally its defences and sketches out how this problem should be
addressed within a European framework. After all, Esprit pronounces that “le
nationalisme est devenu la principale source d’inquiétude quant à l’avenir de
l’Europe”,26 and needs to be addressed accordingly. Thus the West needs to
make its influence felt as a stabilizing model for the Eastern European
countries. Initially, this view is expressed rather straightforwardly by Timothy
Garton Ash, who articulates the idea in an article originally published in the New
York Review of Books. He writes that it is necessary for the West to act as a
stabilizing influence and to project values of a liberal democracy as a
counterforce to the nationalist tide, by forging ahead with “la promotion de la
démocratie”27 in these countries. Put simply, the roles of Eastern and Western
24 François Fejtö, ‘Itinéraire personnel. De Budapest à Paris et de Paris à Budapest: Entretien
avec François Fejtö’, Esprit, 159 (1990), 51-58 (p. 54).
25 Paul Thibaud, ‘L’Europe, essai d’ identification’, Esprit, 176 (1991), 47-63 (p. 50).
26 Pierre Hassner, ‘L’Europe et le spectre des nationalismes’, Esprit, 175 (1991), 5-23 (p. 6).
27 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Dix considérations sur la nouvelle Europe’, Esprit, 163 (1990), 113-117.
(p. 116), originally published in New York Review of Books, 14 June 1990.
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Europe have been reversed: the initial emphasis and infatuation with the East
as a model for a democratically reinvigorated Europe has been replaced by the
conviction that in fact the established democracies of the West need to take the
lead and project and promote democracy on their doorstep.
In several of Esprit’s other articles, however, nationalism does not just
present any threat, but a threat specifically to European democratic values. We
have established in the previous sections how Esprit constructs democracy as a
specifically European ideal and achievement. Moreover, the introductory section
already referred to Thibaud’s text in which he expresses Europe’s constant
need to be on guard against racist or nationalist tendencies. These views are
reiterated also in another article by Thibaud from 1991, ‘L’Europe, essai
d’identification’, in which he notes emphatically that Europe presents “le centre
du monde, l’école de la mondialité, le lieu où les nations s’aident mutuellement
à réaliser leur vocation démocratique.”28 Democracy amounts to an obligation
and “vocation” for Europeans, for “la démocratie est clairement associée aux
idées de progrès et de modernité” (p. 62). These modern democracies
represent European ideals whereas nationalism represents a bygone era which
has no space in this modern and progressive Europe.29 The notion that Europe
represents the pioneering, value-led light in which all nations can fulfil their
calling, is perhaps indicative again of a specifically French school of thought,
and restricted to Esprit, but not debated in the other journals.
Europe’s guiding light is now called upon to return the nations of Eastern
Europe to a democratic path, and to uphold the unfulfilled promise of the 1989
revolutions. The article by Jérôme Sgard, entitled ‘L’utopie libérale en Europe
de l’Est’,30 establishes that the Eastern European countries have since 1989
followed an ultraliberal economic trajectory which has in turn depoliticized the
political space and fatally weakened the prospects of a civil society that would
encourage political dialogue and democratic participation of the citizens. This
has given rise to a culture in which populist and nationalist sentiments can
28 Paul Thibaud, ‘L’Europe, essai d’identification’, Esprit, 176 (1991), 47-63 (p. 62).
29 As suggested also by Marc Olivier Padis in ‘La relève politique de l’Europe de l’Est’, Esprit,
165 (1990), 142-145.
30 Jérôme Sgard, ‘L’utopie libérale en Europe de l’Est’, Esprit, 183 (1992), 62-84.
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fester and take hold. He goes on to suggest that as of 1992 the revolutions of
1989 are no longer perceived in Eastern Europe as the echo of 1789, but as its
defeat: “les révolutions de 1989 ne sont pas reçues en Europe centrale comme
l’écho lointain de celle de 1789: elles seraient vues plutôt comme son ultime
défaite, qui est aussi celle du contrat social et de la volonté de progrès” (p. 73).
Thus, Sgard sketches out the development that he sees as having taken place
in the Eastern European countries: from the embodiment of the ideals of the
1789 revolutions, to their “defeat”, from the possibility of a developed political
space and a social contract to a rampant economic ultraliberalism.
This development - away from European values and positions towards
more insular and nationalist positions - is evident amongst the Eastern
European intelligentsia. Sgard sees the possible faultline as follows: “entre une
intelligentsia intégrée aux échanges et aux courants de pensée européens, et
des sociétés qui restent fermement ancrées dans les cultures politiques plus ou
moins hostiles aux diverses formes d’universalisme occidental” (pp. 71-72).
Without hesitation he declares that the “pro-European” forces constitute the
progressive wing, while any ideology that insists on “le discours de la nation et
de la tradition” (p. 63) is outdated.
With Sgard’s 1992 article the discussion about Eastern Europe and its
place in Europe has come full circle: from the initial promise, hope and
enthusiasm that is invested in the revolutions of 1989 as the new dawn of a
historically reunited and politically rejuvenated Europe, the argument now
changes gear. Crucially, “nationalism” provides a powerful negative foil against
which the “West” posits itself as the carrier of progressive democratic European
values.
Here, I attempted to establish the relevant interpretative frameworks which were
apparent in the discussion of Esprit’s coverage of the 1989 events in Eastern
Europe and during the subsequent transition period. In doing so, the aim was to
demonstrate the shifts in the arguments and the different ways in which Eastern
Europe is tied into the discussion of the newly emerging Europe. From
establishing a historically based common narrative for Eastern and Western
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Europe, Esprit moves to formulating Eastern Europe as an initially positive
mirror image which serves as an inspiration for the jaded and
overinstitutionalized democracies of the West. This view finally gives way to the
conviction that Western European democracies need to prop up the fledgling
transition countries who are displaying nationalist tendencies. At this stage,
Esprit retreats to establishing boundaries and Eastern Europe is being set up as
the negative embodiment of true Western European values.
In the following section, we will turn to NLR and Merkur, in order to
establish where these interpretative frameworks and mechanisms of identity
construction overlap or deviate. Crucially, it will emerge that the concern about
nationalism as a threat to European values is one of the unifying concerns
apparent in all three journals.
4.2 NLR
4.2.1 NLR’s European Agenda
As established in the introduction, NLR is interested in “international socialism”,
rather than in a European framework of analysis in which national interests and
concerns can be overcome or dissolved. Generally, NLR is concerned much
less than Esprit with promoting the idea of a Europe defined by shared historical
ideals and values. Neither is Europe the inevitable and logical political category
above and beyond the nation state in a postnational age that Esprit makes it out
to be. In some regards, NLR’s position is typical of the largely sceptical British
discourse on Europe, which remains at a distance from the continental
discourses. Britain’s entrenched Euroscepticism is often explained with
reference to its “imperial legacy”,31 which is seen as partly responsible for the
country’s reserved and ambivalent attitude towards its role as a “mere” member
state in the European Union, now that its “mantle of ‘imperial’ hegemon” (p.
102), has been taken over by the United States. However, NLR’s criticism of the
EU, we shall see in the following, is not born out of this historical baggage, and
31 Anne Deighton, ‘British Imperial Memories and Europe’, in Memory and Power in Post-War
Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, (see Müller, above), pp. 100-121 (p. 102).
128
is not expressed as a critique of surrendering British political sovereignty, which
underlines many British anti- European discourses.
Rather, the journal’s main bone of contention is that the EU propagates a
systematic and relentless expansion of neoliberal economic policies.
Accordingly, the EU is discussed primarily as an example of a transnational
organisation which provides a legitimising framework for market liberalisation
and the promotion of a free trade agenda. As such, the EU has, in the view of
one NLR contributor, first and foremost served as “the handmaiden to
continental Europe’s postwar boom.”32 Where Esprit wants to re-establish a
Europe that is aware of its historical anchorage and sense of political mission, it
is conceived in NLR primarily as an arena of conflicts between European
business interests and those of European workers. The outcome of these
conflicts will primarily define what kind of Europe will emerge. However, Europe
is merely one, by no means decisive, arena in the world where these two
clashing interests collide within an increasingly globalized economy.
These critical comments having been made, one must nonetheless point
out that NLR’s view of Europe does not only consist of EU-Europe. As will be
shown, the question of alleged common European history and values does
enter the discussion at some strategic points, especially when the question of a
social Europe is being debated. As suggested in Chapter Two, Europe can be
stretched to serve diverse political purposes and ideals; here we will see that
Europe, for NLR, serves to express the desire for a transnational social space.
Some of the elements that provide the backdrop to the shifting
discussions about Eastern Europe in NLR can be summed up as follows: a
socialist agenda and critique which is directed against the EU-Europe, and a
principled rejection of Eurocentrism and nationalism, coupled with a
commitment to universally defined “cosmopolitan Enlightenment ideals”. All
these factors define and sometimes also limit NLR’s discussions about Eastern
Europe. By “limit”, I mean in this context that NLR, more than the other journals,
adheres to ideological views which often predetermine its outlook and leave
little room to expand or develop arguments. For this reason also, the discussion
32 George Ross, ‘Confronting the New Europe’, NLR, 191 (1992), 49-69.
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over the four year period does not develop to the same extent as in Esprit. The
following analysis will aim to highlight how the discussion of Eastern Europe
evolves according to different interpretative frameworks in order to gauge the
extent to which NLR’s discussion follows similar - or different - trajectories as in
the French journal.
4.2.2 After 1989: The “New” European friends
In contrast to Esprit, NLR hardly declares the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe
to be the beginning of a new “Europe”. There are no articles celebrating a
glorious return to Europe and no articles pointing out how Eastern and Western
Europe have historically developed out of the same European intellectual,
political and spiritual influences. The absence of such a historically defined
“united Europe”, however, does not imply that the historical impact of 1989 is
lost on NLR, quite the contrary. Yet the crises and convulsions taking place in
Eastern Europe are not primarily seen as a new beginning for Europe, as Esprit
makes out, but rather as a crisis for socialism as a political project. In the
September issue of 1989, Ralph Miliband proclaims in his article ‘Reflections on
the Crisis of Communist Regimes’ that a “vast mutation” is going on throughout
the Communist world, which undoubtedly constitutes one of the “great turning
points in the history of the twentieth century.”33 He continues: “[w]e know what
this immense historic process is taken to mean by the enemies of socialism
everywhere: not only the approaching demise of Communist regimes and their
replacement by capitalist ones, but the elimination of any kind of socialist
alternative to capitalism” (p. 28).
The question of what form of international socialism might be salvaged in
the wake of the events of 1989 becomes the main concern of NLR’s coverage,
and this is true also of discussions of Europe. Mary Kaldor, a regular contributor
to NLR, describes the relevance of 1989 for Europe in her article ‘After the Cold
War’ as follows.
33 Ralph Miliband, ‘Reflections on the Crisis of Communist Regimes’, NLR, 177 (1989), 27-36
(p. 27). Miliband was a founding member of NLR and influential figure of the British New Left.
He was born in Brussels, where his family – originally Polish Jews from Warsaw – had settled in
1924. The family fled at the beginning of the Second World War and moved to Britain. He died
in 1994. His two sons, Ed and David Miliband, are members in Gordon Brown’s cabinet.
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Indeed what is taking place, in the aftermath of 1989, is a political
struggle for the future of Europe. Whether 1989 was a victory for the neo-
liberal Right, […] or a victory for the new style social movements that
came to prominence in the 1980s, whether East-Central Europe is to be
annexed, economically, socially and culturally, by the West, or whether
we can expect a new evolution of systems in both East and West – all
this depends on politics, on our own contributions to the debates and
campaigns of the 1990s. 34
Kaldor’s article represents an attempt to foretell the future of the “East-West
relationship” on the basis of an historical overview which begins with the end of
World War II. Although this period is recounted as the imposition of a Stalinist
system on Eastern-Central Europe, Kaldor does not portray this history as the
division of a previously united continent and its ultimate reunification.
Equally, in a thematically similar article in the same issue by the eminent
academic Fred Halliday, entitled ‘The Ends of the Cold War’, the historical
background provided is an account of the history of Europe in relation to the
political divisions and partitions after the two world wars of the twentieth
century.35 He concedes that the question of Europe has been central during the
decades of the Cold War. He writes: “throughout the four frozen decades that
have passed, the core issue, the central terrain of rivalry, has been Europe, and
the socio-political system prevailing there” (p. 6). Consequently, he argues, the
question of how Europe will evolve does merit a certain level of attention. He is
quick, however, to deflect any suspicions of Eurocentrism by adding that the
real tragedies of the Cold War have occurred in the “Hot Wars” during that
period especially in Asia, Africa and in Latin America (pp. 6-7). Europe is
therefore just one of the many regions which will have to begin a process of
reassessment and reorientation. NLR’s self-conscious reluctance to indulge in a
view perceived as Eurocentric effectively prevents a deeper engagement with
the question of how Europe might position itself in the wake of the political
changes in Eastern Europe
34 Mary Kaldor, ‘After the Cold War’, NLR, 180 (1990), 25-41 (p. 26-27). Kaldor is Professor of
Global Governance at the LSE and a frequent NLR contributor. She is also a founding member
of the END (European Nuclear Disarmament) movement.
35 Fred Halliday, ‘The End of the Cold War’, NLR, 180 (1990), 5-25.
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Where Esprit relies on the idea of an imagined shared history and
common European values derived from the ideals of the French Revolution,
NLR restricts its account to postwar history and the ideological battles during
the Cold War. The interpretation offered by Esprit is not even alluded to in NLR.
Thus, while the notion of the return to a common European home is evident
amongst Esprit’s French and foreign contributors, it does not feature at all in this
British publication. This lack of engagement with the notion of “historically
intertwined, newly reunited Europe” indicates already the very different
mindsets and outlooks that are in play here, between which little exchanges or
even acknowledgement of different positions is taking place. It comes as no
surprise, therefore, when Mary Kaldor concludes her article with a plea for a
renewed dialogue with what she calls “our new friends in the East” (p. 84). They
are precisely “new” friends, not old, long-lost friends with whom we have been
finally reunited, as Esprit would claim.
4.2.3 Doubts about Democracy in Europe
In Esprit, the emphasis on “redemocratizing Europe” is relevant to its
declarations of European “renewal”. In NLR, however, deep-seated scepticism
of the particular form of democracy that is being promoted in the post-revolution
climate again limits the development of such a European perspective. Evidently,
the journal is not opposed per se to the revolutions; in fact, NLR “salutes” this
“wave of people power in Eastern Europe.”36 The general tenor is a cautious
welcoming of the “awakening of political life” and agreement that the events of
1989 are in fact motivated by a “popular thirst for democracy”.37 Yet NLR is
wary of overt jubilation about the tentative redemocratization of Eastern Europe,
which it considers still too fragile. The editorials are quick to point out, for
example, that the political developments have “brought no improvement in the
economic situation nor prevented an escalation of ugly incidents of national
suppression and violence.”38 And by early 1991 the editorials have definitely
taken a more sombre turn: “[f]ollowing the ‘revolutions of 1989’ there was a
36 ‘Themes’, NLR, 179 (1990), 1-3 (p. 1).
37 ‘Themes’, NLR, 174 (1989), 1-3 (p. 1).
38 ‘Themes’, NLR, 177 (1989), 1-3 (p. 1).
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widespread belief that a new era of peace was dawning in the world and that
democracy was carrying all before it. One year later the sanguine hopes of that
time have been belied”.39
This interpretation derives from an underlying scepticism of the prevailing
form of democracy, which NLR sees as being “imposed” on Eastern Europe.
After all, NLR has an altogether different concept of democracy. The journal
advocates a “participatory democracy that upholds the values of socialist
humanism”40 as the only viable option. Democracy should be first and foremost
a means of invoking social rights and a system that can “pacify the
contradictions of the capitalist market” (Camiller, ‘Beyond 1992', p. 3). The form
of Western liberal democracy that is evoked so jubilantly in Esprit as the path
towards freedom and self-determination, however, is, in NLR’s interpretation,
“guilty by association” with detrimental free-market policies. Its main dereliction
of duty is considered to be “acquiescence in the inhuman effects of capitalism
and imperialism” (p. 2). The following two texts – one by the late Italian
philosopher and historian of political thought Norberto Bobbio, the other by
Peter Gowan, a member of NLR’s editorial board - illustrate the ambivalence
about the implications of democracy that characterize most of NLR’s articles
during this time.
Norberto Bobbio’s article ‘The Upturned Utopia’41 emphasises first of all
the positive achievements of liberal democracies, namely to have secured the
“freedoms of modern man”, and he reminds readers of the “slow and arduous”
process through which “our democracies” (p. 38) have been achieved. Bobbio,
however, never makes clear who or what is meant by “our”: it might well refer to
European, or more generally “Western” democracies, but in any case he makes
no attempt to render a European framework explicit, which is broadly typical of
NLR’s approach. Consider, by contrast, how on numerous occasions Esprit had
established democracy as a specifically European accomplishment. In NLR,
however, such a positively defined European framework is scrupulously
avoided. With regard to Eastern Europe Bobbio then goes on to argue that,
39 ‘Themes’, NLR, 185 (1991), 1-3 (p. 1).
40 ‘Themes’, NLR, 180 (1990), 1-3 (p. 2).
41 Norberto Bobbio, ‘The Upturned Utopia’, NLR, 177 (1989), 37-40.
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despite all the achievements and guarantees of securities, “the law-based
liberal-democratic state” is no adequate framework to solve problems of today,
especially in those countries which are in the process of transition, as this form
of democracy is too corroded by free-market influences.
Similarly, a text by Peter Gowan published in 1990 begins with a
statement that “conventional wisdom does not for a moment doubt that the
peoples of Eastern Europe have at last entered the realm of freedom and self-
determination.”42 Yet Gowan is sceptical whether this is really the case or
whether the countries have not in fact merely substituted one imposed system -
socialism - for another, namely capitalism. Gowan asks whether the transition
processes really amount to a “political democratization” or whether they do not
just represent another “capitalist social transformation” (p. 66). In short, he is
unconvinced that the needs of Eastern Europe can be adequately met by
democratization. The reservations voiced here to a degree reflect NLR’s
preoccupation with readjusting its own theoretical position on socialism.43
Therefore, the critique voiced against the dominance of a capitalist democratic
framework that is threatening to engulf the Eastern European countries does
not involve the question of how these countries will integrate into a European
democratic framework.
Although NLR recognises the inherent value and appeal of “liberal
democracy”, it does not consider this to be an adequate basis for promoting a
European renewal. In fact, NLR takes issue with the very idea of European
democratic renewal as it is laid out in Esprit, for example. This point is made not
by one of NLR’s British contributors, but by the well-known Slovenian
philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek. The article ‘Eastern Europe’s
Republics of Gilead’44 deals in the main with the rise of nationalism in Eastern
42 Peter Gowan, ‘Western Economic Diplomacy and the New Eastern Europe’, NLR, 182
(1990), 63-85 (p. 63). [Emphasis mine].
43 This concern is apparent in articles such as Jürgen Habermas, ‘What does Socialism Mean
Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left’, NLR, 183
(1990), 3-23, and in Robin Blackburn, ‘Fin de Siècle: Socialism after the Crash’, NLR, 185
(1991), 5-67.
44 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead’, NLR, 183 (1990), 50-62, originally given
as a conference paper at the University of California (San Diego, 28 April 1990) The article’s
title, Žižek explains, alludes to the dystopian “Republic of Gilead” that the Canadian writer
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Europe. I will discuss nationalism further below; at this point, however, I would
like to draw attention to the beginning of the article, where Žižek criticises what
he terms Western Europe’s misdirected “gaze”. Taking issue with the broadly
defined “Western” stance towards Eastern Europe, he begins his text with the
rhetorical question why the “West” is so fascinated by recent events in Eastern
Europe and delivers the following answer in the form of a somewhat sophistic
Freudian analysis:
What fascinates the Western gaze is the re-invention of democracy. It is
as if democracy, which in the West shows increasing signs of decay and
crisis, lost in bureaucratic routine and publicity-style election campaigns,
is being rediscovered in Eastern Europe in all its freshness and novelty.
The function of this fascination is thus purely ideological: in Eastern
Europe the West looks for its own lost origins, for the democratic
experience of ‘democratic invention’. In other words, Eastern Europe
functions for the West as its Ego-Ideal: the point from which the West
sees itself in a likeable, idealized form, as worthy of love (p. 50).
Žižek does not further specify which countries he is alluding to, nor does he
provide evidence or examples to support his assessment. His argument does,
however, represent an instance of what I identified above, in the discussion of
Esprit, as the “use” of Eastern Europe as a Western “mirror image” and model
for democratic renewal. Žižek points out that this mechanism has in fact little to
do with incorporating Eastern Europe into a European framework, but rather is
indicative of Western navel-gazing. His exposition can be read not only as a
critique of the idea of a European democratic renewal, but also as an attack on
what he sees as Western European self-absorption and Eurocentrism.
Thus far, neither Esprit’s idea of a historically reunited Europe nor that of
a newly democratic Europe is relevant or adequate for NLR. In this instance, the
inherent scepticism towards the implications of “liberal democracy” explains why
NLR does not posit “democracy” as an adequate category for explaining the
changes that Europe is undergoing. In fact, the premise of a “democratic
renewal” is dismissed as a narcissistic Western prism. Even so, this does not
Margaret Atwood has depicted in her novel The Handmaid’s Tale: a republic in which “a moral-
majority fundamentalism reigns” (p. 62).
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deter NLR from pronouncing Eastern Europe as an agent for a social “renewal”
of Europe, as will be shown below.
4.2.4 The Chances of a Social Renewal for Europe
For NLR, a new social framework is the prerequisite for a European
regeneration. Already in 1989 an editorial pronounces that “socialist renewal
remains the only basis on which the problems of the [Eastern European] region
can be lastingly tackled”.45 The search for such a “socialist renewal” is
motivated by a sense of discontent over social policy in Europe. We have
already seen how in Esprit the possibility of a new beginning has been posited
on the basis of discontent over the undemocratic and inscrutable decision-
making processes epitomized by Maastricht. Similarly in NLR, as Chapter Three
has already indicated (see Section 3.4), Maastricht serves as a springboard for
advocating a vision of a renewal of Europe which incorporates - to an extent at
least - the question of Eastern Europe.
While Esprit has identified the lack of democratic processes as its main
concern in relation to Maastricht, NLR stresses how the treaty will tip the
already markedly neoliberal policies in Europe even further towards the
interests of big business. On the question of democratizing Europe, Mary
Kaldor’s aforementioned article, for example, makes only passing reference to
the need for a “democratization of new and existing trans-European institutions”
(p. 36). This is not to say that the argument pertaining to a “lack of democracy”
is entirely absent. It is mentioned in many of the articles, such as a 1992 article
by Niels Christiansen which discusses the Danish No-vote to the Maastricht
treaty. The author makes mention of the fact that “the bureaucracy in Brussels
is too far away, and besides, is impervious to the claims of popular movements”
and pronounces that, overall, “the EC suffers from what has been called a
‘democratic deficit’”.46 By and large, however, the discussion of the European
democratic deficit is simply not as important to NLR’s critique of Maastricht as it
is in Esprit.
45 ‘Themes’, NLR, 176 (1989), 1-3 (p. 1).
46 Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘The Danish No to Maastricht’, NLR, 195 (1992), 97-102 (p. 101).
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Both journals identify civil society groups, more commonly referred to in
NLR as “social movements”, as the potential sources of European renewal. Of
special importance to NLR are traditional labour movements and trade unions,
though it also grants much attention also to the social movements emanating
from Eastern Europe.47 Their main role in a European context is to redress
Europe’s existing economic and social imbalances, which are currently under
even greater threat from the Maastricht treaty. Patrick Camiller, for example,
has the following to say on the issue of Maastricht.
Whatever elements of indicative planning it [Maastricht] may have
contained, the programme of European integration has been
progressively stripped down to a core idea that the removal of national
barriers to capital movement and economic activity will clear the path to
dynamic renewal of the European economy.” 48
He then calls upon the European labour movements and trade unions to
provide a positive counterbalance to this economic onslaught. For it is only if the
“organized labour movements of continental Europe”, and the “European Left”
as a whole unite, Camiller claims, that they can provide an “alternative to 1992”
(pp. 10-11). Other articles, such as one by John Grahl and Paul Teague entitled
‘The Cost of Neo-Liberal Europe’, also point to the way in which Europe has
been “hijacked by corporate interests”,49 resulting in a complete absence of a
“social space” (p. 48). The authors then appeal for a united Europe in which the
dispersed national trade unions need to rally together in order to ensure a
unified European social space.
Undermining these proposals, however, is always an intermittent
scepticism about their viability. Intellectual historian Donald Sassoon has
pointed out that this uncertainty was characteristic of the European socialist
movement which found itself marginalized during the neo-liberal resurgence of
the early 1990s.50 Accordingly, Peter Gowan, in his article ‘Western Economic
47 See for example: Andrzej Walicki, ‘From Stalinism to Post-Communist Pluralism: The Case of
Poland’, NLR, 185 (1991), 92-121; Petr Uhl‚ ‘The Fight for a Socialist Democracy in
Czechoslovakia’, NLR, 179 (1990), 111-119.
48 Patrick Camiller, ‘Beyond 1992: The Left and Europe’, NLR, 175 (1989), 5-19 (p. 8).
49 John Grahl and Paul Teague, ‘The Cost of Neo-Liberal Europe’, NLR, 174 (1989), 33-51 (p.
49).
50 See Donald Sassoon, ‘The New Revisionism’, in One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West
European Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: The New Press, 1996), pp. 730-755.
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Diplomacy and the New Eastern Europe’, heavily criticizes the “Western” goal of
striving for the quickest possible transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe
without taking account of the social costs of such a development, and remains
unconvinced that social forces there will be able to exert any real influence.
Similarly, Italian author Lucio Magri notes that Europe is in fact marked by an
inherently “weak capacity to foster and support mass movements”51 amongst
workers, which will also limit the possibility for co-operation between East and
West. Thus, although Magri is deeply committed to the idea that Europe’s social
problems need to be addressed in a pan-European rather than national
framework, he is doubtful about the chances of success. Where the possibility
of a renewal is seriously discussed, however, it depends on an alliance between
Eastern and Western European “reform forces”. For example, one of NLR’s
editorials pronounces that “as the West European governments prepare to give
up many of their national regulatory levers, an alliance between the Western
Left and socialist reform forces in the East could throw back the neo-liberal
offensive of the past decade and place planned social advance once again at
the heart of debate on the continent.”52
Accordingly, Camiller writes that “the European Left should in principle
welcome the idea of a genuine integration of the economic and cultural
resources of a continent whose fragmentation has underlaid two world wars in
this century” (‘Beyond 1992’, p. 11). Note that this quotation is one of only a few
occasions where NLR refers to the “continent” of Europe, not just “EU - Europe”
in the sense of a political or economic entity. When it comes to relaunching a
socialist Europe, the Eastern European countries are being quite readily
integrated into a European framework in order to pronounce a European social
renewal. In fact, it presents the only instance in which NLR declares East and
West to be part of a common European framework and united and motivated by
a common goal. Moreover, the “reform forces” not only share the same goal,
but are also made out to be the carriers of expressly “European” traditions
which constitute the “cosmopolitan Enlightenment ideal” (p. 9). This “ideal”
51 Lucio Magri, ‘The European Left between Crisis and Refoundation’, NLR, 189 (1991),
5-19 (p. 8).
52 ‘Themes’, NLR, 175 (1989), 1-3 (p. 1).
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encompasses the values of “liberty, equality and solidarity for all residents of
Europe” (p. 15). In fact, Camiller argues, the current struggle over Europe is in
his view at the core of the “destiny of the three-hundred-year tradition of the
Enlightenment” (p. 16). For the socialist movement is the carrier of these ideals:
“the socialist movement could rightly claim to be the inheritor of the
Enlightenment ideal of a Europe in which national antagonisms had been
overcome” (p. 6).
In a similar vein, Mary Kaldor’s article stresses the role of social
movements throughout the 1980s and discusses the future part that they might
play in establishing a new sense of pan-European solidarity and social justice.
The Western peace movements in the 1980s built “links with peace, green and
human rights groups in the East”, as a result of which “the individual isolated
dissident gave way to social movements as a new form of opposition in East-
Central Europe” (‘After the Cold War’, p. 34). Kaldor asserts, like Camiller, that
these movements represent the “proud and honourable socialist tradition in
Europe – of workers’ movements, ideas and education” (p. 37).
On the basis of these existing links between Eastern and Western
groups, Kaldor asserts that a new direction for Europe might be viable.
Currently, she detects a trend of an “Americanization of Europe”, marked by
“high levels of military spending, high levels of private consumption, a kind of
unifying materialist culture, and pockets of poverty especially in the European
periphery” (p. 35). However, she also envisages a second possible direction for
Europe.
The second direction, proposed by the new social movements,
emphasizes their concerns about peace, the environment, gender,
multiculturalism and democracy. This would involve a more equal
relationship between East and West Europe in which there was change
in the West as well as the East (p. 36).
As Kaldor sees it, Europe in its present form is a dystopia, marked by
materialism, capitalism, and militarism. The realisation of a socialist, pacifist,
and green Europe will depend crucially on the re-uniting of Eastern and
Western social movements. These social movements, she maintains, will be the
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main factors in European renewal, rather than the integrating forces of shared
history and democracy as propounded in Esprit.
The social renewal which NLR advocates here might build on the
involvement of Eastern Europe, but it is in fact restricted to promoting NLR’s
predetermined agenda of a social Europe. Thus, while NLR criticizes “Western”
discourse for its allegedly narcissistic gaze in connection with a democratic
renewal, it in fact appropriates Eastern Europe in a very similar fashion when it
comes to calling for a European social renewal.
4.2.5 Nationalism: Bonding Against the Agreed Enemy
This final section will address how NLR uses a European framework in
connection with the question of nationalism, a theme that enters NLR’s articles
extensively from 1990 onwards. As mentioned earlier, in NLR’s opinion, the
“Enlightenment ideal of a Europe in which national antagonisms had been
overcome” (Camiller, ‘Beyond 1992’, p. 6) provides the desirable state of
affairs.53 It goes without saying that nationalism is unequivocally condemned
and considered a threat and challenge that must be taken seriously. After all, as
Žižek caustically remarks in ‘Republics of Gilead’, the eruption of nationalism “in
all its violence has always taken by surprise the devotees of international
solidarity” (p. 57). Thus, nationalism in Eastern Europe is reported in a distinctly
alarmed tone. Žižek explains: “The dark side of the processes current in
Eastern Europe is thus the gradual retreat of the liberal-democratic tendency in
the face of the growth of corporate national populism with all its usual elements,
from xenophobia to anti-Semitism” (p. 51). The reasons behind this explosion of
nationalist sentiment are, as in Esprit, chiefly attributed to instability and
imbalances created by the “capitalist purgatory”54 to which the West has
consigned the Eastern European countries. Peter Gowan considers the West’s
economic policies directly responsible for the emergence of “authoritarian
53 At least as a principle or state of mind: where the dissolution of the nation state also implies
free trade and economic liberalism, NLR does invoke the right of nations to reassert their
borders quite readily, as in the following text by Alain Lipietz, ‘The Debt Problem, European
Integration and the new Phase of World Crisis’, NLR, 178 (1989), 37-51.
54 ‘Themes’, NLR, 182 (1990), 1-3 (p. 2).
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populist and nationalist movements” (‘Western Economic Diplomacy’, p. 80) in
Eastern Europe.
Crucially, NLR does not see nationalism as confined to Eastern Europe.
Instead, it alleges that these developments are closely matched in Western
Europe where they are prevalent in the form of racism and demagogic
populism. Whereas Esprit uses “nationalism” to posit the progressive European
West against a regressive East, NLR depicts it as a common European
denominator deriving from an entwined history. In this view history is about to
repeat itself, at a time when “fin de siècle capitalism becomes mired in its own
contradictions”.55 As Camiller points out, national antagonism is one of the key
themes of European history that have been detrimental in the past to the
development of European solidarity.
Just as the nation-state has become a barrier to social and economic
advancement within the geographic space of Europe, so have the
nineteenth century or earlier identities of European citizens become a
factor of often quite explosive division within most of the major European
countries (p. 15 -16).
This perspective is further established in a text entitled ‘Nationalism and Politics
in Eastern Europe’ by Ernest Gellner, the eminent theorist of nationalism.56
Gellner explains the current rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe by setting it in
a larger historical context. His point of departure is the Congress of Vienna in
1815, from where he charts the different stages and developments that
nationalism has undergone in the emergent European nation states. There is no
room here to go into the detail of Gellner’s highly sophisticated exposition of the
causes of nationalism in relation to industrialisation and modernity. It is relevant
to note, however, that he considers nationalism in Eastern Europe as a
development that is regrettable but unsurprising, because foreseeable. “The
political reaffirmation of ethnic identity”, he remarks, is part of a pattern that is
now “being played out in new, indeed completely original circumstances” (p.
133).
55 ‘Themes’, NLR, 193 (1992), 1-3 (p. 1).
56 Ernest Gellner, ‘Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe’, NLR, 189 (1991), 127-134.
141
The article serves as a reminder that the events in Eastern Europe are by
no means unprecedented but can be understood to some extent as a variation
of processes which Europe has witnessed throughout the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries. Gellner’s article is written in very matter-of-fact prose and
does not make any overt declarations that posit “nationalism” as a shared
“European” burden or legacy. It reads, however, as a sober and restrained
antidote to Esprit’s paternalistic and self-congratulatory accounts of nationalism
as a solely Eastern European affliction.
An article by Benedict Anderson, entitled ‘The New World Disorder’,
paints an even broader canvas.57 Here, as in Gellner’s text, nationalism is
placed in its historical context and analysed as the manifestation and result of
deeply conflicting and troubling imbalances caused by industrial capitalism,
mass communication and mass migrations. Eastern Europe is mentioned in this
text as only one example of a region where “nationalism and ethnicity are very
likely to move in” (p. 7) to replace lost ideologies. Crucially, in Anderson’s
analysis nationalism is not a sign of political atavism. Rather, it can display
distinctly modern tendencies and is evident everywhere in the world, including
in Europe. In fact, a particularly virulent form of nationalism is alive and well, he
reminds readers, in the United Kingdom, where the IRA is conducting a ruthless
terror campaign feeding on a “local nationalist appeal” (p. 13).
To sense these [nationalist] forces one does not need to go outside Old
Europe itself. As the crow flies, Belfast is less than 500 kilometres from
London, but has been an armed camp for the past twenty-five years,
despite British use of the most sophisticated urban counter-insurgency
methods against the IRA (p. 12-13).
Anderson’s comparison serves to highlight the notion that nationalism is in fact
a pervasive European phenomenon which can be explained historically and is
now experiencing a revival in distinctly modern permutations. Eastern Europe is
not being singled out as the wayward, deviant European “Other”, as in Esprit.
Instead, nationalism provides a common thread that links these countries
together.
57 Benedict Anderson, ‘The New World Disorder’, NLR, 193 (1992), 3-15.
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For an explicit statement which highlights this “shared European
experience”, we can now turn to the article by the French writer Étienne Balibar;
‘Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe today’.58 (The
article owes its partly German title to the fact that Balibar delivered it as speech
at a conference in Germany, and in this printed version, NLR has retained the
reference to the original German.) The text’s central message - though in terms
of style and terminology immediately recognizable as atypical for NLR – is
consonant with Gellner’s and Anderson’s analysis of the problems of racism
and nationalism in Europe: unsurprisingly, perhaps, since Balibar is firmly
anchored in the political Left. He states explicitly that Europe is historically at
once marred, but also united by the ideology of nationalism. His article attempts
to set into context the problem of a resurgent nationalism and racism which he
sees as central to the understanding of Europe.
The ending of the political division of Europe is a progressive
development of immense historical significance. It is understandably
accompanied by a certain enthusiasm among intellectuals for the idea of
‘European culture’ and one can share this enthusiasm which is
productive of new ideas and projects. But the mass ideological reality
corresponding to this culture is at first one of exacerbated nationalisms
(p. 8).
Balibar warns that the idea of a positively defined European culture should be
approached with scepticism. Instead, it is necessary to look at the issue of
European nationalism. For Balibar, Europe presents a “historical problem
without any pre-established solutions,” and nationalism is part of this dilemma:
European culture, and so the very idea or myth of Europe, intrinsically
contains, […] two specifically racist ideological schemes which are likely
to continue producing memory and collective-perception effects: the
colonial schema, and the schema of anti-Semitism (p. 12).
In posing the question of nationalism as a unifying European trait, Balibar spells
out what is only implied in the other texts. Unlike in Esprit, where “nationalism”
serves as a category for differentiation between the “progressive and the
58 Étienne Balibar, ‘Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe today’, NLR,
186 (1991), 5-20, originally delivered to the Congress on Migration and Racism (Hamburg, 27-
30 September 1990).
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regressive Europe”, in NLR it serves as a unifying factor that enables inclusion
in a historically defined Europe, a framework which NLR scrupulously avoids in
other instances. Here Eastern Europe becomes part of Europe because it
follows a historically recognisable pattern. These “colonialist and anti-Semitic
schemes” continually produce variations of racism and nationalism in different
guises, which include both the populist, demagogic nationalism in Eastern
Europe and the murderous “modern” nationalism of the IRA.
Finally, if for NLR, liberal European democracies are not a viable
alternative that would contain this nationalism, since they are “tainted” by
association, what is? Again, the “universal” Enlightenment values already
invoked in relation to the European tradition of workers’ solidarity come into play
once more. In the 1992 article ‘The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies’,59 Eric
Hobsbawm identifies all “right-wing, demagogic, xenophobic, nationalist
regimes” as “the most dangerous phenomenon of our fin-de-siècle” (p. 64). The
only values which might be able to counter them are those “of freedom, reason
and civilization” (p. 64). Similarly Camiller points also to the way in which these
ideals can be achieved by referring to that classical Enlightenment maxim, the
“universal programme of emancipation” (‘Beyond 1992’, p. 11).
In short, the discussion of nationalism in Eastern Europe does not
declare the existence of two different “Europes” (and a strict hierarchy as to
which is preferable). NLR, as I have shown, is in most instances very reticent in
constructing its arguments around a shared European history. In this instance,
however, an overarching European framework is made explicit and nationalism
becomes the common binding denominator between Eastern and Western
Europe.
In order to analyse the discussion about Eastern Europe in NLR, it has been
necessary to first point to the different aspects that determine NLR’s discourse
on Europe, which include: internal reservations about promoting a possible
Eurocentrism, general doubts about the neoliberal nature of European
integration, and a prism which is primarily concerned with the aspect of
59 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies’, NLR, 192 (1992), 55-65.
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socialism versus capitalism, rather than with the question of establishing a new
European framework. They all explain in parts why NLR is initially not as prone
as Esprit to invoking a European framework and to including Eastern Europe as
part of a recognisable European space.
It was indicated earlier how NLR completely bypasses the idea of a
historically united Europe or the use of European democracy as an integrating
political concept. In neither of these cases are the changes in Eastern Europe
discussed as a relevant factor in the emergence of the new European
landscape. However, where NLR’s own agenda comes into play, namely that of
a “socialist renewal”, the reform forces are credited as the carriers of these
European Enlightenment values. Overall, relatively little evidence of a cross-
cultural dialogue and hence of a common public sphere between the journals is
taking place. Each advertises different roles for Eastern Europe in the new
Europe. While there is disagreement between NLR and Esprit as to the
relevance of certain categories, such as the role of history and that of
democracy in light of 1989, the question of nationalism, however, is considered
in NLR, as it is in Esprit, as the determining factor in the further development of
Europe. In the concluding part of this comparison we will now turn to Merkur in
order to assess where its discussions differ from, or correspond to, what has
been ascertained so far.
4.3 Merkur
4.3.1 Merkur’s European Agenda
In Merkur, one must differentiate clearly between the notion of the political
Europe and that of Europe as a cultural or civilizational ideal. For, while the
journal is largely unconvinced of European political integration, it celebrates
Europe as represented by figures of “high” culture, such as Thomas Mann and
Mozart, and regards itself as bound to classical European traditions and values.
Moreover, Germany is seen to provide a special contribution to this European
civilization. For example, a translated text on the prospects of German
reunification originally published in Le Monde by the French academic Serge
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Christophe Kolm has the following to say on Germany’s cultural depth and
contribution to “European civilisation”.
Das wahre Deutschland, […] ist der Name einer Kultur von einem
Reichtum einer Kraft der geistigen wie der emotionalen Tiefenschichten,
die sie zu einem der imponierendsten Zeugnisse der Menschheit
erheben und zu einem der beiden Pole der europäischen Zivilisation.60
Kolm does not specifically mention what the second “pole of European
civilisation” is, but one is inclined to speculate that he has France in mind, given
that the author is French himself. What is most revealing about this passage,
however, is that Merkur publishes this “praise” of German culture from the pen
of a foreigner - possibly because it would be unacceptable for German
intellectuals to use such hyperbolic language. One might infer from this
quotation that it does indeed express the way in which Merkur’s editors would
like to think about German culture, even if they are unable to say so outright.
Yet this ideal of Europe as a superior civilizational model should not be
confused with the contemporary EU Europe, since politics should not be guided
by assumptions of shared values or cultural commonalities but by political
expediency and national self-interest alone. Lord Ralf Dahrendorf (who will be
quoted extensively in the following, since he is Merkur’s most prominent source
of essays on Europe) points out that a political Europe should grow out of the
pursuit of overlapping interests: “Europa als politische Realität entsteht aus
gemeinsamen Interessen der bestehenden Staaten, die ihrerseits in rechtliche
und institutionelle Form gegossen werden.”61
Merkur’s main argument against too deep an integration is that only
sovereign nation states can guarantee functioning democratic representation
and ensure peace and security for its citizens. Therefore, Merkur is arguing for
a Europe in which nations cooperate but at no point surrender too much
sovereignty. In this regard, Merkur’s discourse is different from the views of a
majority of German intellectuals, which have been largely unequivocal about the
necessity for a strong Europe in order to neutralize and contain the dangers that
60 Serge Christoph Kolm, ‘“Teutomanie” und Pascals Wette: Zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung’,
Merkur, 494 (1990), 345-350 (p. 349).
61 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Europa der Regionen?’, Merkur, 509 (1991), 703-707 (p. 705).
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strong nation states potentially pose; a position which is in turn determined by
Germany’s own disastrous historical experience. Therefore: “[t]o be a ‘good
European German’ […] means to have finally overcome the country’s militarist
and nationalist past and to have learned the right lesson from history.”62
Merkur’s arguments are, however, not determined by this specific
German discourse about Europe, which is based on the country’s historical
experience. Rather, editor Karl Heinz Bohrer advocated that a country’s
relationship with historical memory should be foregone in favour of a more
acute “socio-analysis of the present”,63 unconstrained, one might infer, by
historical taboos.
The journal repeatedly makes the case for the continuous relevance of
the nation as the main ordering category – while conceding that exactly these
borders are being eroded and dissolved in the new “postnational” age. To
Merkur the nation state is not only relevant as the guarantor for peace and
democracy but also as the sole legitimate political actor. Thus Dahrendorf writes
in one of his columns: “Staat heißt nun mal nach wie vor Nationalstaat” and
“Europa ist kein Ersatz für den Nationalstaat”.64 As a result of this emphasis on
the role of the state, there is less attention paid to the role of civil society and
peace movements, which Esprit and NLR explore. Instead, the discussion
focuses on the role of the state, on treaties and organisation, and on the way in
which these organisations will shape the Europe that is emerging in the wake of
the events of 1989. For example, concerning the role of the economic
importance of the European Union, Rüdiger Altmann writes:
Ziel der europäischen Einigung ist weder die Wiederbelebung des
christlichen Abendlandes noch irgendeiner anderen Vergangenheit, noch
die Restabilisierung nationaler Traditionen, noch eine wirtschaftlich
gefestigte Frontstellung nach Osten. Aufgabe der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft ist die Herstellung eines gemeinsamen Marktes seiner
Mitglieder.65
62 Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, ‘Identity Politics and European Integration: The
Case of Germany’, in The Idea of Europe (see Pagden, above), pp. 287-313 (p. 287).
63Adam Chalmers, ‘Refiguring the European Union’s Historical Dimension’, European Journal of
Political Theory, 5 (2006), 437-454 (p. 442).
64 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Eine deutsche Identität’, Merkur, 493 (1990), 231-235 (p. 234).
65 Rüdiger Altmann, ‘Der Nomos der Marktgemeinschaft. Zur Rekonstruktion Europas durch die
politische Ökonomie’, Merkur, 489 (1989), 960- 973 (p. 963).
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Consequently, the rationale for the Maastricht treaty is presented as follows:
Die westeuropäischen Staaten schließen sich in der Vollendung des
Binnenmarkts 1992 wirtschaftlich und später in einer Europäischen
Politischen Union politisch zusammen, weil sie allein zu klein sind, um
den Anforderungen ihrer Bürger nach Steigerung wirtschaftlichen
Wohlstandes und Gewährleistung physischer Sicherheit gerecht zu
werden.66
Altmann declares this form of economic-political cooperation preferable to
utopian visions of a common “European home” which are not conducive to
solving the “real” problems which Europe has to face up to. Dahrendorf writes:
“dieses unpräzise, träumerische, eigentlich utopische Europa löst kein einziges
Problem” (’Europa der Regionen’, p. 705). Furthermore, Karl Heinz Bohrer
points out that a coherent European idea or cultural unity does not exist and
amounts to nothing more than “eine rein ideologische Formel […] ohne
Realitätsgehalt”.67
Initially, Merkur aims to maintain this neat distinction between political
pragmatism and Europe as a carrier of civilizational ideals and values. There
are no set ideas about what exactly 1989 might entail for Europe, nor are the
same hopes attached to “European renewal” as in Esprit or NLR. Over the
course of the four years this position begins to soften slightly and there emerges
a greater awareness that the developments in Eastern Europe will affect
Europe’s identity. However, this more “inclusive” view is swiftly reversed in
relation to the discussion of nationalism, which follows a pattern similar to Esprit
and NLR, as it provokes strong declarations of European Enlightenment values.
4.3.2 Rejecting Utopias
Initially, Merkur rejects the idea of a historically united and tragically divided
Europe that Esprit so passionately invokes. Unlike in NLR, where there was no
engagement with this concept at all, Merkur shows an attempt at least to
respond to these ideas, even though it does not concur with Esprit’s
interpretation.
66 Ernst Otto Czempiel, ‘Konturen einer Gesellschaftswelt. Die neue Architektur der
internationalen Politik’, Merkur, 500 (1990), 835-851 (p. 844-845).
67 Karl-Heinz Bohrer, ‘Provinzialismus (VI) Europrovinzialismus’, Merkur, 512 (1991), 1059-1068
(p. 1064).
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Merkur’s authors criticize the trend towards “rehistoricizing” the year of
1989 in a specific European context. They find fault with the outpourings of
jubilation and with the parallels that are being drawn between the current events
and the French Revolution of 1789. These ideas are voiced by the German
writer Jochen Schimmang, who describes what he sees as a trend amongst
German intellectuals and politicians to fall back on readily available, but
ultimately vacuous comparisons between 1989 and 1789.68 Schimmang notes:
“[e]s scheint als fordere der schöne Gleichklang 1789/1989 zur Sinnproduktion
geradezu heraus” (p. 341), and mocks the way in which eminent journalists
from other German publications such as Der Spiegel and Die Zeit have used
these juxtapositions. For Schimmang, these declarations reveal a facile,
romanticized enchantment of intellectuals with the notion of popular uprising.
Another text published one year later by the political scientist Claus Offe
similarly dismisses the metaphors of a common European home as
“Augenblickserfindungen mit absichtsvoll undeutlichem semantischem
Gehalt”.69
In essence, the objections to these comparisons stem from to the idea
that the “common cultural Europe” is considered by Merkur as an empty
ideological formula, a position more thoroughly explained in a text by Michael
Rutschky entitled ‘Mitteleuropa: Rückblick auf eine kurzfristige Utopie’.70 In the
article, the author dismisses the entire edifice on which Esprit, for example,
builds its ideal of a common, united European space as an unqualified
intellectual construction which elevates alleged shared cultural and historical
values to hide real existing differences. The author refers specifically to the
writings of Eastern European intellectuals which have stressed their countries’
impeccable resistance towards Soviet hegemony and innate allegiance to
Western European culture and identity (as we have seen for example in
Smolar’s exposition in Esprit). Rutschky does not specifically discuss the
68 Jochen Schimmang, ‘Die Wiederkehr des Weltgeistes: Unsystematische Anmerkungen zum
neuen Glauben an die Geschichte’, Merkur, 494 (1990), 340-344.
69 Claus Offe, ‘Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in
Osteuropa’, Merkur, 505 (1991), 279-292 (p. 280).
70 Michael Rutschky, ‘Mitteleuropa. Rückblick auf eine kurzfristige Utopie’, Merkur, 516 (1992),
183 -200.
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resonance of this concept amongst Western European intellectuals, but alleges
that this construction of a culturally cohesive and united “Mitteleuropa” which
conflates Western with Central/Eastern Europe is in essence “ein kulturelles
Identitätschema” (p. 185) and a “utopisches Selbstbild” (p. 186) that naively
celebrates cultural pluralism under an all-embracing label of the “European”
space, whilst glossing over existing cultural and historical disparities between
Eastern and Western Europe. This is potentially even dangerous, Rutschky
remarks, since culture and identity are not necessarily concepts which promote
peace and understanding. He writes: “Kultur und Identität haben, das macht
nicht friedfertig, wie wir inzwischen wissen, es führt direkt zum Krieg” (p. 192).
The idea of a historically united, common European space that is promoted by
Eastern European intellectuals is a dangerous utopian vision. Instead, Europe
should be defined only by common political interests.
Rutschky likewise dismisses NLR’s dream of salvaging a socialist Europe
as the unrealistic fantasies of a unified Europe. He writes: “[d]er Sozialismus,
sagen die Utopiker, der jetzt zusammenbricht, ist gar nicht der gewesen, der
einmal kommen soll – an der Utopie des Sozialismus halten wir fest. Dasselbe
gilt für die Utopie Mitteleuropa. Was de facto sich in Mitteleuropa abspielt,
davon wird sie nicht berührt” (p. 187).
The repudiation of the idea of a common cultural or of a socialist Europe
displays at least a modicum of engagement and familiarity with other visions of
Europe. If Merkur alleges that these utopias are untouched by reality then what
does it consider as the relevant factor in the discussion? Crucially, as the
following section will show, Merkur in this initial phase does not feel compelled
to situate or to include Eastern Europe as part of a new European identity, or to
proclaim a new European beginning. Instead, Merkur prefers to focus on the
institutional and procedural aspects of the political developments.
4.3.3 The Free-Market Road to Democracy
A majority of Merkur’s texts emphasize the economic and security implications
of 1989 in relation to the EU and concurrent international organizations such as
NATO. For example, Peter Bender writes that a possibly enlarged European
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Union would change the political status quo: “[a]us einer westeuropäischen
Gemeinschaft würde eine europäische Gemeinschaft, die nicht mehr identisch
wäre mit der Nato”.71 Another text by an American writer, Daniel Bell, stresses
the economic aspects, which he refers to as the “Einschluß Osteuropas in einen
europäischen Handelsblock”.72
Democracy occupies a large part of the discussion about Eastern
Europe, but is treated in a very different manner than in Esprit or NLR.
Specifically, I would like to indicate three aspects relevant to Merkur’s discourse
on democracy. Firstly, democratization is discussed in its global implications,
rather than as a merely European phenomenon. Secondly, the connection
between democracy and economic free-market reforms is considered
elementary to the advent of democracy. And thirdly, there is a conviction that
democracy can only ever thrive in a nation state rather than through the
workings of civil society or social movements, as emphasised in Esprit and
NLR.
Merkur largely concurs with and follows the then-influential “third wave
theory” of democratization (as coined by Samuel Huntington) in order to explain
the Eastern European transition processes, according to which these
democratization processes are to be understood as part of a larger worldwide
phenomenon of democratization waves.
As in NLR, Merkur eschews a distinctly European framework in favour of
a discourse which sees the emergence of democracy as the result of global,
political and economic processes. There is only one instance where Dahrendorf
refers to the events of 1989 as “das Jahr der europäischen Freiheit”,73 but the
overall framework is not that of a distinctly European achievement as in Esprit.
Merkur frequently makes the point that democracy can only flourish in a
free-market economy. For example, one of the articles by Lord Dahrendorf
interprets the revolutions of 1989 as a quest for democracy and market
economy, which is then directly equated with freedom: “Es geht um Demokratie
71 Peter Bender, ‘Über der Nation steht Europa: Die Lösung der deutschen Frage’, Merkur, 495
(1990), 366-376 (p. 374).
72 Daniel Bell, ‘Einige Ausblicke ins 21. Jahrhundert’, Merkur, 500 (1990), 965-972 (p. 968).
73 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Die Sache mit der Nation’, Merkur, 500 (1990), 823-834 (p. 823).
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und Marktwirtschaft, also um Freiheit.”74 The quest for democracy and market
economy is the main driving force for the revolutions in 1989, Dahrendorf
claims: "[e]s geht schlicht um die Alternative: Bürokratie und Planwirtschaft oder
Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft” (‘Deutsche Kopfschmerzen’, p. 1022). For
Merkur, political freedom and democracy can only flourish where economic
deregulation and free trade have gone before. This correlation is voiced in no
uncertain terms. Indeed, the question of democracy in Eastern Europe and the
chances for its success are thus directly linked to economic performance.
Democracy is the main “currency” of the international system to which Eastern
Europe will have to subscribe, in the same way, as it will have to absorb a free-
market system as the entry ticket into an international system.
Another article even goes so far as to allege that stable and reliable
Western Europe, specifically Germany, is in a position to install democracy in
those countries by grace of its economic might and “organisational” capabilities:
“Der europäische Osten ist auf niemanden mehr angewiesen als auf die
Deutschen, auf ihre Wirtschafts- und ihre Organisationskraft. Deswegen hängen
auch die Chancen der Demokratie dort von ihnen weit mehr ab als von allen
anderen Westeuropäern und den Amerikanern.”75
The discussion of democracy in Eastern Europe is interpreted as the
emancipation of those states into newly sovereign, functioning nation states.
Merkur, as was mentioned in the introductory section, places great emphasis on
the relevance of the “nation”. Accordingly, when it discusses the advent of
democracy in the Eastern European countries, it relates this to the formation of
sovereign, democratic nation states. The German sociologist Ulrich Oevermann
emphasizes here the “notwendige Verklammerung von politischem
Nationalstaat und demokratischer Herrschaft”76 in Eastern Europe. Similarly,
Dahrendorf points out that 1989 has also signified the return of the sovereign
nation state. In his aforementioned text ‘Die Sache mit der Nation’, he discusses
74 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Deutsche Kopfschmerzen-Angst vor dem Wandel’, Merkur, 489 (1989),
1019-1023 (p. 1022).
75 Claus Koch, ‘Zwischen östlichem Staatsbedürfnis und westlicher Marktgesellschaft:
Experimentierfeld Deutschland’, Merkur, 503 (1991), 97-111 (p. 110).
76 Ulrich Oevermann, ‘Zwei Staaten oder Einheit? Der dritte Weg als Fortsetzung des deutschen
Sonderweges’, Merkur, 492 (1990), 91-107 (p. 91).
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the return of the nation state in Europe in relation to Germany and Eastern
Europe. His analysis interprets the events of 1989 as, amongst other things, a
resurgence of the nation state, the sole form of governance in which democracy
and freedom can flourish. For the revolutions to succeed, it was necessary
daß Länder, eben Nationalstaaten, sich als solche wiederfanden und
aufhörten, bloße Versatzstücke eines in sozialistischer Fertigbauweise
hergestellten Blocks zu sein. Für Polen und Tschechen und Ungarn und
Rumänen und manche andere hieß im Jahre 1989 die Freiheit zugleich
die Wiederkehr des souveränen Nationalstaats […] (p. 824).
Merkur sees the role of the state in delivering and ensuring democracy as much
more important than that of the civil society groups discussed extensively in
Esprit and NLR. While Merkur welcomes the concept of a politicised
“bürgerliche Zivilgesellschaft”, it is generally sceptical about its relevance in
promoting democracy. This is most apparent in the fact that none of its writers
are actually prominent dissidents, or members of civil society groups. Granted,
Ralf Dahrendorf sketches out the position of Eastern European intellectuals in
his column ‘Europäisches Tagebuch III’,77 but their role is largely discussed as
an afterthought in most articles.78
Consequently, the possibility for exchange between East and West,
which is so crucial to the declarations of a “renewal” as sketched out in Esprit,
are completely absent here. Claus Koch, for example alleges that “die
Aufbruchsbewegungen im Osten haben keine neuen Ideen in den Westen
bringen können” (‘Zwischen östlichem Staatsbedürfnis’, p. 100). In short, the
social movements are simply not made out to be the agents of a European
renewal, a reinvigoration of political life in Europe, or as vital to establishing a
social Europe. In fact, Koch’s text also takes issue with the way in which the
revolutions have been appropriated by the West as representative of a
romanticized democratic idea. He writes:
[d]ie gewaltlosen Volkserhebungen, welche die Implosion des
Kommunismus in Osteuropa vollendeten, waren keine Revolutionen. Sie
77 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Europäisches Tagebuch II’, Merkur, 521 (1992), 737-741.
78 One such exception is an article by Axel Honneth, ‘Soziologie. Eine Kolumne. Konzeptionen
der civil society’, Merkur, 514 (1992), 61-66. This article offers an attempt to define and
historically locate the role and relevance of civil society in political philosophy, but is critical
about what it sees as largely unclear and romanticized notions of civil society.
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als Revolutionen hochzuloben, liegt heute vor allem dem liberalen
Konservatismus im Westen am Herzen. Er will damit den Umsturz in
Osteuropa für sich vereinnahmen, als eine Option für die westliche
repräsentative Demokratie – und nebenbei für ihre politische Klasse (p.
109).
Since Merkur’s discussion is built on the foregone conclusion that Eastern
Europe will have to adapt to the “Western” political and economic system, this in
turn leaves little room for discussing the potential that Eastern European civil
society groups could bring to a specific European framework. Consequently, the
sense of introspection and self-criticism as well as the calls for a
“redemocratizating” of the European space, are absent from Merkur’s pages.
This section has demonstrated the different interpretative frameworks which are
used by the journals in their discussions of democracy in Eastern Europe.
These differences are, to an extent, attributable to political left/right differences
and therefore unsurprising; however, I would suggest that they are also
indicative of larger disagreements about the merit and value of democracy as a
common European framework. Whereas Esprit promotes democracy as a
specifically European set of values and achievements and as the new “raison
d’être” for Europe, the understanding in NLR and Merkur is markedly different.
Whereas NLR rejects the form of liberal democracy that is being promoted in
those countries, Merkur aligns itself with a specific discourse of the political
Right, which emphasizes the role of the economy and nation state to functioning
democracies in Eastern Europe. Democracy is not posited as an ideal in its own
right and certainly not a European achievement.
4.3.4 Maastricht and the Rapprochement between Europe East and West
Thus far, Merkur’s discourse has been relatively unperturbed by the events of
1989. It acknowledges that fundamental changes are taking place, but the
journal has neither tuned in to a sense of euphoria about Eastern Europe, which
it would then have to disavow, nor is it forced to defend and readjust its own
compromised position like NLR. Merkur’s discussion of democracy amounts to
a one-way street, since it is simply assumed that the East will be integrated into
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the Western European model. Consequently, Merkur does not feel compelled to
include or incorporate Eastern Europe as an integral or inevitable part of the
European framework, or to locate it as a source of its own “renewal”. This
implicit understanding is maintained throughout, as the difficult transition
process takes its course. While Merkur also takes the line that Western Europe
is in a state of democratic crisis, which becomes more and more evident in the
“Maastricht” debate, it certainly does not look to Eastern Europe for a new
impetus.
Up to this point there is only scant evidence of a more inclusive
formulation of European identity in the wake of 1989. Rather, Merkur works with
clearly defined boundaries between Eastern and Western Europe. Eventually,
however, these strict boundaries dissolve. There are examples of articles which
signal a growing acceptance of the idea that Europe will be altered not only
politically, but also psychologically by the East. The distinction between Europe
as a political and cultural entity is beginning to break down, and an
acknowledgement towards cultural and identity questions is evident in two
different texts by Christian Meier, which aim to explain and contextualise the
events of the previous year. According to the author, 1989 serves as a much-
needed “heilsamer Schock” which will awaken people out of their cosy
“Blockmentalität” that has defined the European “Nachkriegsdenken”.79 He also
notes that the newly emerging Europe will be composed out of “sehr
verschiedenen und einander noch kaum gewöhnten westlichen und östlichen
Ländern” (p. 386), with the result that a new understanding of European identity
will become necessary:
Und es wäre eine wichtige Aufgabe, kollektive Identifikationen
auszubilden, die den neuen Verhältnissen in irgendeiner Weise
entsprechen. Denn die nationale Identität hatte ja etwa die Funktion, den
Einzelnen einem Ganzen zugehörig zu machen, innerhalb dessen er
wirklich Teil des ins Ungemessene gewachsenen Weltgeschehens sein
konnte. Und entsprechende Vorgänge innerhalb des Identitätsbereiches
könnten angesichts der neuesten Geschichte notwendig werden.80
79 Christian Meier, ‘Die “Ereignisse” und der Umbruch im Weltsystem’, Merkur, 495 (1990), 376-
387 (p. 386).
80 Christian Meier, ‘Vom “fin de siècle” zum “end of history”?’, Merkur, 500 (1990), 809-823 (p.
822).
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Even so, it is too early yet to foretell how this new identity will be composed,
since Europeans themselves do not yet comprehend the changes surrounding
them. This, at least, is also the prevailing tenor in Claus Koch’s essay published
in early 1991, which alleges that “[w]as da plötzlich auf der Tagesordnung
erscheint, müßte die Westeuropäer in größte Aufregung versetzen. Doch nichts
dergleichen. Sie ahnen wohl, daß ein Jahrhundert europäischer Geschichte
abgeschlossen ist, aber sie können die neue Tagesordnung noch nicht lesen”
(‘Zwischen östlichem Staatsbedürfnis’, p. 100).
In ensuing articles, the question of how Eastern Europe will fit into the
new Europe is posed directly in relation to the Maastricht discussion. Although
Merkur affirms Maastricht as a positive development to bring about economic
integration, the journal nonetheless also features articles which focus on the
glaring gap between economic integration and political representation. More
concretely, Merkur, like Esprit, bemoans the danger of a “depoliticization” of the
European space, in which the voice of the European citizen – or “Citoyen”, in
the formulation that Koch prefers (p. 402) – goes unheard. Three texts should
be mentioned in this connection: one by a French historian, Joseph Rovan, and
two articles written by the aforementioned German professor of law and
philosophy, Meinhard Miegel.
Rovan is perhaps better known as a frequent contributor to Esprit,81 and
the views expressed in this article are indeed reminiscent of Esprit’s view of
Europe. For example, Rovan emphasises the historic and cultural dimensions of
Europe and proclaims that it is “ohne Zweifel eine Kulturgemeinschaft und
heute schon weitgehend eine Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft”. In this text, Maastricht
symbolizes the lag between economic integration and an increased European
awareness. “Die europäische Integration ist in Maastricht vorangekommen,
aber nicht das europäische Bewußtsein” (p. 208). This lack of a common
awareness is a serious shortcoming, and he sees a due need to espouse a
81 Joseph Rovan, ‘Europa der Vaterländer oder Nation Europa’, Merkur, 516 (1992), 200-210.
Rovan (1921-1994) was born into a German-Jewish family, but immigrated to France at an early
age and converted to Catholicism. He authored numerous books on Franco-German history and
cultural relations.
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common value system. The question as to what exactly Europe should
represent is adumbrated as follows:
[v]on der Idee einer Nation Europa sollte die Notwendigkeit eines
gemeinsamen Wertebewußtseins abgeleitetet werden, das vermittelt und
gepflegt werden muß. Die Demokratie ist nun einmal nicht in China
entwickelt worden, und die Menschenrechte wurden nicht von den Mayas
formuliert (p. 209).
Rovan here advocates a shared system of values that builds on distinctly
European achievements of democracy and human rights as the foundation of a
shared understanding of the newly emerging Europe. The fact that a text by
Rovan is included in this journal might be taken as an indication that Merkur
becomes more amenable towards an understanding of a contemporary Europe
built on common historical values.
The attempt to frame European integration in a cultural and historical
context is also apparent in Meinhard Miegel’s articles. In his texts, untypical for
Merkur, Maastricht is explored not as a means for economic integration but as a
way of renegotiating and reconceptualizing European borders as historic
conductors for “cultural exchange”, rather than as the classical markers of the
nation state. Miegel writes: “[m]it der Vollendung des Europäischen
Binnenmarktes eröffnet sich für die derzeitigen Grenzregionen die Chance, ihre
historische Funktion erneut zu übernehmen, das heißt den Übergang vom
Eigenen zum Fremden fließend zu machen”.82 Above and beyond this
interpretation, he asserts that Maastricht will come to eventually impinge on the
hitherto unmoved and unaffected Western Europe.
Ungleich bedeutsamer als diese europaweiten Bewegungen von Kapital,
Gütern und Menschen dürfte jedoch zumindest mittelfristig die
Veränderung der europäischen Psyche sein. Dabei sollte der Westen
keinesfalls glauben, der Osten öffne sich einseitig westlichen Werten und
Prioritäten. Dafür sind diese zu verschlissen. Vielmehr werden je länger,
je stärker auch östliche Werte und Prioritäten im Westen Einfluß
gewinnen. […] Ob hieraus eine neue Synthese europäischen Denkens
und europäischer Sichtweisen erwachsen wird, bleibt abzuwarten. Mit
Sicherheit wird sich jedoch das europäische Bewußtsein in ganz Europa,
im Osten wie im Westen, verändern.83
82 Meinhard Miegel, ‘Die Rolle Deutschlands und Europas in den Migrationen des 20.
Jahrhunderts’, Merkur, 503 (1991), 111-119 (p. 115).
83 Meinhard Miegel, ‘Das verunsicherte Europa’, Merkur, 521 (1992), 733-736 (p. 736).
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Miegel addresses outright for the first time in Merkur’s articles that the
Maastricht treaty will affect the European psyche. He also raises the possibility
that Eastern European values and priorities will have a role to play in this new
Europe, even though he fails to explain how and to what extent. Both Rovan’s
and Miegel’s texts from 1992 employ a markedly different framework than the
main corpus of Merkur’s texts from 1989 onwards. The texts formulate a more
inclusive and encompassing notion of Europe and point to the changes which
will eventually alter and affect Europe’s “psyche” in as yet unguessed ways.
Moreover, they now acknowledge European identity as a valid and relevant
vector in the changing European landscape, rather than as dismissing it as the
empty ideological rhetoric seen earlier by Merkur’s editor.
4.3.5 Nationalism: Eastern “Tribalism” Versus Western Political
“Civilization”
If Merkur’s discourse moves towards a more inclusive, accommodating
understanding of the newly emerging Europe, a limit is quickly reached when
the question of nationalism enters the debate. Merkur here follows a similar line
of argument to the one propagated in Esprit and discriminates between two
different types of Europe.
According to Claus Koch, this division runs as follows. He states that “alle
Westeuropäer einschließlich der Westdeutschen das Nationale hinter sich
lassen wollen und keine Lust haben, es sich von den noch halbautoritären,
staatsbedürftigen Osteuropäern noch einmal aufdrängen zu lassen” (‘Zwischen
östlichem Staatsbedürfnis’, p. 99). Therefore, two different types of democracy
are currently observable in Europe.
Die Demokratie, die sich die Osteuropäer jetzt errichten müssen, ist eine
ganz andere Demokratie als sie in Westeuropa zur Debatte steht. Sie
muß in dieser mithin vormodernen Region erst einmal repräsentativ und
pluralistisch werden, um Konflikte zu bewältigen, die der Westen nicht
mehr kennt. Die nur schwach mit Institutionen ausgefüllte und noch lange
nicht politische Demokratie des Ostens wird sich mit den
überinstituionalisierten, nachpolitischen Demokratien des Westens nur
schwer verständigen können (p. 99).
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We notice here how in a similar manner to Esprit, the dividing line between
Eastern and Western Europe is sharply drawn between “pre-modern” Eastern
Europe and a “post-political” Western Europe. Koch sees no viable antidote to
these contrasting developments, now that the short-lived euphoria has come to
a rather abrupt end: “Kurz nur wie ein Regenbogen strahlte über dem Osten
Europas die Idee der Demokratie als einer Gemeinschaft der Freien und
Gleichen” (p. 106).
Instead, the spectre of nationalism is making its presence felt amongst
the “semi-authoritarian” Eastern European countries, as Dahrendorf recognizes
in one of his many articles on nationalism. “Das vielerörterte Thema hat eine
neue Aktualität gewonnen in den Jahren der europäischen Freiheit und der
deutschen Einheit” (‘Die Sache mit der Nation’, p. 828). He describes the
current situation as one in which “im sicherheitspolitischen Vakuum und in der
inneren Anomie des östlichen und südöstlichen Europa Gefahren lauern, gegen
die kein Kraut gewachsen ist” (‘Europa der Regionen’, p. 706). These
developments are dangerous, chiefly because they entail according to
Dahrendorf’s analysis the splintering of a heterogeneous, but stable nation state
into smaller minority groups and ethnic communities which threaten to
undermine the efficacy of the nation state.
Only in Western Europe does he find the nation state still intact. “Es sieht
ganz so aus, als stünde der heterogene Nationalstaat zumindest außerhalb
Westeuropas heute unter Druck” (p. 704). This is especially worrisome, since
Dahrendorf considers this heterogeneous nation state as “die größte
Errungenschaft der politischen Zivilisation” (p. 704). The developments in
Eastern Europe are therefore seen as a rejection of civilisation and a return to
“tribal” existences: “jener merkwürdige und beunruhigende Prozeß, den man als
Rückkehr zu den Stämmen, zur Stammesexistenz beschreiben muß” (p. 704).
This regression is a response to the uneven political and economic
developments in Eastern Europe, and can be understood as the “Ungeduld
derer, die allzulange auf die Segnungen von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft
warten müssen” (p. 704). Empathy aside, he is nevertheless clear that these
developments represent the inversion of the values of Enlightenment and
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reason, and the return to Kant’s “selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit” (p. 704).
Dahrendorf highlights the contrast between the irrational, tribal nationalism as
one which defies and undermines the achievements of political civilization and
Enlightenment.
The irrational elements of a tribal nationalism are also noted in Michael
Rutschky’s aforementioned text, in which he talks about his “Angstphantasien
was noch kommen könnte, wenn Mitteleuropa die nationalistischen Utopien
seiner diversen Ethnien weiterverfolgt” (‘Mitteleuropa’, p. 195). For him, the
prospect of a separate “kulturelle Identität für jedes Dorf” (p. 195) presents the
ultimate threat to political civilisation.
Other texts focus less on the question of the nation state and more on
the development of a viable democracy in Eastern Europe in the light of
nationalism; but here too the schism between the “enlightened” progressive
West and the irrational political space of Eastern Europe is made explicit. Claus
Koch does not shy away from a frank analysis of the chances of nationalism in
Eastern and Western Europe: “[d]er Nationalismus, der in Osteuropa
heraufzieht, ist, noch ehe er zum Ruf nach harter Ordnung und nach Ausschluß
des Fremden wird, ein Ausdruck der Anarchie” (‘Zwischen östlichem
Staatsbedürfnis’, p. 110). This onset of anarchy will enable authoritarian leaders
to install themselves in fragile democracies which bear no resemblance to
“liberalen Demokratien nach westlichem Muster” (p. 110). After all, Koch
characterizes Western democracies as places in which “Nationalismus und
Bonapartismus höchstens noch vorübergehend Chancen haben” (p. 110).
Interestingly, however, Merkur appeals to the strength of a united Europe
as a potent force for good in curtailing nationalistic excesses. In the face of this
danger, Dieter Grimm notes that the prospect of a united Europe becomes more
appealing than ever: “angesichts der nationalen Exzesse in den ehemals
sozialistischen Staaten Osteuropas kann man ein vereintes Europa nicht hoch
genug einschätzen”.84
84 Dieter Grimm, ‘Verfassungsreform in falscher Hand? Zum Stand der Diskussion um das
Grundgesetz’, Merkur, 525 (1992), 1059-1073 (p. 1066).
160
Similar to NLR’s call for a universal and enlightened cosmopolitanism as
a corrective against nationalist forces, Merkur also appeals to the guiding lights
of “freedom” and Enlightenment in order to curb contemporary nationalism.
Jetzt, im Jahr 1992, sind die Hoffnungen auf eine neue Freiheit kräftig
untermischt mit Zweifeln und Ängsten. Rechtsstaat und Marktwirtschaft
stoßen auf beharrliche Hindernisse in den neuen Demokratien in Mittel-,
Ost und Südosteuropa, und es wird noch geraume Zeit vergehen, bevor
ihre Verfassungen fest in Bürgergesellschaften verankert sind. Aber das
Licht flackert noch, und für diejenigen unter uns, die die Freiheit über
alles andere lieben, ist nichts wichtiger als dieses Licht vor feindlichen
Winden zu schützen und ihm Nahrung zu geben, so daß es ganz Europa
und die Welt jenseits seiner Grenzen aufklären kann.85
To recapitulate, we noted that Merkur initially relies on an instrumental political
and economic conception with no attempts to incorporate or inscribe Eastern
Europe as part of a common historical or cultural space. Eventually, there are
indications of more inclusive formulations, which at least acknowledge the
impact that Eastern Europe might eventually bring to the newly emerging
Europe. However, this does not lead to a substantial or prolonged engagement.
Indeed, when it comes to the question of nationalism, Eastern Europe is
labelled again as the unenlightened, “tribal” or at least semi-authoritarian Other,
whereas Western Europe is guided by the powers of reason.
4.4 Conclusion
The main questions outlined at the beginning of the chapter were defined as
follows. How, and through what mechanisms is European identity delineated
and articulated in the cultural journals, and to what extent is the European
public sphere relevant and necessary to articulations of European identity? On
the basis of the above discussion, we can draw the following preliminary
conclusions.
Firstly it has become apparent that the formulation of European identity is
treated differently in each of the journals and is moreover continually shifting
within the journals themselves. At times, Eastern Europe is made out to be an
85 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Moralität, Institutionen und die Bürgergesellschaft’, Merkur, 520 (1992),
557-569 (p. 558).
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inalienable part of Europe, at other times Eastern Europe becomes the West’s
mirror image or “Other”. The journals seem to veer between different
mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion or mirroring but do not follow a systematic
pattern. This would confirm in part also the findings of the quantitative overview,
which indicated that the amount of articles about Europe does not follow a
gradual increase, but occurs according to peaks and troughs in the reporting.
Secondly, generally speaking, the journals have a very different
understanding of Europe and employ different criteria of relevance when
discussing it. Primarily, the journals aim to further a specific agenda which they
consider to be relevant in connection to Europe. It would appear, then, that the
question of the journal’s ideological background is a much more salient factor in
determining how the discussion about Europe will unfold. In other words, the
political, religious and cultural prejudices that define the profile of each of these
journals also determine their view on 1989 and the consequences for Europe.
While Esprit and NLR emphasise the role of civil society groups, they
highlight various ways in which these groups might bring about a social or
political renewal. Merkur dismisses altogether the relevance of these social
movements to a European framework and is in any case unconvinced by the
need for such a renewal: after all, it is expected that Eastern Europe will simply
conform to the Western European model. Consequently, disagreement prevails
over the criteria of relevance in discussing these issues. While Esprit considers
the understanding of a politically divided, but culturally and historically united
European continent as integral, this view is not at all shared in the other
journals. In NLR it does not feature as a relevant category, and in Merkur’s
opinion the concept of the common European home is in fact a spurious claim.
Similarly, while Esprit promotes democracy as a specifically European
achievement and a unifying element that will become the new raison d’être of
the European political landscape, NLR and Merkur, for different reasons, beg to
differ. Neither of these two journals addresses democracy in a specifically
European context, but they instead emphasise the global dimension of
democracy and the link between democracy and a free-market economy.
Therefore, Esprit’s vision of Europe as bound by the values of progressive,
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liberal democracies does not emerge as a commonly agreed framework. We
can conclude that no overarching debate or acknowledgement between these
divergent views is taking place here and that a common prism on how to
evaluate the events of 1989 in a European context is missing.
This brings me to the third point. Throughout this chapter I argued that
the topic of nationalism provokes a compelling response in all of the journals.
While Esprit and Merkur see the phenomenon as an atavistic development that
affects mainly Eastern Europe, NLR maintains that nationalism in Eastern
Europe is just a variation of an old European affliction. All journals agree,
however, that nationalism, with its nationalistic, populist and racist tendencies,
presents a major threat to, or inversion of, European Enlightenment values,
defined as those of Enlightenment and Reason. Each of the journals singles out
slightly different keywords that Enlightenment connotes – “Progress” and
“Emancipation of the People” in NLR, “Reason” and “Freedom” in Merkur, and
“Progressive” and “Liberal” Ideas” in Esprit. Yet the perceived threat of
nationalism galvanizes these intellectuals into formulating what Europe
allegedly stands for. Amidst the confusion and discord of how the new Europe
should be understood, the threat of nationalism acts as a catalyst, I would
contend, that triggers a consensual rejection of nationalism in favour of a liberal,
democratically defined Europe which celebrates values of reason and
enlightened governance. This shared sense of European identity is, however,
less the result of an internal, gradual process of increasing European debate
and intellectual exchange than motivated by the sudden need to confront
emerging questions of democracy and to ward off the threat of increasing
nationalism.
Based on these observations, how relevant is a common public sphere
to formulating European identity? Certain common points of reference and the
rephrasing of arguments between the journals have been noticeable only to a
limited extent. Yet this shared view of European identity as defined by what we
might call “Enlightenment values” has occurred here less as the outcome of
argumentative dialogue and exchange than in response to an external
perceived “threat”. The hypothesis was that processes of debate and increased
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interconnectivity would be relevant and integral to the articulation of a more
defined discursive sense of European identity. Yet in this instance, the question
of nationalism has been more pertinent to formulating a common European
identity than processes of argumentative exchange and debate between the
journals. Thus, one might tentatively observe a “reverse link” between the public
sphere and identity formation. Not the public sphere has shaped a common
identity, rather, one might suggest, the galvanizing of a common European
identity has shaped a public sphere, in which criteria of relevance overlap.
The following chapter will analyse the discussion of the journals eleven
years on and will aim to provide a more conclusive answer as to whether the
EPS can contribute to a sense of a European identity that is the synthesis of an
inclusive dialogue of debate, dialogue and transnational exchange.
.
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Chapter 5
Reaching Outwards and Retreating Inwards. Discussion in the
Journals, 2003-2006
Despite Western worries over Eastern Europe’s readiness for sharing Europe’s
alleged liberal democratic, “enlightened” values, the process of political
“reintegration” eventually led to the membership of those countries in May 2004.
This chapter’s analysis will begin in 2003, and although the question of the
Eastern European accession still features to some degree in the journals, the
main focus of debate has shifted elsewhere. At this stage, the discussion about
the proposed European Constitution, and more pertinently its rejection by the
French voters in 2005 provide the background for several discussions about the
state of Europe. Yet the American-led Iraq invasion in 2003 provides the trigger
for a shared debate across all the journals about Europe’s role in the world and
the values it should or could project.
5.1 Esprit
Esprit’s overarching concern during 1989-92 was with heightening European
historical awareness and with rejuvenating its democratic procedures towards a
more participatory, direct democracy. Especially in 2003-2004, the discussion
has become centred on defining European values on a philosophical and ethical
level, while the question of what Europe signifies politically and historically
seems to have solidified somewhat: the “historically reunited” Europe, as
defined in the previous chapter, presents the “true” Europe. Even though this
definition has become part of Esprit’s repertoire, the journal feels compelled to
explore in detail what exactly the values of this “true” Europe now amount to.
The question of values is pivotal, Esprit’s editor-in-chief Olivier Mongin
claims, since “des valeurs ne sont pas un supplément d’âme mais irriguent
inéluctablement les décisions à venir concernant le futur de l’Europe […] et du
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reste du monde.”1 What is perhaps most striking in the unfolding debate about
European values is that, although it arises out of a sense of “crisis” about
Europe’s role in the world, Esprit does not develop these values in opposition to
a negative Other. Rather, as the following discussion aims to show, European
values are formulated as a vision of cosmopolitan understanding and
acceptance of the Other. The last chapter has demonstrated how in its
discussion of Eastern Europe, Esprit veered between formulations of inclusion
and exclusion. However, this chapter will argue that, eleven years on, Esprit
strives to circumvent these codes of inclusion/exclusion as a basis for European
identity and to formulate positively defined values in its stead. Evidently, some
of these texts are marked by a tension between these two possibilities. On the
one hand, there is an underlying desire to establish limits and borders which
can delineate the divisions between European and Non-European; on the other
hand there is an aspiration to the philosophical ideal of openness, acceptance,
inclusion and the attempt even to dissolve the distinction between Self and
Other. Both tendencies are apparent to greater or lesser degree at different
points in time.
5.1.1 The Constitutional Treaty: Completing the European Chapter
Post -1989
The debate about the proposed Constitutional treaty is a central theme in Esprit,
even though neither Merkur nor NLR share this interest. Generally speaking,
there is no common or overlapping debate about the merits or disadvantages of
the Constitution between the journals, but is confined mainly to Esprit. The
journal’s point of departure is that the ongoing national debate in France –
dominated by the protest of the French Left revolving around a social Europe
versus a neoliberal Europe – is an essentially displaced debate which fails to
focus on the “real” issue that the Constitution raises.
This “real issue”, according to Mongin, is the urgent task of finalising an
historic definition of Europe which can no longer be avoided in the wake of the
events of 1989 and more recently of 9/11. “[L]e déplacement du débat sur le
1 Olivier Mongin, ‘L’Union européenne, l’Europe et ses valeurs?’, Esprit, 298 (2003), 19-24 (p.
24).
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modèle social est également significatif pour l’Europe, pour une Europe qui ne
peut plus, après 1989, après le 11 septembre 2001, se soustraire à une
entreprise de redéfinition historique.”2 This analysis of the ongoing French
debate as a mere displacement for the allegedly “real” issues proved, with the
benefit of hindsight, to be rather ill-judged. For the French No-Vote in 2005 was
a demonstration of how serious the French felt about concerns for a social
Europe. Yet although social issues are mentioned during 2003-04 by Esprit’s
editors and writers, those who opposed the Constitution on these grounds are
criticized for harbouring anti-European sentiments and French isolationist
leanings.3 In the wake of the No-Vote, Esprit did eventually wake up to these
“displaced” concerns and engaged more thoroughly with the social dimension,
we shall see later on. However, during 2003-04 the Constitution is presented as
a project with an altogether “nobler” purpose than providing adequate welfare
provisions for European citizens.
At the time, Esprit aims to present the prospective Constitution as a
positive European success story which will codify European values into a
positive historical and political framework. One Esprit editorial maintains that it
“comporte une signification historique profonde et apporte des novations
importantes.”4 The Constitution is made out to be the manifestation of a
positively defined Europe which elevates 1989 and the developments thereafter
as the defining European narrative. The rationale for the Constitution is
presented as the completion of the European project. Padis declares for
example that the Constitution will redefine Europe as follows: “[l]a Constitution
n’a pas pour vocation d’accoucher d’une ‘nation Europe’ mais doit aider à
dégager l’originalité de la communauté européenne comme invention
institutionnelle et comme projet historique.”5 More than that, it will aid Europe in
2 Olivier Mongin, ‘Les deux préalables d’un débat sur l’Europe. Le socialisme et la
mondialisation’, Esprit, 309 (2004), 67-74 (p. 72).
3 See Marc Olivier Padis, ‘Constitution européenne: que veut dire la bataille du “non”?’, Esprit,
308 (2004), 6-14.
4 Éditorial, ‘Désamours européens, Esprit, 306 (2004), 3-5 (p. 4).
5 Marc-Olivier Padis, ‘Le moment postfédéral de l’Europe: Introduction’, Esprit, 291 (2003), 6-8
(p. 9).
167
a necessary “reconnaissance de ses valeurs”6 and serve to answer “la question
identitaire” (p. 10).
An article by Christophe Leonzi and Fabien Raynaud provides further
elaboration of these points.7 In their view, the Constitution would represent the
culmination of Europe’s success story since 1989, with its difficult integration of
disparate social, cultural and political systems between Eastern and Western
Europe.
Cette nouvelle étape de nature politique vise à relancer la dynamique de
l’intégration européenne, dans le contexte des bouleversements
intervenus en Europe et dans le monde depuis 1989. Cette refondation
du projet européen s’efforce de donner à l’Union une identité et un
contenu politique à la mesure des défis auxquels elle est confrontée
depuis l’effondrement du monde soviétique (p. 130).
Not all the arguments for the Constitution are phrased so grandiloquently, but
are buttressed by more concrete and pragmatic arguments. Politically, the
Constitution will aid the “renforcement de la légitimité fondatrice par un socle
démocratique plus solide” (p. 131) since it can satisfy the legitimacy
requirements of the newly enlarged Union. Padis similarly points out that it will
formalise the hitherto largely informal relations within the European Union and
“fixer les règles du jeu avant l’asphyxie institutionnelle” (‘Constitution
européenne’, p. 7). Ultimately, though, Leonzi and Raynaud always invoke the
historical dimension to make their case. The authors assert that a rejection of
the Constitution would be tantamount to “un refus implicite du processus
d’élargissement de l’Union européenne engagé depuis la chute du mur de
Berlin” (p. 147). In so saying, they allege that those who reject the Constitution
are in fact Cold War retrogrades who refuse to acknowledge the realities of the
post-1989 world and the ensuing enlargement process. Instead, they are
longing for a return to “une Europe organelle plus ou moins mythique, organisée
autour d’un couple franco-allemand mû par la France” (p. 147).
With this sleight of hand, the case for the Constitution is inevitably tied to
a vote for or against the enlargement, for or against affirming and welcoming
6 Olivier Ferrand, ‘Trois scénarios pour l’avenir de l’Europe’, Esprit, 291 (2003), 9-32 (p. 21).
7 Christophe Leonzi, Fabien Raynaud, ‘Une nouvelle phase européenne? Lecture du projet de
Constitution européenne’, Esprit, 310 (2004), 129-148.
168
Europe’s path since 1989, for a forward-looking Europe which embraces the
new realities against an alleged mythical and backward-looking Europe of
bygone days.
This argument retraces points already raised during 1989-1992,
according to which Eastern Europe is now returning to its true spiritual home.
The late Bronislaw Geremek emphasises in an article from 2003 that “c’est
l’élargissement à l’Est, illustrant la fin de la guerre froide et celle de la division
de l’Europe, qui donne sa réalité à l’idée d’unification de l’Europe.”8 And in the
same vein, the Hungarian Miklos Haraszti speaks once again of the “rêve
historique”, 9 which began in 1989 and is now being completed through the
political act of enlargement in May 2004 and the prospective Constitution for
Europe. These views are reiterated here to signal that those countries which
underwent the revolutions of 1989, together with the old Europe, constitute the
true version of Europe, as they share the same values. Countries such as
Turkey are, however, not inherently “European”, for reasons given as follows.
5.1.2 The Debate about Turkey: A Challenge to Europe’s Self-Conception
On the matter of a possible entry of Turkey into the EU, Olivier Ferrrand makes
the following point.
Ce pays [Turkey] représente en effet un changement de nature de la
construction européenne. Jusqu’ici, les élargissements ne posaient pas
de difficulté car ils concernaient des États appartenant au cœur de
l’Europe: intuitivement, ils avaient vocation à devenir membre de l’Union
(‘Trois scénarios’, p. 28).
According to this quotation, the European member states from the 2004
enlargement round are “intuitively” European, whereas Turkey would alter the
nature of what it means to be European. This is also apparent in an interview
with the Turkish economist Kemal Derviş.10 Towards the end of the interview,
the following statement is put to the interviewee by Esprit’s editors.
8 Bronislaw Geremek, ‘Penser l’Europe comme communauté’, Esprit, 298 (2003), 5-12 (p. 6).
9 Miklos Haraszti, ‘Plus d’Europe, mais pas moins d’Amérique’, Esprit, 296 (2003), 178-180 (p.
178).
10 Kemal Derviş, ‘L’Europe et la Turquie: la frontière, le projet politique et l’histoire’, Esprit, 309
(2004), 3-9.
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L’Europe s’est construite sur le refus de la shoah; elle a défini
initialement ses frontières d’un point de vue éthique. Puisqu’il est
question ici de savoir ce qu’est l’Europe, sur quelles bases elle peut se
construire, la Turquie a-t-elle un rapport particulier avec ce qui s’est
produit lors de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale […]? (p. 9).
More interesting than Dervis’s response (in which he outlines the alleged deep
relationship of respect and dialogue which Turkey has enjoyed with its Jewish
community throughout history), is Esprit’s assertion that Europe is defined by
the common rejection of the Holocaust and that since Turkey does not share
the Holocaust as a central, defining experience in relation to its European
history, the country’s membership in the EU would endanger this construction.
This view is based on the alleged common rejection of the Holocaust by
all European countries which perpetrated it, or were to varying degrees
implicated or affected by it. Turkey was no participant in either of these
European events; therefore, the country’s potential membership would have to
be justified through other means and thus would present a departure from the
current self-understanding of Europe. It should be added, however, that positing
the Holocaust as constitutive of a European identity (a topic briefly discussed
also in Chapter 2.2.2 ‘Current European Identity Models’) is not propagated by
Esprit repeatedly or systematically throughout. Moreover, it does not form the
basis of an outright rejection of Turkey as a possible candidate country. Rather,
Esprit aims to incorporate Turkey and the challenge which it poses to perceived
notions of “Europeaness”, by emphasising that European values are able to
reach outwards towards the unknown Other. In order to understand this form of
reasoning, it is necessary to digress from the subject of Turkey for a moment
and to turn to the philosophical debate conducted in Esprit at this time on the
subject of European values. This will subsequently shed some light on Esprit’s
arguments for Turkey’s entry into the European Union.
5.1.3 Philosophical Questionings of Europe: The Legacy of Jan Patočkà
An Esprit dossier entitled ‘Le Destin suspendu de l’Europe’ in its December
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2004 issue is key to understanding the journal’s thinking on Europe.11 This
dossier, which is mainly devoted to the thought of the Czech phenomenologist
philosopher Jan Patočkà (1907-1977),12 and to a lesser degree to the
philosopher and theologian Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929),13 offers a
substantive and complex exploration of their philosophical enquiry on the
meaning of the concept Europe. Moreover, the analysis contained in these
essays provide an insight into Esprit’s value-led sense of European identity, and
the relevance it assigns to historical memory in understanding, and furthering
such a European identity.
Mongin explains in the introduction to the dossier that its aim is to reassess and
reinterpret Patočkà’s philosophical inquiry into the concept of Europe, which
was deeply influenced by the caesura of the First World War and the
experience of the slaughter in the trenches.14 Patočkà’s thought serves as a
reminder of the need to maintain an appreciation of the moral and ethical
responsibilities of the entire twentieth century history. Europe once stood for a
certain way of life that encapsulated cultural and intellectual traditions and an
awareness of its moral and ethical duties, which were reduced to rubble with the
First World War. Regrettably, Mongin says, the 1914-1918 war is today largely
eclipsed by the Second World War as a common reference point in the
European consciousness, yet there is due need to return to an understanding of
Europe as outlined by Patočkà, especially in the current climate in which
Europe is mainly understood as a “Europe procédurale” (p. 7).
According to Patočkà’s thought, Europe must be understood as defined
by its “vocation universelle”. Europe is anchored in distinct roots but this does
not mean that Europe is forever tied to these roots. Rather, Europe is able
11 Dossier, ‘Le destin suspendu de l’Europe’, Esprit, 310 (2004), 6-73. Of the seven articles in
the dossier, five are discussed here: Olivier Mongin, ‘Jan Patočkà, la rupture de 1914 et l’Esprit
européen’, 20-27; Marc Crépon, ‘Penser l’Europe avec Patočkà. Réflexions sur l’altérité’, 28-44;
Frédéric Worms, ‘Quelle universalité pour l'Europe?’, 50-56; Jean Marc Ferry, ‘Quelle Europe
chrétienne?’, 45-50; Abdennour Bidar, ‘Le destin de l'Europe spirituelle’, 64-73.
12 See ‘Research Focus: The Philosophical Work of Jan Patočkà’, Institute for Human Sciences
<http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=243> [accessed
18 January 2008].
13 See Arnold Betz, ‘Franz Rosenzweig, Essay and Exhibit’, Divinity Library Jean & Alexander
Beard Library, Vanderbilt University <http://divinity.library.vanderbilt.edu/rosenzw/rosenart.html>
[accessed 2 May 2008].
14 Olivier Mongin, ‘Expérience du front et pensée de l’Europe’, Esprit, 310 (2004), 6-8.
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always to “transcend” these through the application of reason. Marc Crépon’s
text rephrases Patočkà’s leading ideas as follows.
C’est sa vocation universelle qui définit l’Europe. Si elle se trouve
tributaire d’un triple héritage (la Grèce antique, le christianisme et la
philosophie des Lumières) le caractère particulier de cet ancrage
(historique et géographique) se trouve transcendé dans l’avènement
d’une rationalité qui se veut universelle (‘Penser l’Europe’, p. 30).
The use of reason is for Patočkà the guiding principle of such a universal
calling. However, this rationality must always imply an “ouverture au reste du
monde” (p. 32) and an overriding belief in “idéaux humanistes” (p. 34). Europe
must open up and constantly “decentre” itself, in order to remain universal.
However, it must do so without imposing itself on the rest of the world, but
remain guided by the principles of reason and a constant questioning of its own
role. Frédéric Worms formulates this as follows: “l’impossibilité d’abandonner et
même la nécessité de préserver quelque chose d’universel pour l’humanité,
incarné dans la raison” (‘Quelle universalité’, p. 52).
However, this ideal of a benevolent and enlightening European “vocation
universelle” has been distorted or perverted throughout European history,
Patočkà notes, by three possible scissions or threats: firstly, by nationalism,
because it entails chauvinistic and exclusionist traits; secondly, by
totalitarianism in all its forms because it violates central tenets of the dignity and
sanctity of every human being; and thirdly, by imperialism, with its tendency to
view Europe as a superior civilisation. These aberrations, he maintains, have
led to a state in which Europe does not remain open towards the rest of the
world but runs the danger of turning inwards on its own imagined roots.
Consequently, from a European standpoint, the identity of the other is always
experienced “contre un premier risque ou une première menace, son repli sur
une identité particulière ou nationale" (‘Quelle universalité’, p. 52).
Esprit picks up Patočkà’s enquiry by raising the question as to whether it
is possible to define Europe in such an open, extended manner, rather than
through its limits. This would require that a European identity projects positive
ideals towards the outside world. “Mais cette identité ne s’atteint pas seulement
par les menaces ou les violations qui la révèlent en la brisant. Elle s’atteint
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aussi par les actes et les œuvres qui la révèlent en l’affirmant” (p. 55). Rather
than attaining an identity in response to threats, only an affirmative
understanding of European identity will lead to a state in which Europe can
open up towards alleged threats and strive towards “une ouverture sur l’altérité,
ou plutôt les ‘altérités’ qu’elle rencontre en elle et au-dehors d’elle” (p. 54).
Abdennour Bidar’s article then even claims that this would provide the
basis for a new “homme européen” for whom “l’Europe doit lui apparaître
comme un élément constitutif de sa propre conscience de soi” (‘Le destin’, p.
67). Evidently, this new “European man” would be a “homme sans horizon” (p.
70) who stands for universal values which exclude the above-mentioned
aberrations of “nationalismes, totalitarismes, impérialismes que dénonce
Patočkà” (p. 70).
The point of this digression was to explain the two main principles behind
Esprit’s reasoning outlined in this dossier. Firstly, the necessity for a positively
defined European identity, secondly the requirement to “project” such a positive
identity beyond Europe’s shores in a spirit of openness rather than by creating
walls and borders. These are also at the root of Esprit’s discussions about
Europe and Turkey, to which I now return.
5.1.4 Turkey and Islam: Incorporating the Religious Other
We began by saying that the Turkey discussion includes references to
European roots and values, especially to recent European history, from which
they note Turkey has been absent. I also suggested that this does not lead to
declaration about the incompatibility of Turkey and Europe, but is presented as
a chance for a new understanding of Europe. This argument is developed most
clearly in Jean Marc Ferry’s ‘Quelle Europe chrétienne?’. The article probes the
problems of modern day Europe in relation to questions of EU enlargement.
Ferry considers Patočkà’s views as perspicacious now, as when initially
published, for he begins by saying that ”[a]près 1989, l’appel à un élargissement
de l’Union fait résonner cette parole en écho aux réflexions de Patočkà, tandis
que se profile le spectre d’un nouveau fondamentalisme portant exclusion de ce
qui n’est pas ‘européen’” (p. 45). In the light of the new forms of exclusion of this
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non-European”, he aims to come up with alternative ways of thinking about this
non-European Other.
Ferry acknowledges that reflection on Europe needs to begin with “une
recherche de son juste principe de fermeture” (p. 47). To him, Europe is clearly
defined by Christianity; defined here however as Christian spirit and ethics,
rather than solely the practising of the religion. Defining Europe as a Christian
space does not therefore imply in his mind that further enlargement is restricted
only to fellow Christians: “[i]l n’implique en aucune façon que l’élargissement
doive se limiter aux peuples de tradition chrétienne” (p. 48). Rather, Christianity
should be understood as the guiding European ethos – “le principe européen
doit aussi à l’Esprit du christianisme” (p. 49) – which provides the underlying
cultural foundation of the continent that has enabled a spirit of openness and
tolerance to develop in Europe in the first place.
Those who are seeking to exclude Turkey on the grounds of its religious
alterity are mistakenly falling back into negative schemes of us and them, and
into an “argument d’exclusion de tout ce que n’est pas ‘européen’ au sens de
l’héritage culturel” (p. 47) which is, “la voie la plus immédiate et la plus facile” (p.
47). The real challenge, however, is to build European identity as one “dont le
principe consiste dans la disposition à s’ouvrir aux autres identités” (p. 46). This
includes consequently the engagement with Turkey and the opening up of
Europe’s Christian heritage, which might become necessary also for strategic
reasons, Olivier Abel implies in an interview about the Turkey/Europe debate.15
He points out in no uncertain terms that without Turkey’s membership “[c]e qui
m’inquiète, c’est que sans la Turquie, l’Europe n’est qu’un club postchrétien, un
club de retraités de l’histoire” (p. 51).
In the remainder of this section, I would also like briefly to broach the
topic of “Islam and Europe”, broadly defined. Even though these are different
issues, the connecting thread here is the cultural and religious Otherness and
the question of how, according to Esprit, it can be overcome. The reason why
this topic does not occupy a larger section here is because it simply is not
discussed in Esprit extensively. The topic carries much greater weight in
15 Olivier Abel, Michel Marian, ‘Le débat européen sur la Turquie. Quelle Europe? Quel projet?
Quelle périphérie?’, Esprit, 322 (2006), 45-58 (p. 51).
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Merkur, as we will see later, where it is discussed as a direct challenge to
Western values. Esprit aims at a more dialogic engagement with Islam, but it
does not paint a uniformly harmonious picture either and acknowledges to some
extent threats posed by “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamic terrorism”.
Mongin’s aforementioned text ‘L’Union européenne’, for example, points out
that the continent needs to “répondre à la guerre des cultures, des identités et
des religions qui est annoncée par certains, à la guerre idéologique et
stratégique qui a cours depuis le 11 septembre 2001” (p. 22).
Similarly, Bruno Tertrais maintains that Europe is “une cible de choix
pour la mouvance islamiste”,16 and that Islamic terrorism “pourrait être, volens
nolens, l’une des clés intellectuelles et politiques d’une redéfinition à venir de la
notion d’Occident“ (p. 113). However, Tertrais’s text does not represent the
majority opinion of Esprit articles, which by and large handle the topic more
gingerly. Most texts aim to intervene in the larger debate, which, Olivier Abel
declares, “oscille entre une vision anhistorique de l’islam et le scénario d’une
radicalisation rampante de l’Islamisme.”17 Several of Esprit’s articles aim to
reach a more positive understanding of the role of Islam in Europe, at which
point the imprint of Patočkà’s thought becomes recognisable again.
For example, the philosopher Abdennour Bidar alleges that Europe could
offer Islam Europe’s universal moral and political values, which “éduquent nos
consciences depuis le siècle des Lumières”.18 If it were possible to inscribe
Islam into this culture of Enlightenment, Europe in return would learn to accept
Islamic beliefs and enrich its own heritage. Consequently, Islam would not
remain “un corps étranger, mais comme l’une des dimensions fondatrices de la
conscience européenne” (p. 12). Abdelwahab Meddeb, a French-Tunisian writer
and poet, concurs in his article that precisely these universal Enlightenment
principles emanating from Europe could exert an “effet didactique sur l’islam,
dans la guerre qu’il mène contre ses propres démons.”19 He concludes: “[l]a
16 Bruno Tertrais, ‘La question occidentale’, Esprit, 307 (2004), 114-129 (p. 112).
17 Éditorial, ‘L'élargissement européen, la Turquie et l'islam’, Esprit, 291 (2003), 4-5 (p. 4).
18 Abdennour Bidar, ‘Lettre d'un musulman européen. L'Europe et la renaissance de l'islam’,
Esprit, 296 (2003), 9-31 (p. 12).
19 Abdelwahab Meddeb, ‘Europe, les conditions de l'universel’, Esprit, 301 (2004), 6-12.
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reconquête d’une telle universalité aidera véritablement l’islam à se séparer de
l’islamisme, pour la paix du monde” (p. 12).
The stress is placed here on European values acting as a universalising
influence, rather than retreating into an adversarial encounter between two
value systems. Again, the ideal of striving towards openness while at the same
time defining and reassessing the own European heritage is central to Esprit’s
discourse at this time.
To conclude, it remains to be seen how durable and viable such a
construction could prove to be in reality, where the luxury of intellectual
equivocation and ambiguity obviously does not exist to this extent. Even so, I
would argue that as an intellectual discourse, it represents a real step forward
from the long-established scheme of a negative “othering”.
5.1.5 Europe after the Iraq Invasion: Reasserting Universal Values
On the question of Europe’s role in the run-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq,
unanimity exists between Esprit, Merkur and NLR that Europe’s behaviour
represented a foreign policy debacle which exposed its inability for concerted
action. All journals also include a discussion of what Europe’s role in the future
should consist of. In what follows, I would like to analyse how and to which end
European values are highlighted in Esprit’s interventions in response to the
American-led invasion.
The need to promote European values as a positive counterforce
towards the hegemony of the United States is explained by Mongin.
Si les valeurs propres à l’Europe antinazie et à l’Europe antistalinienne
ont correspondu à des phases significatives de la formation de l’Union, si
les valeurs de ces combats conservent tout leur sens, inscrire l’Union
européenne dans l’histoire mondiale exige de promouvoir des valeurs
spécifiques la distinguant de celles qu’impose de l’autre côté de
l’Atlantique une stratégie néo-impériale de l’après-guerre froide (‘L’Union
européenne’, p. 24).
While some European values still retain their validity today, Mongin deems it
necessary to promote values that distinguish Europe from the neo-imperial
tendencies which the US stands accused of. European values fulfil for Mongin
the function of formulating an adequate response to what is perceived as
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American “hyperpuissance”20 in the “disorderly” post-9/11 world,21 when Europe
has weakened and runs the danger of letting the US become the uncontested
“empire du monde”.22
Olivier Ferrand comes to a similar conclusion about Europe’s current
standing. “Les grands États européens ont pratiquement disparu de la scène
politique internationale, où les États-Unis règnent aujourd’hui sans partage”. In
order to counter this tendency, he notes “il faut avoir une identité propre, un
modèle à vocation universelle”, which will thrust Europe into a more decisive
and defining role on the world stage (‘Trois scénarios’, p. 22).
If this is the prescribed remedy for Europe’s malaise, the question that
follows is which values Europe should “promote” as a counterbalance to US
dominance? This is indeed a tricky point, for although American
“neoimperialism” is criticised and the need to counterbalance to US dominance
spelled out, the majority of Esprit articles from that time claim that, despite these
frictions, Europe and the US share essentially the same value system.
Consider, for example, this exposition by Percy Kemp.
On pourrait en fait dire que l’Europe, aujourd’hui, ce sont les États-Unis.
L’Europe est absente parce que l’Amérique est la prolongation des
valeurs européennes. Cela a été le cas tout au long de la guerre froide,
quand le camp occidental, mené par les États-Unis, était censé
représenter les valeurs démocratiques occidentales et le camp socialiste
mené par l’Union soviétique, les valeurs du despotisme oriental.
L’Europe paie en ce sens le prix de la primauté qu’elle a accordée à
l’Amérique dans la seconde moitié du siècle dernier. 23
Effectively, Kemp declares, Europe is still an undeniable part of a Western,
democratic value system with the US at its helm. The dominant role of the US in
shaping Europe throughout the Cold War, he notes, is undeniable and can not
be shaken off. Therefore Kemp concludes that Europe will be unable to
distinguish itself in real terms from the US. “C’est là le principal problème de
20 The term “hyperpuissance” was coined by the French foreign minister at the time, Hubert
Vedrine, to describe the US position in the wake of the Iraq invasion; it is not an expression
used directly by Esprit.
21 An allusion to Tzvetan Todorov’s book: The New World Disorder: Reflections of a European,
transl. by Andrew Brown (Oxford: Polity Press, 2005)
22 Olivier Mongin, ‘La rudesse des temps, ou l’entrée dans l’après-guerre froide’, Esprit, 298
(2003), 5-9 (p. 9).
23 Percy Kemp, ‘Chaos et cosmos de l'après-guerre froide’, Esprit, 298 (2003), 10-39 (p. 22).
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l’Union européenne, qui ne pourra le résoudre qu’en se démarquant
culturellement et ethniquement des États-Unis d’Amérique” (p. 23). This is also
voiced in the aforementioned text by Bruno Tertrais, who notes that Europe is
an inseparable part of the “identité occidentale” (‘La question occidentale’, p.
101) which encompasses “la communauté euro-américaine” (p. 110).
Thus, the prospect of demarcating European values from American ones,
which Mongin and Ferrand maintain as necessary, is not going to work
according to these other writers, who emphasise that Europe still stands in
America’s postwar shadow and that, consequently, Europe’s value system
could be more aptly described as “Western”, rather than distinctly “European”. It
is important to keep in mind that, despite French anguish and insecurity along
the lines of “l’Europe peut elle vraiment s’affirmer face aux Etats-Unis?”,24 the
rift between Europe and the US is always understood as one of different
policies, rather than as a cultural rift or a clash of values. This position is also
put forward by Merkur and NLR, and there appears to be agreement that
European values are identical with Western, meaning American values.
Unanimity prevails about the fact that European values are not distinct enough
to stand on their own, and that Europe can only survive within the framework of
a Western identity, a point which will be illustrated in the subsequent sections.
What, then, does Esprit propose in the face of the perceived American
neoimperial current? While it is not possible to effectively demarcate European
values in contradistinction to American ones, the notion that European values
are already always universal values gains traction in Esprit’s articles from that
time. Esprit, I would argue, makes a virtue out of necessity: the impossibility of
defining European values in the wake of the US-Europe crisis leads to a
reassertion of European values as universal values which are only
indistinguishable as such because they have already been disseminated so
effectively.
This is evident in the aforementioned article with the apposite title
‘Europe, les conditions de l’universel’, by Abdelwahab Meddeb. His intellectual
quest, as the summary in the table of contents describes, is raising the question
24 Marc-Olivier Padis, ‘La culture politique américaine, au singulier et au pluriel’, Esprit, 307
(2004), 114-129 (p. 119).
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of la vocation de l’homme européen” (p. 2) in the light of “positions politiques
que l’actualité a provoquées” (p. 6), referring to the Europe/US divide. Meddeb
refers to ideals of “cosmopolitique” (p. 11), as the expression of reason and
humanism, and explains that the calling of “l’homme européen” can be traced
back to: “la diffusion universelle des Lumières” (p. 11). His article implies that
European Enlightenment values are still central today, but are by nature always
also “universal” and therefore not distinctly recognizable as European ones.
Another text by the familiar pen of Timothy Garton Ash frames these
ideas in slightly more pragmatic terms.25 Ash calls upon the EU as a political
entity, rather than Europe in general, to act on these universally valid
cosmopolitan ideals which emanated from the Enlightenment and which still
stand today. They can also act as a corrective to the current American
aberrations:
[l]’Union européenne devrait servir à la construction d’un monde libre
aider à parvenir à ce qu’ Emmanuel Kant, dans son Idée d’une histoire
universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique, ce texte extraordinaire
appelait ‘une union civile complète de l’espèce humaine’ (p. 119).
To sum up, the debate in Esprit on European values is precipitated by a sense
of crisis over its own inability to counter or match up to the US. Yet the
recognition that the US and Europe are fundamentally intertwined leads to a
reassertion of European values as universal ones, reasserting thereby the
centrality of the French, and by extension European “vocation universelle”.
5.1.6 After The French No-Vote
After the French No-Vote on the Constitution in May 2005, the emphasis of the
debates, I will endeavour to show in the following, changes from a value-based
one towards more strategic, geopolitical concerns about political expediency
and efficacy. The continued US/Europe discussion, which will be briefly
summarized, serves to illustrate this point. Thereafter I will return towards the
theme of European enlargement in the aftermath of the rejection of the
Constitution by the French electorate.
25 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Y a-t-il des fondations morales de l’Europe?’, Esprit, 326 (2006), 106-
120.
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The vexation about alleged American imperialism is still evident during
2005-06 in Esprit. However, now the discussion of the topic pertains more to
questions of exerting diplomatic and military power, rather than to which
European values might provide a counterweight towards American hegemony.
For example, one Esprit editorial from 2006 alleges that the French No-Vote
has again left Europe in a weakened position, marked by a lack of clear
leadership and political will. Even so, out of this crisis a new European foreign
policy must be born: “l’opposition aux États-Unis devait être l’acte fondateur
d’une diplomatie européenne autonome”.26 This imperative is to create “après la
fin de guerre froide, une autre organisation du système international” (p. 4),
which will bring about greater equilibrium in the international system, a view
echoed in an extensive article from 2005 by Hassner and Tertrais.27 The
authors emphasize the need for a stronger, more concerted European foreign
policy, based on the premise that the rejection of the Constitutional treaty has
left Europe in a state of paralysis. Europe’s goal now must lie in creating a
viable counterbalance to the US within the framework of international
institutions. So while the idea remains facing up to undue American influence on
the world stage and strengthening Europe’s voice, the emphasis is now firmly
placed onto a more efficient European diplomacy, and enhanced military power.
This is evident also in the debate about Europe’s borders and future
enlargement, a topic which is pushed back onto the agenda after the No-Vote,
not least because for Esprit the two topics are inseparably intertwined. Since
the Constitutional Treaty supposedly signified the completion of the European
project after 1989, the rejection of the Constitution consequently constitutes in
an analysis of Padis, a “référendum rétrospectif sur l’élargissement européen”
and what is more also a “référendum anticipé sur l’entrée de la Turquie dans
l’Union.”28 Thus the protest registered by the voters also implies a rejection of
enlargement processes at large. Another editorial from 2005 – with the
revealing title ‘Pour une autolimitation du projet européen’ – formulates the
26 Éditorial, ‘International: la césure de 2005’, Esprit, 321 (2006), 3-5 (p. 3).
27 Pierre Hassner, Bruno Tertrais, ‘Nouvelles puissances, nouvelles menaces’, Esprit, 322
(2006), 59-73.
28 Marc Olivier Padis, ‘Une France sans vision de l’Europe?’, Esprit, 314 (2005), 6-13 (p. 7).
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challenge as follows: “Si le traité constitutionnel est désormais caduc, l’enjeu
qu’il représentait, lui, demeure d’actualité: il nous faut désormais penser
l’autolimitation du projet européen.”29
This call for a discussion of Europe’s self-limitations is no mean feat, for
as we ascertained in the previous section, Europe in Esprit’s discourse
becomes strongly identified with universalist concepts and values, and ideals of
openness. The problem, therefore, is how and where to draw its borders. The
political scientist Helene Sjursen has pointed to this dilemma in reference to the
enlargement debates: “the moral appeal of the universalist dimension makes it
difficult to draw a line where Enlargement should stop. Universalist, moral
principles […] give no guidance in terms of drawing borders.”30
The question for Esprit is how to respond to the challenge of defining
borders without compromising Europe’s theoretical openness, and without
completely diluting Europe’s claims to universalism. The journal achieves this
by discussing current and future enlargements from a more narrowly defined
political view that bypasses the “value” criterion, whilst maintaining the idea of a
core Europe.
This “core” Europe, is the one created in 2004 with the enlargement of
the ten Eastern European countries which represent the “true” Europe. Every
subsequent enlargement, including Turkey, must be treated as a strategy for
more political clout and/or enhanced security. These enlargements have no
subsequent influence on the “real” Europe, which will remain unchanged. This
stance is developed in a text by Christian Lequesne, which deals with French
worries over the drawing of European boundaries.31 Lequesne concludes that
France must realise that European enlargement is the only option in a post-Cold
War world. If Europe does not seize the chance of bringing countries like Turkey
and the Ukraine into its political sphere of influence, these countries will look to
the US instead. Although future enlargement will slow the pace of internal
29 Éditorial, ‘Pour une autolimitation du projet européen’, Esprit, 318 (2005), 3-4 (p. 4).
30 Helene Sjursen, ‘Enlargement in Perspective: The EU’s Quest for Identity’, RECON Online
Working Paper, 2007/15
<http://reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html> [accessed 12
February 2008].
31 Christian Lequesne, ‘Sur les craintes françaises d’une Europe espace’, Esprit, 322 (2006),
28-35.
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reform, it is in Europe’s interest to build up its links with countries with which it
shares joint interests. Europe needs to be “ouvert aux demandes d’adhésion
d’une périphérie qui se démocratise et avec laquelle on a intérêt à bâtir en
commun” (p. 35). Lequesne’s position also underlies an article on the topic
Ukraine as a possible candidate country for EU membership.32 The main thrust
of the article contends that it would be in Europe’s interest to develop closer ties
with the Ukraine because it would increase Europe’s leverage in Russian
affairs, rather than revolving around issues of common values or shared cultural
affinities.
Michel Foucher, a professor of political geography, expands on these
ideas in a detailed and long investigation into the concept of borders and
frontiers.33 He acknowledges that representations of “européanité” include
aspects such as “influence des cartes mentales, poids des solidarités
historiques et des voisinages familiers […]” (p. 87). Yet he points out that with
the accession of the ten member countries of 2004, circumstances have
changed. “Depuis 2004 l’Union ne s’étend plus aux acteurs d’un long passé
directement commun mais à d’autres nations, plus ou moins consolidées, qui se
trouvent, spatialement, en position de périphéries” (p. 91). Foucher introduces
here the idea of the European peripheries, and new zones of European
influences and neighbourhood agreements, which will determine Europe’s
future enlargement. He concludes that while the “cœur européen” (p. 91) is
constituted by what was reunited with the “rupture libératrice et heureuse de
1989” (p. 91), Europe has to maintain its principal openness in order to structure
its relations with the outside world, to act as an “exemple vertueux” for modern
statehood and a “vecteur innovant de diffusion de la modernité” (p. 91).
Of course the three texts can be read as indications simply of a more
sober and realistic discourse about Europe, after the French electorate has
voted against what the Constitution was supposed to represent in Esprit’s view.
Even so, I would maintain that these texts also demonstrate the thin line which
Esprit is walking between trying to come up with a satisfactory answer as to
32 Grygoriy Nemyria, ‘L’Ukraine et l’Europe: l’histoire reprend’, Esprit, 312 (2005), 52-64.
33 Michel Foucher,’L’Union politique européenne: un territoire, des frontières, des horizons’,
Esprit, 329 (2006), 86-115.
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what Europe’s borders are, while also maintaining the principal element of
openness and “universality” which Europe is supposed to project: while
Europe’s “cœur” is clearly demarcated by shared history and commonalities, it
must continue to extend towards other countries its enlightening and
modernising influence.
5.1.7 Social Europe as the Common European Ethos
Thus far, Esprit’s discourse has been concerned above all with questions of
European enlargement, external borders and potential new applicants, with the
US, and with Europe’s role in the world. In this final section I would like to return
to the Constitutional Treaty after the French No-Vote, which was delivered in a
period of perceived French malaise and economic discontent. As I noted in the
earlier section on the Constitution, most of the Esprit articles before the
referendum had dismissed the debate about social concerns as a distraction.
However, now Esprit’s editors face up to the fact that “social concerns” are very
real and tangible for the French voters. The notion of social Europe is by no
means new or unprecedented in the debates about Europe (see the discussion
of NLR 1989-1992 in the previous chapter). In this instance, Esprit elevates
social concerns from the French national context towards the level of social
Europe as a political programme with connotations of yet another moral and
ethical rebirth for the whole of Europe. Again, Esprit stays true once more to the
ideals voiced in the dossier on Patočkà, which stressed the need for an internal
model of positive identification, here in the guise of social Europe.
Unsurprisingly, several Esprit editorials discuss the result of the
referendum in the issues of the second half of 2005 immediately after the “No-
Vote”. One such editorial states that the reason for the refusal lay in the
discontent with the provisions for a “modèle social européen”34 as proposed in
the Constitutional treaty. Interestingly, Esprit from the outset never discusses
the concept of a renegotiated social model as a matter of national concern, but
insists that it can only be achieved within a European framework. The reason
for this lays in a deep sense of insecurity over globalisation processes, or rather
34 Éditorial, ‘Une Europe au pluriel’, Esprit, 316 (2005), 4-5 (p. 5).
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their deregulatory effects on the economy, working conditions and social
provisions. Writers such as Mongin and Padis claim that France has been
particularly hard hit by processes of economic deregulation, which have left its
social model particularly exposed. By contrast, they allege that countries like the
United Kingdom or the Scandinavian countries, with their more flexible
economies and social models are better placed to absorb the shocks of
globalisation. France, on the other hand, is in a particularly weakened position
to steer these economic processes which are seemingly beyond its control to its
advantage. Therefore they insist that Europe needs to renegotiate a “just” social
model as a corrective to the imbalances and injustices incurred through
globalisation.35 This, in short, provides the premise upon which Esprit
subsequently declares that, in the wake of the referendum, “le social donne un
bon paradigme pour discuter de l’Europe” (‘Pour une autolimitation’, p. 4).
Consequently, Esprit makes a serious attempt to fold the French
discontent over social injustice into a European matter. This is undertaken in
several ways; most thoroughly perhaps in a text by Bruno Palier, a French
political scientist who sketches a picture of the different European social
systems, before spelling out the need for a refoundation of social provisions
which would take into account current economic realities.36 At its core, the text
poses the question whether it is possible to maintain a social democracy based
on a social compromise rather than the complete victory of neo-liberal
tendencies. However, along the way, it sketches out in detail the different social
models of Eastern and Western Europe and aims to formulate coherent and
systematic recommendations for politically viable social reforms, which take into
account the experiences of all these countries.
The eminent Franco-Czech historian and political scientist Jacques
Rupnik points out in the article ‘La crise de l’Union européenne vue d’Europe
centrale’ that the idea of a new social model must encompass East and West in
35 See in Olivier Mongin, ‘De la Constitution européenne à la place Saint-Pierre.
Métamorphoses et déroute du langage’, Esprit, 314 (2005), 179-181; Marc Olivier Padis, ‘La
France insulaire’, Esprit, 316 (2005), 47-53.
36 Bruno Palier, ‘Refonder la protection sociale: les expériences européennes’, Esprit, 324
(2006), 53-78.
184
order to implement truly transeuropean policies.37 Despite perceived cleavages
between Eastern and Western social models, the discrepancies are in fact not
that great and can and must be rethought on a transeuropean level: ”[l]a
redéfinition et la réforme douloureuse des “modèles” sociaux sont aujourd’hui
une ambition transeuropéenne” (p. 133). Padis also notes that, ideally, Europe
should become “un lieu de redistribution” (‘La France insulaire’, p. 51) yet
admits that this will be difficult to achieve, given how strongly “égoïsmes
nationaux” (p. 51) still prevail.
This understanding of social Europe not only as a political programme,
but based on a strong ethos of social solidarity, is contained in a text by Esprit’s
Europe editor Paul Thibaud, with which I would like to conclude the discussion
about Esprit.38 His article presents a treatment of the legacy of the Polish
Solidarity movement, which it commends as the embodiment of a successful
model of social solidarity. Again, one can observe Esprit’s enthusiasm for
Poland which I referred to in Chapter Four, which in this instance is based on
the notion of solidarity based on the Catholic bond and on the communitarian
impulse which Emmanuel Mounier – as noted on the introduction – continuously
tried to advocate as a guiding philosophy during his editorship of Esprit.
The article brings full circle some of the issues which Esprit so ardently
pursued during 1989-92 and 2003-06: Eastern and Western Europe reunited
and the possibility even of a European renewal inspired by the shining example
of the “people’s revolution” in 1989, which is repackaged here as the possibility
of a social renewal for Europe.
Thibaud sees Solidarnosc as the model not so much for a new political
movement, but as the embodiment of a social Europe deserving of the name.
“Solidarnosc”, Thibaud points out, combines the positive ideals not only of “une
certaine tradition catholique” and the much cherished “utopie de la société
civile”, but also “l’idée ancienne d’un socialisme non matérialiste, se
caractérisant par des valeurs sociales et non par une organisation de
l’économie” (p. 158). All these components provide an ideal to which the whole
37 Jacques Rupnik, ‘La crise de l’Union européenne vue d’Europe centrale’, Esprit, 326 (2006),
121-137.
38 Paul Thibaud, ‘Solidarnosc: la solidarité et les malentendus’, Esprit, 318 (2005), 157-162.
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of Europe should aspire. Sadly, of course, such a “richesse culturelle et
spirituelle” (p. 160) is currently lacking. Due to a lack of interest and general
apathy in the West towards Eastern Europe, these values were never inscribed
into the post-1989 European narrative (pp. 160-161). Yet, Thibaud points out, at
their core they entail the vision of a social and democratic society united by a
sense of solidarity, towards which Europe should work and which would
reassert once again its sense of a “vocation universelle”. Thibaud concludes:
“[i]l me semble qu’au projet d’une Europe qui ne serait pas une simple
expression géographique, mais une perspective sur le monde, une vision du
monde, l’éthique de Solidarité pourrait contribuer, y trouvant une nouvelle
chance de s’incarner” (p. 162).
This section has endeavoured to outline how Esprit’s discourse about Europe
developed from 1989-1992. Firstly, there is an overall stress on the need to
define and discuss Europe’s values, necessitated by various external
challenges Europe is exposed to. Interestingly, Esprit here reasserts European
cosmopolitan values and Enlightenment ideals as always already “universal
values”. However, while one could interpret this as a sign of a renewed, more
outward-looking Europe, I have argued here that the rediscovery of these
allegedly “universal” values is to some extent a strategy to reassert European
relevance in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, in the wake of the recognition
that European values are indistinguishable from American ones.
Secondly, there is a self-conscious attempt to establish questions of
borders and heritage without an appointed Other. Here, I identified Esprit’s
dossier on the philosopher Jan Patočkà as crucial to understanding its
reasoning on these issues, which defined its position not least on the question
of Turkey and the encounter between Islam and Europe. The European ability
to accommodate the unknown and to act as a universalizing influence – even if
this requires a readjustment of the traditional European heritage – was
highlighted. While this ideal can probably only be understood as an intellectual
ambition, it at least represents on older, established schemes of identity
formation because it aims to dissolve the dichotomies of Self and Other.
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Esprit sometimes has to tread a fine line between defining borders and
maintaining the ideal of openness, especially in the wake of the French No-Vote
which also entailed a protest against European enlargement. Esprit achieves
this by insisting on a definable core Europe, the one reunited in 1989, and by
presenting further possible enlargements as a tool simply to enhance political
influence.
Finally, the journal strives to formulate a positive internal self-image for
Europe. After the failed Constitutional treaty, which was presented in Esprit as
the culmination of the European success story since 1989, it subsequently
elevates the theme of a just and communitarian social Europe as a foundation
for such a positive self-identification. As in 1989-90, it uses an example from
Eastern Europe (the Solidarity movement) to proclaim the rebirth of a European
society that not only implements adequate social provisions for its citizens, but
is based on ethical ideals of “solidarity”.
Yet while the dimension of Eastern Europe, especially the caesura of
1989, is still central to Esprit’s discourse, some themes are notably absent.
Most striking is probably the absence of Europe as an exporter of democratic
values, which was predominant in Esprit during 1989-1992. By way of
explanation one might suggest that the idea of “exporting” democracy has
become an almost toxic issue for the political Left in the wake of the disastrous
American attempts to democratize Iraq. For the political Right, as we will see in
the case of Merkur, this discourse remains however very salient. The idea of a
European civil society, which was such a strong factor in Esprit earlier, has also
faded from view. Finally, the common rejection of nationalistic tendencies,
which has proved such a potent common denominator between the journals
during 1990-92 has receded and hardly enters the discussion – not least
because Esprit rather aims to define Europe positively, rather than by “what it is
not”. The following sections will aim to shed more light on which of these
concerns and frameworks are similarly evident, or absent, in the discussions of
NLR and Merkur.
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5.2 NLR
Whereas Esprit devotes a great deal of attention to defining European values
and identity, NLR’s concern with Europe pertains chiefly to the question of
Europe’s role in relation to the US. Chapter Three has already shown that NLR
publishes fewer articles on Europe during this timeframe than previously, since
it is principally concerned with the US-led Iraq invasion. In addition, the critique
of economic neo-liberalism, in Europe and elsewhere, remains as relevant to
NLR as ever. The criticism of American military, political, and economic power
is central to NLR’s discourse of the time. The word “criticism” here is somewhat
of an understatement, though, since the rhetoric which NLR adopts reaches a
fever-pitch, especially in 2003-04. Just the titles of two articles reveal the depth
of antipathy which the journal holds towards the policies of the Bush
administration. One article, which looks at American foreign policy is entitled
‘American Lebensraum’, another on the American Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) in Baghdad’s Green Zone bears the title ‘Vichy on the Tigris’.39
Comparing the actions of the US to the Nazi ideology of Lebensraum and the
CPA to the puppet regime of Vichy during the Second World War are certainly
questionable, but are part of NLR’s aim to provide a dissenting voice against
what its sees as a wide-spread complacency in the West over the war. Over the
course of the four years studied here, NLR continues to chronicle and comment
on the Iraq invasion and the subsequent descent into protracted violence
(especially in 2005) with articles such as ‘Hegemony Unravelling’ and ‘The
Abyss in Iraq’.40 This indictment of the US, as we shall see throughout this
chapter, is accompanied, however, by an equally strong criticism of Europe’s
inaction over the Iraq invasion.
Due to the much smaller number of articles on Europe in NLR, it seems
more apt to begin with the themes which the journal ignores or only tangentially
covers during this time. Firstly, no article deals with the proposed Constitutional
39 Peter Gowan, ‘American Lebensraum’, NLR, 30 (2004), 155-164; Susan Watkins, ‘Vichy on
the Tigris’, NLR, 28 (2004), 5-19.
40 Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Hegemony Unravelling-1’, NLR, 32 (2005) 23-82; Patrick Cockburn, ‘The
Abyss in Iraq’, NLR, 36 (2005), 35-68.
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Treaty prior to the crisis precipitated by the No-Vote. Neither is the topic of
European enlargement, so crucial to Esprit’s discussion, ever addressed in
depth in NLR. This holds true for the May 2004 admission of the ten new
member states as well as for prospective further enlargements, including the
admission of Turkey. Finally, the broadly defined topic of “Europe and Islam” is
conspicuous by its absence and merits only one article in relation to the French
debate over the wearing of the hijab in schools.41
I begin by discussing the reasons why NLR is not interested in
discussing these topics, and explain also the different meanings which
European “identity” and “values” – key concepts for Esprit – have in NLR’s
understanding of Europe. I shall then go to point out the existing overlaps in the
discussions of the journals, where they exist. Crucially, there is convergence
over the crisis of Europe’s inaction in the wake of the Iraq invasion, which
results in a more sceptical questioning of Europe’s identity. Furthermore, the
French No-Vote provokes in NLR a renewed interest in France, because it
interprets this verdict as a victory for the Left and for the fight for a social
Europe. The No-Vote shifts this issue to the centre of NLR’s concern, which is
consonant with Esprit’s analysis.
5.2.1 Enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty: Securing Economic
Markets
In NLR, the question of the Constitution is more or less ignored, as it has been
decided from the outset that it is yet another neo-liberal tool to ensure that
prevailing big business interests are being further entrenched in the European
market. Whereas for Esprit the Constitution symbolises the success story since
1989, Peter Gowan alleges in his article ‘Pax Europæa’ that it codifies “afresh
the whole post-Cold War evolution of the EU, via Maastricht, Amsterdam and
Nice: the drive towards monetary union, the use of EU law to push through the
free-market agenda.”42 This free-market agenda, according to NLR, is pushed
by the undemocratic and unaccountable “Brussels” elite which does not itself
adhere to the democratic standards it demands from its own member states and
41 Emmanuel Terray, ‘Headscarf Hysteria’, NLR, 25 (2004), 118-28.
42 Peter Gowan, ‘Pax Europæa’, NLR, 34 (2005), 134-145 (p. 139).
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which consequently does not represent the will of the people. Gowan further
remarks that it fails to include any concessions towards a more “representative
democracy”. Rather, European elites are trying to preserve their grip on the EU
which has for many years been run by an “undemocratic elite oligarchy, run by
the mandarins of member states and big business for neoliberal goals” (p. 141).
These two main contentions are of course general criticisms routinely
levelled against the EU by NLR and have little to add to the discussion of the
Constitution itself – in fact, the arguments here seem almost interchangeable
with the arguments that NLR advanced against the Maastricht Treaty back in
1992. Everything that emanates from the “EU machinery” is deemed inherently
undemocratic because it is allegedly imposed from the top down. Consequently,
any further meaningful engagement or discussion concerning the potential
relevance of the Constitution is dismissed outright. 43
By the same token, NLR does not have anything substantial to say on
the topic of enlargement, which again, according to the journal, just guarantees
business-friendly policies for Western companies in these countries. For
example, Susan Watkins, NLR’s editor-in-chief, points out that enlargement is
simply a means “of retooling the central European economies as open capitalist
markets”.44 Yet if NLR complains, in the words of one commentator, that
“[t]oday there is zero discussion of Enlargement – absolutely zero – because
that is what makes life easy for transnational companies and financial
markets”,45 one must also point out that NLR undertakes very little to redress
this perceived lack of discussion. The journal insists that the European Union
does no more than pursue a “mercantile” policy (‘Pax Europæa’, p. 139)
towards Eastern European countries. What is completely absent in NLR’s
pages is some form of discussion of how the new EU members perceive their
new status or any analysis of how these countries might potentially change the
political and cultural landscape of Europe.
43 Granted, NLR did publish as early as 2001 a translated text by Jürgen Habermas, entitled
‘Why Europe needs a Constitution’, NLR, 11 (2001), 5-26, but evidently did not feel the need to
step in on the debate at this later time when the Constitutional Convent (2002-2003) and the
Intergovernmental Conference (2003-2004) were negotiating the Constitutional Treaty.
44 Susan Watkins, ‘Continental Tremors’, NLR, 33 (2005), 5-23 (p. 10).
45 Bernard Cassen, ‘On the Attack’, NLR, 19 (2003), 41-62 (p. 58).
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Even the case of Turkey’s potential membership, a contentious issue in
Europe and relatively widely publicized at the time, is mentioned in only one
article. ‘The Turkish Bell Jar’ provides a portrait of the political situation of the
country and also addresses the question of potential EU membership.46 The
article mainly relates the protracted negotiations and infighting within Turkey’s
political elites over an agreed position on EU membership, and the author
makes the point that the prospect of EU membership would help to force
Turkey’s ruling elites to democratize the country. Keyder’s article makes clear,
however, that questions which concerned Esprit - how the country’s
membership will affect the issue of European self-understanding with regard to
cultural and religious differences – are not relevant for this journal’s discussion
at all. The article mentions in passing that the view that “Turkey was not
European enough, or too Islamic, culturally speaking” is a view purported mainly
“by Austrian and German Christian Democrats” (p. 80). Evidently, these
questions did not only preoccupy centre-right politicians, but also the French
and – as we shall see in relation to Merkur – the German intelligentsia.
It is difficult to plot a more exact position on the issue, since NLR does
not provide any further distinct British or European perspective on Turkey, or a
more nuanced discussion of the ways in which Turkey’s entry would affect the
current European status quo. What this text shows, however, is the degree to
which questions of cultural or religious differences are seen as irrelevant and of
no real consequence to the discussion for NLR. The example of Turkey
provides a case in point of how “Europe” as a historical and cultural concept, so
prominent in the French and German discourse, is entirely absent from NLR’s
understanding. The journal applies here completely different “criteria of
relevance” from Esprit, which places the emphasis on exploring Europe’s values
in the context of the post-1989 European landscape. These are suggested,
proclaimed and negotiated as part of the discussions on the Constitutional
Treaty and on the question of European enlargement, but not in NLR. The
journal abstains from discussing any such matters but has, so far, followed its
familiar crusade against the EU based on preestablished arguments which
46 Çağlar Keyder, ‘The Turkish Bell Jar’, NLR, 28 (2004), 65-84.
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completely exclude the “value” question. Therefore one can certainly not speak
about any common criteria of reference or overlap of debate between the
journals thus far.
5.2.2 The Critique of European Values and Identity
NLR’s rigid ideological views on the European Union, it has been already
argued in the previous chapter, often limit and constrict arguments to a certain
predetermined agenda. Here, I would like to show in greater detail the different
mindsets behind this lack of common ground on the aforementioned topics, in
order to explain why NLR remains averse to the use of “values” as an element
in its discussions. Two articles offer comments on NLR’s understanding of
European values and European identity respectively.
Gowan in ‘Pax Europæ’ alleges that European values amount to no more
than a “tool” of official EU diplomacy, summed up under the initials “HRDGG”,
which stand for “Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance” (p. 138).
Yet the fact remains “that the EU operates as a strongly mercantilist caucus and
its directorates are renowned for their ruthless assertion of West European
business interests in their economic diplomacy” (p. 139). Thus, “[s]ince the start
of the 1990s, the EU has rather successfully masked this mercantilist reality
with its HRDGG diplomacy” (p. 139). In other words, European values, Gowan
maintains, are just a smokescreen, intended to divert attention from the EU’s
“real” economic agenda, which it promotes ruthlessly. Evidently, NLR’s
assessment could hardly be further removed from Esprit’s which asserts that
European values are the outcome of a shared European history and culture.
Equally, NLR keeps a critical distance from the concept of “European
identity”. An article by a German academic, Lutz Niethammer, provides a critical
overview of the use of “identity politics”, which have resulted in “formulaic
constructions of collective identity” as a “symptomatic signature of the
present”.47 The article takes issue with all forms of “collective identity”, including
47 Lutz Niethammer, ‘The Infancy of Tarzan’, NLR, 19 (2003), 79-93 (p. 82). Niethammer has
published extensively on the topic of identity, most recently in Kollektive Identität: Heimliche
Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur (Reinbek, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2000) and specifically on
European Identity in: The Question of European Identity: a cultural historical approach, ed. by
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European identity, and aims to explain the manifold ways in which communities
and societies “adopt” a collective identity for disparate political purposes. On the
issue of such a European identity, Niethammer mentions that it has served the
function of “domesticating” and “neutering” European national cultures, which
up until the Second World War were locked into antagonistic encounters. The
idea of a European cultural identity, however, has “reduced the nationalist
claims of their various cultural identities to the level of a peaceable
conversation, within an overarching federal order of ballot and market” (p. 90).
While he does acknowledge that a newly invented European identity has served
to pacify the European continent, he finds that it has resulted in “neutered
cultural identities without sovereignty, lashed into the iron cages of
modernization; a colourful drapery of local traditions for good feeling; a quiet
playground for once conflictual cultures” (p. 90).
In Niethammer’s view, European identity is part of an overarching
ideology that has shaped a benign, inoffensive and harmless, but ultimately also
irrelevant sense of “substitute” identification for the different national identities.
This assessment is a far cry from Esprit’s appraisal, according to which a
positively defined sense of European identity will serve to foster a more
progressive encounter with the Other. Niethammer, though, is overtly critical of
the notion that identity is currently being theorized in a form “that does not
exclude difference” (p. 88). He specifically mentions Jacques Derrida as the
main instigator of formulating European identity as something which aims at
“incorporation – rather than exclusion – of difference” (p. 89).48 This “loving
adoption of the Other” as Niethammer scornfully remarks, however, amounts to
no more than “[t]he new fairy tales of our philosophers” (p. 91).
These two mutually exclusive views about the role and relevance of
European values and identity are directly contrasted in the discourse of these
journals. The differences between Esprit and NLR, I argue, amount to more
than simply divergent political viewpoints on European events. Rather, they
Lutz Niethammer, Paul Michael Lützeler and Luisa Passerini, EUI Working Paper, HEC, 1
(1998) <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/handle/1814/32> [accessed 06 May 2006].
48 Niethammer mentions specifically Derrida’s monograph The Other Heading: Reflections on
today’s Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), which I also referred to in
Chapter Two.
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derive from fundamentally different understandings of the role and relevance of
European values and identity for the discussion of European issues.
5.2.3 After Iraq: Europe in a Shambles
Although NLR largely ignores European values as a criterion of relevance in its
discussion, the climate of uncertainty and crisis after the American-led Iraq
invasion does precipitate a self-critical enquiry into Europe’s role in the world
and the question of what European values amount to.
Some of the key allegations and criticisms which NLR adduces against
the European response to the US invasion can be summarized from Tariq Ali’s
article ‘Re-colonizing Iraq’.49 He paints the picture of a completely feeble Europe
at pains to please the American empire whilst tearing itself apart, and compares
the inability of European countries to thwart the Iraq invasion to the failure of
European Social Democratic parties to prevent the outbreak of the First World
War. Then as much as now, these protests amounted to no more than “worthy
sentiments” (p. 6) which dissolved into thin air. The alleged split between the
European countries was, in Ali’s estimation, intentionally hyped up in the media
rather than a real rift. He notes sarcastically how the story was reported by a
gullible media.
The Franco-German initiatives aroused tremendous excitement and
consternation among diplomatic commentators. Here, surely, was an
unprecedented rift in the Atlantic Alliance. What was to become of
European unity, of NATO, of the ‘international community’ itself if such a
disastrous split persisted. Could the very concept of the West survive?
(p. 11).
The hyped-up fear about the survival of the West was, however, always
baseless. There was no real danger of such a split, since the countries involved
- France and Germany - soon faltered and toed the line once the invasion
began. Therefore it comes as no surprise that “[t]he vast bulk of official opinion
in Europe, and a substantial chunk in the US, is desperate to begin the post-war
healing process.” (p. 19). The alleged “healing” only amounts to a continuation
of the lies told over the Iraq invasion, and imply a false sense of compromise
49 Tariq Ali, ‘Re-colonizing Iraq’, NLR, 21 (2003), 5-21.
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between Europe and the US. In reality, “healing” only serves the purpose of
obtaining “retrospective cover for the invasion” (p. 19). Ali ends his article with
advocating a complete rejection of any form of cooperation with the United
States.
These strong statements reveal the depth of the crisis for the European
community. The alleged differences and rifts between Europe and the United
States, which supposedly “endangered” the unity of the West, as Ali scoffs,
were no more than the feeble and unprincipled posturing of countries such as
France and Germany for their own national audiences. All in all, Europe has
exposed itself as spineless and unable to exert a real counterforce against the
US but has instead become part of the “United States of the West”; an
expression used as the cover title for another article in NLR from January
2003,50 to which I would now like to turn.
The teaser in the table of contents for this article, authored by Régis
Debray51 and translated from the French for NLR, reads: “[w]hy does a
malcontent Europe not simply sue for union with the global hegemon,
discarding its wisps of independence to exchange proud membership of the
American Empire for today’s sullen servility?” (p. 4). The article is a witty spoof
letter, written by an imaginary French diplomat who has assumed American
citizenship and who writes back to his “European friends”. The fictional diplomat
satirically suggests forming a union between the US and Europe so that, he
says in addressing the Europeans, “your voice will be heard” (p. 38). After all, in
the current cumbersome and inconvenient system in which Europe is nominally
independent from the United States, its role in the world appears to be
confused: “What role will Europe settle for in America’s march across Asia –
50 By ‘cover title’ I mean the title of the article on the cover of the issue, which differs here from
the title in the journal. Here the ‘United States of the West’ is replaced with the less polemical
title, ‘Letter from America’, NLR, 19 (2003), 29-40.
51 Régis Debray is a political activist, adviser and writer with an adventurous and sometimes
improbable political career. Active on the French Left of the 60s, he went to Latin America,
where he joined Che Guevara’s guerrilla group. He also spent four years in a Bolivian jail for his
“resistance activities”. Back in France, he served as special adviser to Mitterand on foreign
affairs during the 1980s. In yet another turnaround to his political career, he has most recently
sat on the commission under President Chirac on the issue of banning the wearing of the hijab
in French schools, which it contentiously advocated. See Ian Birchall, ‘Debray’s Memoirs: Tears
of a Clown’, International Socialism: A Quarterly of Socialist Theory, 116 (2007)
<http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=375&issue=116> [accessed 12 December 2008].
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staffing a first-aid post on the Afghan frontier? Patrolling the Gulf in a paddle
boat? Providing after-sales service for the Middle East?” (p. 30). More
preferable and convenient for everyone involved would be a swift and painless
formal union of Europe and the United States.
As well as pointing out the fact that Europe is politically completely
dependent on the US, the letter goes on to sardonically comment on the inanity
of European culture and lack of distinct European values. He quips:
is there a single value proclaimed in European speeches that America
has not more successfully put into practice? Peace? Both world wars
came out of Europe. Democracy? Over here, the community elects even
the sheriff and the judge (p. 38).
As for differences between the cultural tastes, American mainstream culture has
subsumed European tastes anyhow. Thus, all things considered, Europe’s
identity appears inchoate and lacks self-confidence, while America is certain
what it stands for. This is evident for Debray in the American dollar bills which
“proclaim America’s eternal faith in God and in itself: a combat currency,
splendidly messianic, with its roll-call of heroes, eagles, arrows, olive branch
and the All-Seeing Eye”. In comparison, the hollowness of the Euro bills display
the “emptiness of the supermarket state” (p. 39), which are “[n]otes from no-
man’s land that show featureless bridges and windows opening on the void. No
portraits, no landscapes, no maxims – have the Europeans no achievements,
no history?” (p. 39), he asks in mock exasperation.
Culture, economics, politics – all these aspects are in fact part of a value
system that is essentially American. Therefore, Debray demands that
instructions are given to “our international-law specialists to draw up a
conversion plan, transforming a region of common values into one of shared
sovereignty.” To this effect, all that would be necessary would be “three extra
initials on the passport, some flags to run, bilingual messages to be played on
internal flights – the necessary adjustments would hardly be noticed at all. Your
signature here, please, at the bottom of the page” (p. 39).
Debray’s hyperbole aside, the idea that Europe and America should
formalise their union to form the “United States of the West” provides a drastic
form of satire to describe the state Europe finds itself in as NLR sees it. Not only
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has Europe squandered its integrity by allowing the war to happen, as Ali
argues, but it is completely dependent to and has become upstaged by the US.
Despite the evident differences in style and tone of the analysis, both Esprit and
NLR arrive at the conclusion that Europe is so closely associated with American
values that they have become interchangeable and must be more accurately
defined as broadly “Western” – or, as NLR would probably say – neo-liberal
values.
Yet while it is clearly possible for the two journals to agree that Europe
lacks an identity, analysis diverges again on the question of how Europe might
sharpen its profile. For while Esprit consequently aims to reassert Europe’s role
in the world as a harbinger of enlightened, cosmopolitan liberalism, NLR rejects
any such notions as intellectual delusions. The ideas are dismissed out of hand
since the “reality” of Europe’s role in the world simply does not conform to the
grandiose aspirations which Esprit formulates. Gowan admonishes that there is
not the slightest indication to suggest that European “politics of cosmopolitan
liberalism” (‘Pax Europæa’, p. 135) will be able to make any dent in the minds of
Washington policymakers, nor does he see any evidence that Europe has the
political will-power or resources to back up this “fantasy of European global
dominance” (p. 137). In any case, he keeps reminding the reader, “Europe as
based upon – indeed the embodiment of - liberal norms” masks the fact that
these norms are in fact “a thicket of positive laws for particularistic capitalist
interests” (p. 136).
Along the same lines, Susan Watkins acerbically argues that Europe has
time and again since 1989 displayed its inability to live up to its self-appointed
norms. For Watkins, the debacle over Yugoslavia in the mid 1990s was the first
of many episodes in which Europe failed to put its ideals into action and proof, if
necessary, that “the post-Cold war era has seen it [the EU] locked into a
subordinate role within the US hegemonic system” (‘Continental Tremors’, p.
20).
Once more NLR withdraws into an initially combative, but then ultimately
defeatist tone which fails to come up with any alternatives to Europe’s role in
the wake of the Iraq disaster. Whereas the lack of distinctive European values
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as a counterbalance to the US is stressed in the strongest terms and while it
dismisses the notion of Esprit’s “universal Europe” - which is only logically
consistent within NLR’s reasoning - there is no immediate suggestion as to how
Europe might step out of America’s shadow. However, after the May 2005
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the model of a social Europe rises to the
surface again.
5.2.4 People’s Power: Rejecting the Constitutional Treaty
The French No-Vote in May 2005 energises NLR’s treatment of European
issues because it finally proves NLR’s agenda right. While any discussion of the
Constitutional Treaty prior to the referendum has been ignored on the basis that
it is just another neo-liberal ruse thought up by the elites, NLR reports on the
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French voters with a certain amount
of glee. Again, the ensuing arguments do not necessarily engage with the
Constitution itself, but follow a pattern already evident during 1989-92: the idea
that “people’s power” will democratize and breathe new life into the
undemocratic and out-of-touch EU. Whereas in 1989 this role fell to the
populace of the Eastern European countries, this time the good people of
France have given a spirited display of democracy in action.
Rather narrowly, the rejection of the Constitution is celebrated as the
rightful revolt of people power against the elites. Bernard Cassen, the director
general of the Le monde diplomatique and one of the founders of the ATTAC
movement, writes a guest article in the aftermath of the No-Vote, the title of
which gets straight to the point: ‘ATTAC against the Treaty’.52 In his eyes, the
“historic character” (p. 32) of the No-Vote is revealed in the fact that the
“citizens of Europe are no longer willing to accept their destinies being decided
by EU political mechanisms over which they have no real purchase” (p. 32).
The French critic Jean Baudrillard comments in the same issue that the
outcome was a No to the “Say Yes to Yes campaign”53 and thus constitutes a
true citizens’ uprising against the “benevolent despotism” of the EU project, in
which the public is reduced to retrospectively affirming the policies of “the
52 Bernard Cassen, ‘ATTAC against the Treaty’, NLR, 31 (2005), 27-36.
53 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Holy Europe’, NLR, 33 (2005), 24-27 (p. 25).
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infallible, universal Holy Europe” (p. 24), which have been already decided
beforehand.
More than this, the No-Vote is also interpreted as a sign of protest
against the pervasive neoliberal encroachment in Europe. Watkins observes in
an analysis of the No-Vote: “Popular rejection of the EU treaty raises the
possibility that the general political narcosis induced by Brussels may now be
failing” (’Continental Tremors’, p. 21). Although under no illusion that the No-
Vote will herald a sea change in politics, Watkins states that the “summer
lightning of 2005” (p. 21) represents a step towards a more social Europe. As I
noted already in Chapter Three, NLR runs markedly more articles during 2005
and 2006 on France than on any other European country, indicating its renewed
interest in the wake of the No-Vote as a launching pad for the renewed
possibility of a social Europe.54 Again, this agenda is of course not novel to the
journal but was evident already in 1989-92, when the possibility for Europe’s
renewal was tied to an alliance between Eastern and Western European forces.
5.2.5 Social Europe as the American Countermodel
Now as then, social Europe represents in NLR the only permissible model
which has resulted out of Europe’s historical development. Kees van der Pijl for
example alleges in his article ‘Lockean Europe’55 that continental postwar
Europe has firmly developed around an alleged consensus of social cohesion
and class compromise, which has shaped and defined these countries’ political
and historical development. Britain can be characterized according to van der
Pijl as belonging to the “Lockean heartland”, which represents the fullest
expression of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, and which has evolved differently from
continental European traditions. These different socio-economic developments
are the main underlying reason for Britain’s tenuous relationship with the rest of
Europe and are unlikely to be remedied in the future. On the contrary, in his
54 From articles about the French political scene in Sebastian Budgen, ‘Liberal Francophobia’,
NLR, 38 (2006), 150-160, to comments on the French banlieue riots by Jean Baudrillard, ‘Pyres
of Autumn’, NLR, 37 (2006), 5-8, and discussions of the French intellectual scene in Gregory
Elliott, ‘Parisian Impostures’, NLR, 41 (2006), 139-147, France does merit far more interest than
any other European country.
55 Kees van der Pijl, ‘Lockean Europe’, NLR, 37 (2006), 9-37.
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view the “prominence of the EU issue in British politics is diminishing” (p. 20),
not least because the rejection of the Constitutional treaty shows that the
appetite for “pervasive liberalization” in Europe is slowly diminishing. In van der
Pijl’s view, the “true” Europe connotes “continental” Europe but tellingly
excludes the United Kingdom.
Van der Pijl also provides his own explanation as to why the Constitution
so spectacularly misfired. In his view, it has to do with the misguided aim of
encoding a system of “full-fledged neoliberalism” (p. 32) which was “ill-fitting” to
the Continental European model and would only generate “anomalies” in the
political and social system. The injudicious aim to “compete with the American
model wholesale” (p. 37) has resulted in the attempt to impose an “alien” (p. 37)
system on the European countries and has plunged continental Europe into a
crisis.
Thus the continental European social system is considered as the
defining European trait, and which, according to Robin Blackburn, also presents
Europe’s real raison d’être. In the article ‘Capital and Social Europe’,56 which is
a detailed analysis of how a system of European wealth distribution would work
in practice, Blackburn notes that “[f]rom the beginning the founders of the
European Community intended it to be more than a free-trade agreement” (p.
103). Not for nothing, he claims, was the European Community “founded, in
part, to avoid the social catastrophes of the pre-war (and postwar) periods (p.
103). Blackburn then argues that it is exactly these values to which Europe
should now return, because a common social policy would go a long way
towards binding Europeans together. Above all else, it would provide a renewed
sense of purpose in the aftermath of the European debacle over the Iraq
invasion.
Washington’s bellicosity is itself prompted by the desire to distract US
citizens from grave social problems and ballooning inequality at home.
Europe should aspire to a quite different model, both for its own people
and in its relations with the rest of the world. Developing some welfare
ties at a continental level, binding together old and new members, would
help to build the civic confidence which might underpin a more generous
56 Robin Blackburn, ‘Capital and Social Europe’, NLR, 34 (2005), 87-114.
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approach to overseas development, and a sense of common citizenship
that could support an independent and progressive foreign policy (p.
134).
Here is the case for social Europe laid out in its clearest form. Firstly, a just and
social welfare system would equip Europe with a convincing countermodel to
the American superpower. Secondly, social Europe would unite Europeans with
common ties of citizenship that would encompass “old” and “new” Europe. The
inclusion of such a reference to the new member states here is notable only
because the new member states have been more or less ignored in NLR’s
coverage during these years. Of course, NLR’s language is not tinged with the
same rhetoric as Esprit’s and it certainly does not hold up the example of the
Polish Solidarity movement as a model for the entire Europe. Unsurprisingly,
Blackburn avoids any mention of how social Europe will in turn lead to a more
distinct “European identity”, but instead refers to “common ties” and the more
tangible “common citizenship” between Europeans. In essence, though, Esprit
and NLR propagate a similar vision, in which the keyword “social Europe”
encapsulates the defining ethos of what Europe should stand for.
The following key points on NLR can be summed up as follows. Firstly, we
established that NLR does not much change or develop its arguments on
European issues. By and large, the same repackaged arguments against a
Europe which has sold out to the neoliberal promise against an undemocratic
and elitist Europe persist. Eastern Europe has completely faded from view, and
none of the articles engage with, for example, the changed constellations of the
enlarged Europe after 2004. Of course, Europe does not occupy the same
relevance as in Esprit in any case, and the US-led invasion of Iraq also
unsurprisingly eclipses these other events, but, even so, there is a distinct lack
of engagement on these topics evident here. Moreover, where Europe is
discussed, at least in the initial stages, the rift between Esprit and NLR could
not be greater with regard to the fundamental concepts of European values and
European identity, which are employed to very different purposes in the
journals, and which ultimately account for the different “criteria of relevance”.
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Only the response to a perceived crisis elicits common criteria of
relevance, insofar as the question of what Europe values stand for rises to the
surface and is addressed by NLR at last. In the previous chapter, the looming
fear over a return to nationalism in Europe resulted in a common diagnosis of
what Europe does and does not stand for. Some ten years later, the European
foreign policy crisis over the Iraq war leads to shared understanding in Esprit
and NLR about the lack of a distinct European identity vis-à-vis the United
States. For both journals, the US is the yardstick against which European
values cannot be satisfactorily demarcated. Instead, Europe is by common
agreement identical with Western values. Unlike Esprit, NLR does not feel
compelled to advocate a more important place on the world stage, nor does it
share its beliefs about core European “universal” values. However, NLR does
return to its main message of a social Europe, through which it would return to
its “core” values and represent a positive countermodel to the United States
while promoting inner cohesion and “binding ties”.
In the final section, we turn to Merkur to investigate, what part, if any,
social Europe plays in Merkur’s discourse, and how it assesses the relevance of
Western values for Europe.
5.3 Merkur
As in the case of NLR, several of Merkur’s arguments in its discourse about
Europe remain unchanged from the previous years. Most recognisable is
perhaps the ongoing attempt to argue for the political sovereignty of the nation
state. Therefore, the journal still retains the same sceptical attitude towards
European political cooperation. Yet, in marked contrast to the earlier timeframe,
the question of European values is discussed in Merkur, as in Esprit much more
overtly than before. However, the question of what these European values
consist in is answered quite differently than in the French journal and through
very different discursive strategies. What is striking in Merkur is perhaps how
surprisingly straightforward and unambiguous notions of European identity are
put forward. In contrast to Esprit they are based much more on established
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inclusion/exclusion mechanisms: black and white, with only the occasional
shade of grey, is how Merkur’s arguments might be characterized. Declarations
about Europe’s firm anchoring in a Western - or rather American - community of
values, serve the clear purpose of asserting Europe as the cradle and defender
of Western Enlightenment values against the dark Other of Islamic
fundamentalism.
Having said that, Merkur’s search for European values and identity does
not take place solely in opposition to an Other but in certain instances also
takes account of the changes which Europe has undergone since 1989. What
Merkur hinted at in 1991 - namely that eastern enlargement would influence and
alter Europe’s self-conception in as yet uncharted ways - is explored in a fairly
detailed and thorough fashion at this stage. However, this tolerance towards a
modified self-perception of Europe quickly reaches its limits when it comes to
defending Europe’s Western orientation, which is, we shall see in the following,
Merkur’s overarching aim during this time.
Under discussion will be Merkur’s treatment of the Constitutional Treaty,
the question of Eastern Europe, Turkey and Europe, and of course Europe’s
role in the wake of the American-led Iraq invasion. Finally, I shall turn to the
question of the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism, since it is of
particular relevance to this journal. Missing from this section is an extended
discussion of the No-Vote in France and subsequent exploration of the notion of
a social Europe, since Merkur does not debate these themes. Unlike Esprit and
NLR, which undertake a crucial argumentative turn towards a social Europe,
Merkur’s discourse over the four years follows a more straightforward path of
building up a repertoire of European values and identity traits primarily in
defence of a conservatively defined Western ‘civilization’.
5.3.1 The Constitutional Treaty: Defending the Nation State Model
In Merkur’s discussion of the proposed Constitutional treaty no substantially
new arguments are put forward either for or against the treaty. Judging by the
small number of articles devoted to the topic, it is evident that it does not rank
amongst the journal’s main concerns either. Like NLR, Merkur uses the “lack of
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democracy” argument as the main framework to discuss, or rather to dismiss
the Constitution, in contrast to Esprit, where the historical and symbolic
meanings of the Constitution take precedence. For Merkur, the Constitution
becomes a symbol of a rash and irresponsible move towards a postnational
order, thereby feeding into some of Merkur’s well-known prejudices and
ambivalence towards European political integration.
For example, in the article, ‘Kontinentalverschmelzung? Die europäische
Frage und die Zukunft der EU’,57 Rudolf Burger explains the proposed
Constitution mainly as an economic instrument to ensure that European
economic integration, which has stalled since the implementation of Maastricht,
will receive a new impetus. He is content to note that it will render the European
Union more “handlungsfähig” again (p. 188). However, the Treaty amounts to
political rationalisation rather than democratisation because the latter is
impossible to attain within the European Union because it would destabilize the
workings of this political formation: “[v]on einer Demokratisierung wird dabei
keine Rede sein können, sie wäre bestandsgefährdend” (p. 188). Burger even
claims that there exists something like an inverse relation between the level of
democracy and the level of political integration in the EU, because according to
a further unreferenced quote attributed to Ralf Dahrendorf, the general rule is:
“’[j]e mehr EU, desto weniger Demokratie’” (p. 191). Ultimately, the sole
guarantor of democracy remains the nation state, for “ohne Nation, keine
Demokratie” (p. 191). Thus, it is at best a tool to further inscribe “ökonomische
Rationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung” (p. 193). In short, Burger
insists on restricting the declared aim of the Constitution to merely enhancing
technocratic cooperation of sovereign nation states.
Another article on the same topic, originally written for the American
journal Policy Review, raises similar doubts about the Constitution on the
grounds that it represents an attempt to weaken further the role of the nation
state in the era of globalisation.58 The article discusses the EU as the first
example “einer postmodernen internationalen politischen Formation” (p. 282),
57 Rudolf Burger, ‘Kontinentalverschmelzung? Die europäische Frage und die Zukunft der EU’,
Merkur, 647 (2003), 187-200.
58 Marc F. Plattner, ‘Souveränität und Demokratie’, Merkur, 660 (2004), 281-294.
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but voices scepticism as to whether the Constitution is an adequate means of
implementing a democratic postnational order. Like Burger, Plattner is sceptical
about a functioning democracy on a European level and alleges that any
democratically legitimated state is preferable to “irgendeinem transnationalen
Gebilde” (p. 293).
Merkur frames the discussion as a choice between a deficient,
undemocratic postnational order and a fully fledged democracy based on the
model of the sovereign state. However, a further look at other texts leads us to
believe that another reason for retaining the nation state, other than the
ostensibly disinterested and noble appeal to maintain democratic governing
structures is really at issue here. Consider, for example, the text by historian
Heinrich Winkler, written after the French No-Vote in 2005.59 He first reiterates
the familiar argument that the No-Vote should serve as a reminder to refocus
the attention on the nation state and to stop investing in a “postnationale
Illusion” (p. 42). However, Winkler then turns his critique against the German
political Left, which he judges to be primarily responsible for trying to imbed
Germany and other European nation states into such a postnational
constellation.60 He claims that Germany’s political Left has, in the light of the
country’s disastrous nation state legacy in the twentieth century, fostered over
many years the misguided belief that the postnational is a “safer” option than
the nation state state model.
Die Deutschen hatten ihren ersten Nationalstaat, das von Bismarck
gegründete Deutsche Reich, in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945 ruiniert. Viele
von ihnen [...] auch namhafte sozialdemokratische und grüne Mitglieder
der ‘postumen Adenauerschen Linken’, folgerten aus dieser Erfahrung,
die Deutschen seien in besonderem Maß berufen, den übrigen
Europäern bei der Überwindung ihrer Nationalstaaten voranzugehen (p.
42).
59 Heinrich August Winkler, ‘Weltmacht durch Überdehnung? Ein Plädoyer für europäischen
Realismus’, Merkur, 681 (2006), 36-43.
60 There is no time or space to go into the internal German debates taking place in the journal
during that time, but Merkur does adopt an increasingly combative tone against the German Left
on numerous counts: the legacy of the Frankfurt School, the failings of the 1968 movement, as
well as polemics specifically against Jürgen Habermas on account of his critique of the war. See
in articles by Mariam Lau, ‘Kerneuropa bleibt sich treu. Streifzug durch den Antiliberalismus’,
Merkur, 653-654 (2003), 779-789; Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Versuchungen der Unfreiheit. Die
Intellektuellen in Zeiten der Prüfung’, Merkur, 681 (2006), 1-14; Volker Gerhardt, ‘Uneinig gegen
den Terror’, Merkur, 667 (2004), 969-982.
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The ‘postnational illusion’ was able to take hold in Europe mainly because of
these foolish ideals. The EU should be understood as a sum of “Nationalstaaten
und Deutschland ist einer unter ihnen” (p. 43). On balance, one can conclude
therefore that Merkur’s discussion about the Constitution does not really revolve
around Europe but serves mainly to further Merkur’s own agenda of working
towards the return to the (German) nation state.61
Even though Merkur rejects the Constitution, the French No-Vote in 2005
does not arouse the sense of jubilation or triumphalism so evident in NLR.
Merkur merely comments that the No-Vote is unsurprising considering that the
Constitution represented an undemocratic measure in the first place. Other than
that, the French No-Vote has none of the impact which was evident in Esprit
and NLR. Neither does it produce a call for a rethink or reorientation of the
European project towards a more social Europe. Merkur rejects any additional
social-ameliorative policies as an impossible burden on the state, and does not
discuss the evident French discontent nor does the journal provide a critique of
the idea of social Europe. We can infer here that this kind of a basis for a new
European identity appears to have appeal only to the political Left, and those
ideological left/right cleavages in this instance override and preclude the
possibility of a shared debate on the notion of social Europe in all three journals.
Instead, Merkur uses the opportunity for a side-swipe against the French
Left, which rejected the Constitution for all the wrong reasons. One article
notes: “[a]ntiamerikanisch bis in die Knochen und befangen im eigenen
Größenwahn, Europa als Gegenmacht zu den USA aufbauen zu wollen, hat
das Land der EU-Verfassung dennoch ein wütendes Nein
entgegengeschleudert.”62 This quote foreshadows one of the most pertinent
points discussed below and relates to Merkur’s agenda of wanting to inscribe
the European identity as a staunchly Western one, whilst disagreeing with
attempts, such as we have seen in Esprit, to inscribe a specifically European
61 The attempts of the German political Right after 1990 to argue for a more assertive or
German state is supported by points made by Jan-Werner Müller, ‘From National Identity to
National Interest: The Rise (and Fall) of Germany’s New Right’, in German Ideologies since
1945 Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic, ed. by Jan Werner
Müller (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 185-206.
62 Ulrike Ackermann, ‘Französische Zustände’, Merkur, 683 (2006), 260-264 (p. 262).
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identity in opposition to the US. However, there is one point on which Merkur
and Esprit’s frameworks overlap: the plea for a more historically aware Europe
in order to culturally and intellectually unite Eastern and Western Europe after
1989.
5.3.2 Enlargement: New Europe or Western Europe Reaffirmed?
Despite Merkur’s reservations about the EU as a unified political actor, the
journal proves to be very forthcoming about reinscribing post-1989 Europe as a
community of shared values. The enlargement of 2004 is presented no longer in
Merkur as a renewed burden on the hard-stretched Western European
countries due to the East’s allegedly tribal allegiances and half-authoritarian
affinities, as before. Instead, the accession countries are considered equal
members which have altered Europe’s identity and self-perception, even though
these changes have not been recognized by the majority of Europeans. Merkur,
like Esprit, considers 1989 as a key European event and goes so far as to call
for the recognition of 1989 as a new European foundation myth.
Merkur’s doyen Dahrendorf is probably the most vocal proponent of this
view and his thoughts are summarized in a review article of one of his
numerous books, entitled ‘1989 in Perspektive: Ralf Dahrendorfs Antiutopismus’
by Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk. 63 Not only does 1989 represent the “Wiederbeginn
der Geschichte” (p. 66) and “die erfolgreichste Revolution der Moderne” (p. 66),
but, even more, it heralds the constitutive event of present-day Europe, even if
this knowledge is not yet fixed in a common European consciousness.
‘1989’ war ein europäisches Jahr, weil es Europa ermöglichte. Diese
Binsenweisheit wird noch lange kein Allgemeingut sein. ‘1989’ rangiert
noch längst nicht dort im historischen Bewußtsein [...], wo dieses
epochenmachende Jahr [...] hingehört (p. 69).
Based upon these reflections Kowalczuk concludes: “Dahrendorf sieht in ‘1989’
nicht nur eine globale Zäsur, er glaubt auch, daß sie als Gründungsmythos für
das neue Europa taugt“ (p. 67). In order for this new foundation myth to enter
63 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘1989 in Perspektive: Ralfs Dahrendorfs Antiutopismus’, Merkur, 669
(2005), 65-69. The article reviews Dahrendorf’s book, Der Wiederbeginn der Geschichte. Vom
Fall der Mauer zum Krieg in Irak (Munich: Beck, 2004).
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the European consciousness: “’1989’ muß, neben anderen Ereignissen, in
einem europäischen Erinnerungskanon verankert werden” (p. 69).
Karl Schlögel, an eminent writer on Eastern European history and culture
advances a similar argument in two Merkur articles.64 Schlögel makes the point
that the enlargement process is the culmination of Europe’s reunification, “das
Comeback eines Kontinents nach einem Jahrhundert der Selbstüberhebung,
der Selbstzerstörung, der Provinzialisierung” (’Das Jahrhundertprotokoll’, p.
557). As part of this reunification process Europe is going to have to reinvent
itself; “ein neues Bild von sich selber machen müssen” (p. 568). In order to
capture the image of this newly emerging Europe, Schlögel proposes, in a
different article published one year later, the formation of a “Museum der
Transformationsperiode” (‘Sichtbarkeit der Zeit’, p. 911), which would
commemorate and retrace the shifts that Europe has experienced since 1989.
Although Schlögel is convinced that Europe is already changing - “der
Dogmatismus des alteingesessenen, wohlanständigen und allzu selbstsicheren
Europa ist dabei, sich aufzulösen” (p. 916) - he finds it necessary to render
these changes apparent and to commemorate them by building a museum
dedicated to these events.
These thoughts are reiterated by Christoph von Marschall,65 an editor of
the Berlin-based newspaper Der Tagesspiegel, and by Adam Krzeminski, a
Polish journalist who comments frequently in German newspapers on German-
Polish relations and European issues.66 Both authors point somewhat warily to
the lack of a common understanding of 1989 that transcends Eastern and
Western Europe and speak of the need for elevating 1989 as a new European
foundation myth. For example, von Marshall points out in, that 1989 presents
one of the “Sternstunden der Menschheit” (‘Der wilde Osten’, p. 612) – alluding
64 Karl Schlögel, ‘Das Jahrhundertprotokoll. Harry Graf Kesslers Tagebuch 1880-1937’, Merkur,
663 (2004), 557-569 and ‘Sichtbarkeit der Zeit. Skizze für ein Museum der
Transformationsperiode, Merkur, 677-678 (2005), 911-917.
65 Christoph von Marschall, ‘Der wilde Osten’, Merkur, 663 (2004), 610-615; ‘Politikkolumne:
Friedensdividende’, Merkur, 670 (2005), 148-153.
66 Adam Krzeminski, ‘Hauptsache nach Europa. Polnische Modernisierungsschübe’, Merkur,
645 (2003), 36-46; ‘Was macht der trojanische Esel Amerikas im Irak?’, Merkur, 655 (2003),
1067-1072; ‘Die europäische Außenpolitik entsteht im Osten’, Merkur, 671 (2005), 256-262.
Krzeminski has also published, amongst other topics, on the European public sphere: ‘From
Closed Circuits to Communicating Tubes’, Signandsight
<http://www.signandsight.com/features/1400.html> [accessed 18 July 2007].
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here the Austrian author Stefan Zweig’s book title - and that the enlargement
finally represents the political overcoming of Europe’s catastrophe. Yet he
warns that Europe is still divided by a wall of intellectual “non-perception” –
“Nichtwahrnehmung” (p. 610). This is turn can only by remedied, says Marshall,
if both Eastern and Western Europe are prepared to engage in a dialogue about
their understanding of European history (pp. 614-15). In the same vein,
Krzeminski asserts that current Western ignorance towards the Eastern
European history can only be countered through “Nachhilfeunterricht in
ostmitteleuropäischer Geschichte […] der nicht nur alte Denkschemata,
sondern auch die weißen Flecken schierer Unkenntnis zu überwinden hilft” (‘Die
europäische Außenpolitik’, p. 262).
This insistence on a more historical understanding of Europe mirrors
closely the arguments put forward in Esprit. Read on their own, the texts point, I
believe, to a real shift in Merkur towards an attempt to place the Eastern
European countries into a common European framework. We shall see in the
next section, however, that Merkur makes such grandiose proclamations
because, in the final instance, Eastern European countries are considered as
having internalized and reaffirmed fundamentally Western values in Europe,
which to Merkur are pivotal, rather than having altered or challenged these
values. In order to explain Merkur’s reasoning, it is necessary to point to the two
key factors which for Merkur are proof of these countries’ impeccable “Western”
credentials. The first is their commitment to Western economic liberalism, the
second concerns these countries’ stance in the US-led Iraq invasion, and
becomes especially relevant in 2003
Firstly, we have already noted in the previous chapter that, in keeping
with Merkur’s right-wing stance, it has an unshakeable trust in the link between
developing capitalism and developing democratic societies. An example of
Merkur’s advocacy of the free-market agenda is evident in a dossier published
in 2003, entitled “Kapitalismus oder Barbarei”, an inversion of the title of the
journal Socialisme ou Barbarie, published by the now-defunct ultra-left French
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activist group of the same name.67 In one of the articles in this dossier, ‘Patient
lebt: Kapitalistischer Systemwandel in Mittel-und Südosteuropa’,68 the author
Matthias Rüb finds that on balance the Eastern European countries have
vindicated the Western model. He acknowledges that the transition period has
been shaky and turbulent at times and that the continuing economic hardships
in these countries cannot be ignored. Yet he is satisfied to see that the trust of
the citizens remains strong. “Es ist, als hätten die Menschen im Wunderjahr
1989 ein ontologisches Vertrauen in Kapitalismus und Demokratie gefaßt und
ließen in Engelsgeduld nicht mehr davon ab” (p. 840). In the eyes of Merkur,
this ‘commitment’ to a free-market democracy proves these countries’
allegiance to the tried and tested Western system.
Secondly, Merkur, as we have noted above was one of the few
intellectual publications in Europe to support the American-led invasion. It
therefore commended those Eastern European countries whose governments -
though not necessarily their citizens - proved to be more supportive of the US
than, for example, France and Germany, which Merkur singles out for attack. In
the eyes of Merkur’s commentators, this goes to confirm that Eastern European
countries such as Poland have found their place in a “Western”-orientated
Europe and have in fact strengthened these principles. In Dahrendorf’s words,
they have become even more “Western” than Western Europe: “Europa war
schon immer westlich, aber das neue Europa derer, die der Europäischen
Union erst spät beigetreten sind, zeigt sich bewußter westlich, als jene es sind,
die von Anfang an dabei waren”.69
The aforementioned Heinrich Winkler makes a similar assertion as to
where the Eastern European countries belong:
67 This reference is provided in the untitled editorial by Karl Heinz Bohrer from the special issue
‘Kapitalismus oder Barbarei’, Merkur, 653-654 (2003), 745-746. For more information on the
origins of the journal and the political group behind it which operated between 1949 and 1965,
see: Gilles Dauvé, Jean Barrot, ‘From the German Left to Socialisme ou Barbarie’, La Banquise,
2 (1983) <http://www.geocities.com/~johngray/rome06.htm> [accessed 22 May 08].
68 Matthias Rüb, ‘Patient lebt: Kapitalistischer Systemwandel in Mittel - und Südosteuropa’,
Merkur, 653-654 (2003), 832-840.
69 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Europa und der Westen: Alte und neue Identitäten’, Merkur, 655 (2003),
1015-1025 (p. 1020).
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Die acht ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten, die bis zur Epochenwende von
1989/91 kommunistisch regiert wurden und seit dem 1. Mai 2004
Mitglieder der EU sind, gehören ausnahmslos zum historischen Westen.
Die Spaltung Europas im Jahre 1945, für die der Name Jalta steht, war
eine Teilung gegen die Geschichte. Deswegen hat keines der neuen
Mitglieder der EU ein grundsätzliches Problem mit dem Bekenntnis zur
politischen Kultur des Westens (‘Weltmacht durch Überdehnung’, p. 37-
38).
Both authors are unequivocal as to where they locate Eastern Europe, namely
in the West, which is evidently considered a more salient framework than a
merely European one. I would argue that Merkur’s discourse is slightly
inconsistent in the way in which it conceives of the enlargement and of the role
and relevance that the Eastern European countries occupy. Although the
journal is without doubt serious about the impact of 1989 on present-day
Europe’s self-perception and in its calls for a common European framework of
remembrance, Merkur at the same time appropriates these countries as part of
an exclusively Western tradition of values. Hence the notion of a new European
identity has to give way in the final instance to locating Eastern Europe in the
West. Unlike in Esprit, all the talk about Eastern Europe’s starring role in a post-
1989 European identity ultimately serves to forge and reaffirm a Western
identity for Europe.
5.3.3 Turkey: Retreating Inwards
While Eastern Europe can be assuredly placed in a European, or rather
Western community of values, Merkur is confronted with a slightly trickier
scenario regarding the question of Turkey. At one end of the spectrum are
those voices which indeed maintain that Turkey is culturally incompatible with
European values, as pointed out by Çağlar Keyder in his NLR article. But other
voices in Merkur allege that Turkey’s entry into the European Union might be
beneficial and would prevent Europe from becoming a “post-Christian” club, just
as Esprit fears.
In relation to the question of Turkey, it appears that Merkur hesitates
uneasily between two clashing visions of Europe. On the one hand it advocates
the idea of the European Union as a solely economic association, of which
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Turkey should become a member. On the other hand, the journal cannot help
invoking Europe as a civilizational and cultural achievement which precludes
Turkey from joining. Rudolf Burger’s aforementioned article
‘Kontinentalverschmelzung’ is one such example of aiming (and failing) to
reconcile two inherently incompatible views about what Europe should
represent. He first insists that the EU should only be understood as the sum of
the technocratic cooperation of the nation states and as a strictly economic
association. Yet, Burger goes on to claim that the EU will remain “grundsätzlich
offen für neue, kulturnahe Mitglieder” (p. 199, my emphasis). The assertion here
is somewhat baffling, for either the EU represents only an economical and
political alliance – as NLR would agree – or it represents a community open to
those with common values and cultural affinities. To insist that the EU is a solely
technocratic, economically orientated alliance, and then to qualify this by saying
that it is open only to countries which are “kulturnahe”, is logically incongruous.
Burger then goes on to classify Turkey as “kryptoislamisch” (p. 190),
thereby falling foul of the “zivilisatorische Mindeststandards” (p. 189), which
potential new member states have to fulfil. What these minimum standards
amount to is spelled out in full by Heinrich Winkler. Any country wishing to enter
the European Union must fulfil a
vorbehaltlose Öffnung gegenüber der politischen Kultur des Westens. In
dieser Formel steckt auch eine Antwort auf die Frage nach den
politischen Grenzen Europas und damit nach den Grenzen der
Erweiterbarkeit der Europäischen Union Nationen, die sich diese Kultur
nicht aneignen wollen, erteilen damit der Europäischen Union als
Wertegemeinschaft eine Absage und können ihr nicht beitreten
(‘Weltmacht durch Überdehnung’, p. 37).
Again, the “culture of the West”, is held up as the benchmark for assessing a
country’s membership of the European Union. According to Winkler - as the
previous section has established - the Eastern European countries have already
proven their mettle. However, Turkey has in his view only undergone a
“Teilverwestlichung” (p. 38). Despite the country’s modernization processes, it
has yet to prove that it is able to uphold Western traditions. Winkler does not
reject Turkey’s entry out of hand, but he remains doubtful whether the country
can ever become Western enough.
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Similar concerns are raised in Wolfgang Prezewieslik’s article “Ist die
Türkei reif für die EU?”,70 probably the most detailed account in Merkur on this
topic. Without resorting to any overtly anti-Turkish propaganda along the lines of
Burger’s characterization of Turkey as a cryptoislamic state, Prezwieslik
maintains that Turkey’s incorporation into the EU would only be feasible if the
country initiates political reforms and puts a halt to any resurgence of political
Islam within its borders.
Yet, altogether different assessments of the Turkey/Europe question can
be found in Merkur. For example, rather than asserting that Turkey does not live
up to the requisite Western values for EU entry, Sabine Wolf turns this
argument on its head.71 She notes that it might be indeed time for the EU to
adapt and change because “das derzeitige Europa […] kann es sich nicht
erlauben, an einem ‘europäischen Erbe’ festzuhalten, in dem Rechtsstaat und
Menschenwürde auf wundersame Weise als exklusiv christliche Werte
erscheinen” (p. 179). This echoes Esprit’s warning that without Turkey, Europe
will descend into a “club postchrétien” and ultimately lose its relevance. Rather
than proudly evoking the unshakeable Western traditions and values, Wolf asks
whether European values might benefit from an opening up towards a non-
Christian memberstate. After all, she notes, it also took a process of adaptation
for the Eastern European countries to become accepted into the Union, why not
again in Turkey’s case? In a similar text of the same issue Rasmus Althaus
mentions that Turkey and Europe have in fact had a long and complex
relationship of a continuous cultural “Annäherung und Abgrenzung” which is
proof of a common “Bezugssystem”72 of which they are part. Therefore, Althaus
contends that Turkey and Europe are not in fact as culturally distinct as they are
often presented.
One is left, then, with a variety of mutually exclusive viewpoints. While
Wolf and Althaus emphasise the possibility of a European opening-up and
incorporation of new values, Burger and Winkler insist that Western values -
70 Wolfgang Prezewieslik, ‘Ist die Türkei reif für die EU?’, Merkur, 669 (2005), 14-27.
71 Sabine Wolf, ‘Warum die Türkei Mitglied der EU werden sollte’, Merkur, 682 (2006), 176-179.
72 Rasmus Althaus, ‘Warum die Türkei Mitglied der EU werden könnte’, Merkur, 682 (2006),
180-183 (p. 182).
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from which Turkey is excluded - are indispensable and non-negotiable. In either
case, for Merkur, the question of Turkey is ultimately one of cultural and
religious values: of either opening up, extending and absorbing new values,
along the lines of what Esprit proposes, or conserving and fencing off already
established values.
Overall, the treatment of Turkey is not entirely one-sided. On balance, I
would argue, however, that the desire to strengthen and reaffirm “Western”
values is for Merkur more relevant than declarations of openness and notions of
cross-cultural fertilization. Partly, this claim is based in the background of the
authors which were mentioned here: Wolff’s and Althaus’s texts are entries for
an essay competition for young writers under the age of 28 in 2006.73 Winkler
and Burger represent, however, the established core of Merkur’s authors and
are, I would argue, more representative of the journal’s views than the one-off
contributions by the younger writers. Moreover, the views expressed by Burger
and Winkler are reiterated and rephrased in subsequent discussions about
Europe, while those of the younger writers appear to be isolated cases of a pro-
Turkey stance. The fact that Merkur publishes these contributions can be
possibly seen as a pro-forma acknowledgement of different views on this thorny
issue, rather than an affirmation of Turkey’s belonging in the European Union.
5.3.4 Defining the European Identity: Looking Westwards
As noted before, Merkur proves to be a vocal defender of the US decision to
invade Iraq in March 2003. The ensuing discussion about Europe’s failure to
stage a concerted response to the invasion triggers, as in Esprit and NLR, a
great deal of soul-searching about Europe’s identity and sense of purpose.
Much like the other journals, Merkur concludes that European values are in fact
synonymous with Western values. However, while this gave rise to ridicule in
NLR, or to attempts to reinterpret European values as inherently universal
values in Esprit, it provides a welcome opportunity for Merkur to envisage
Europe not only as a close partner and reliable ally of US policies, but also as a
73 See Introduction to Merkur, 682 (2006), p. 3.
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strong co-defender of shared Western values. Effectively, Merkur pays court to
what Norman Davies has defined as the “American variant of Western
civilization”, 74 which developed after the Second World War, and which entailed
“following the leadership of the US”, and accepting its ideas “about democracy
and capitalism” (p. 24). Even though this model is arguably outdated and less
relevant than in the immediate postwar context of Europe, Merkur
enthusiastically advocates it at this stage.
Given that the journal had to argue from a rather embattled and solitary
position in the European media landscape by weighing in favour of the invasion,
it is not surprising that most of the articles must first discountenance the various
views opposed to the war before putting forward their own case. I shall
therefore begin with an overview of the critique levelled against these voices
and then explain how declarations of solidarity with the US are laid out.
As Merkur sees it, Europe is in the dangerous process of forging a
European identity in opposition to the US, given the numerous instances of
overt anti-Americanism which the journal detects in European political and
media discourse. Dahrendorf notes with concern that Europe has made the
“unselige Entdeckung eines neuen Feindes in Form der Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika” (‘Europa und der Westen’, 1021). According to some
commentators in Merkur, the emergence of the US as a new European “Other”
has to do with psychological mechanisms of unacknowledged envy.
The chief advocate of this view is Russell Berman, an American
professor of German Studies at Stanford University.75 In his article, he ascribes
to Europeans an “instinktive Verbohrtheit” (p. 571) as well as an infantile
attitude (p. 574) towards the US, which is guided by “Wahnbilder” and based on
ill-informed myths and conspiracy theories (p. 572). In his view, anti-
Americanism is “Ausdruck eines sozial-psychologischen Krankheitsbildes, das
auf eine kollektive transnationale Identitätsbildung zurückzuführen ist” (p. 580).
Berman sees its source in an unacknowledged envy towards the US, which, as
a sovereign nation state, can maintain a level of independence which the
74 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Pimlico: New York, 1997), p. 24.
75 Russell Berman, ‘Demokratischer Krieg, repressiver Frieden. Über den real existierenden
Antiamerikanismus’, Merkur, 651 (2003), 570-583.
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countries of the European Union - tied up in mutual obligations and
dependencies - have forfeited. As a result of this loss of national identity
“verdammen die Europäer das Nationale bei den Amerikanern als archaisch,
betrachten es aber gleichzeitig mit wehmütiger Eifersucht” (p. 581). One can
easily see how this claim fits well with Merkur’s constant concern over the loss
of the nation state, but it is unclear on what evidence Berman bases his
diagnosis of a collective European secret desire for the return of the nation
state.
Berman is not alone in resorting to such unfounded psychological
explanations. In the view of the German journalist Richard Herzinger, anti-
Americanism serves as a psychological mechanism that enables Europeans to
vent their anger against character traits which they share but do not coincide
with the neat image they have of themselves.76 The US operates as a
Projektionsfläche, um Eigenschaften die es an sich selbst nicht
wahrhaben will, aus dem eigenen Bewußtsein abzuspalten. So gilt
Amerika als Hort des Kapitalismus, der Raffgier, des Rassismus, der
religiösen Bigotterie und der entfesselten Gewalt nach innen wie nach
außen (p. 955).
It is not my aim here to take issue with the veracity of these claims, but to point
out that Merkur uses these views to discredit European anti-Americanism as a
pathological condition. That said, not all of Merkur’s contributors agree with this
argument. More moderate voices like those of Tony Judt, whilst conceding that
the United States are fulfilling the role of a European Other, point out that anti-
Americanism cannot simply be explained with reference to “irgendein
atavistischer Antiamerikanismus oder Raketenneid”.77 Rather, he points to the
absence of a long-term American political strategy in the Arab world and the
ensuing potential for destabilisation as the main cause of European anti-
American sentiment.
For NLR, we have seen, the alleged split between Europe and the US
amounts to mere “political posturing”. Those voices proclaiming the alleged rift
in the Western alliance were viewed by Tariq Ali as ridiculous and preposterous.
76 Richard Herzinger, ‘Das Ressentiment gegen den Westen’, Merkur, 665-666 (2004), 953-965.
77 Tony Judt, ‘Europa gegen Amerika. Entsteht die neue Supermacht in der Alten Welt?’,
Merkur, 673 (2005), 375-387 (p. 381).
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Merkur, however, features precisely those writers who consider the unity of the
West to be in real and present danger. The chief reason why Merkur is so
adamant about the “unity of the West” has to do with Europe’s, and especially
Germany’s, historical debt to the US. Merkur alleges that Germany displays
signs of historical amnesia by forgetting the eternal gratitude it owes to America
in return for the liberation of Western Europe after 1945 and continued
benevolent American involvement up until German reunification. This becomes
a recurrent argument in Merkur and is fundamental to explaining its pro-
Americanism and absolute dedication to all things Western.
For example, Volker Gerhardt comments that, in voicing their opposition
to the invasion, the Germans “vergaßen die Landung in der Normandie und die
Luftbrücke nach Berlin, sie erinnerten sich nicht mehr daran, wem sie den
Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus und die Einheit ihres Staates verdankten”
(‘Uneinig gegen den Terror’, p. 980). Similarly, the renowned conservative
historian Arnulf Baring chides Germans for their naïve and foolish opposition to
the war, while disremembering the sense of gratitude and solidarity to their
strongest ally since 1945.78 After all, he continues, the historical ties between
Europe and the US have also provided the former with its sense of identity:
“[w]as auch immer die Fehler und Schwächen des europäisch-atlantischen
Bündnissystems gewesen sein mögen, es schuf eine psychische Realität, ein
neues Lebensgefühl: die Westverankerung” (p. 188). With an even more
resounding declaration of Europe’s commitment to the West, Dahrendorf offers
the following statement, which hardly needs any explanatory commentary.
Ich jedenfalls bleibe ein Mensch des Westens, bevor ich Europäer bin,
und während manche meiner amerikanischen Freunde zuerst
Amerikaner sein mögen, kann doch keine Definition dieser Identität
übersehen, daß die Werte, die ihr zugrunde liegen, westlich sind
(‘Europa und der Westen’, p. 1015).
He continues to spell out that the postwar history of the European Union can
only be understood as a continuous history of Western values: freedom,
democracy and the open society. All these components add up to a “Definition
78 Arnulf Baring, ‘Unser Fundament bleiben die USA: Über den Dilettantismus rot-grüner
Außenpolitik’, Merkur, 671 (2005), 187-194.
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des Westens” (p. 1017) through which Europe is in turn defined: “für die
aufgeklärte Welt bleibt die liberale Ordnung des Westens Quelle der Identität”
(p. 1024). Hence also Winkler’s definition of European identity: “Wenn wir von
europäischer Identität sprechen, meinen wir, ob wir uns dessen bewußt sind
oder nicht, die Identität des europäischen Okzidents” (‘Weltmacht durch
Überdehnung?’, p. 36).
To sum up, Merkur defines the West as the sine qua non of the
European condition. Therefore any attempt to break with this past or to reinvent
Europe in opposition to the US is an ill-fated enterprise, which will only lead to a
further weakening of Europe. Christoph Bertram notes: “Der Versuch sich
gegen Amerika zu verbünden, wird Europa spalten, nicht einigen.”79 Europeans
should thus refrain from trying to position themselves as a “better” alternative to
the US. Rather, Europeans would be better off trying to complement America,
Münkler writes in ‘Die Selbstbehauptung Europas’.80
It is worth pointing out that Merkur’s views are not just fleeting comments,
uttered when the Iraq invasion was unfolding, or in its immediate aftermath. The
journal stays true to these beliefs even in 2006, rephrasing and defending them
vigorously in the article ‘Vom Aufstieg und Niedergang des Europäismus’.81 The
author, Ulrich Speck, lays down a fiercely worded attack against foolish
attempts to brandish a distinctly European, rather than a more general Western,
identity for Europe which he calls ‘Europeanism’ or “Europäismus”. In Speck’s
view, Europeanism amounts to a false ideology used by the Left after 9/11 to
posit Europe as a postnational, civilized, and more humane alternative to
America that has overcome the nationalist and hegemonic aspirations of the US
as an “aggressiver Machtstaat” (p. 244). Once more, Merkur’s obsession with
the nation state vs the “postnational” European Union is evident.
Der Europäismus bezieht seine Energie aus dem Selbstverständnis, eine
höhere Stufe der Zivilisation erreicht zu haben – den Schritt zum
postnationalen Regieren gegangen zu sein und damit die kriegerische
Vergangenheit überwunden zu haben (p. 244).
79 Christoph Bertram, ‘Stärke und Schwäche. Eine Antwort auf Robert Kagan’, Merkur, 647
(2003), 200-207 (p. 206).
80 Herfried Münkler, ‘Die Selbstbehauptung Europas’, Merkur, 649 (2003), 373-383.
81 Ulrich Speck, ‘Geschichtskolumne: Vom Aufstieg und Niedergang des Europäismus’, Merkur,
683 (2006), 243-247.
218
Worse, Speck continues, the proponents of this ideology argue from the basis
that Europe today is the result of a process of self-civilization
(Selbstzivilisierung) that took place after the Second World War. They are blind
to the fact that Europe owes its achievements solely to the US. An unprejudiced
examination of European postwar history would lead to the following inevitable
conclusion: “Die große Erzählung von der Selbstzivilisierung Europas fällt in
sich zusammen. Die westeuropäische Zivilisierung wird erkennbar als bedingt
durch eine transatlantische Beziehungsgeschichte” (p. 246).
To recapitulate, Merkur rejects the idea that a distinct European identity
can be furnished above and beyond a Western identity. Rather, the commitment
to the “West” is the basis of Merkur’s moral and political compass for Europe
throughout the four years discussed here; it is not merely a matter of
temporarily siding with the US on the issue of the war. As we have seen, the
West was the crucial framework also in regard to the question of Eastern
European countries, and over Turkey’s admittance to the European Union.
Crucially, one can conclude from these points that Merkur and Esprit
pursue completely opposing lines of argumentation with regard to what
European identity should entail. After all, Esprit does attempt to formulate
European identity as a “better”, more peaceful and cosmopolitan alternative in
order to counter the American hegemony, while Merkur postulates that
European identity has always been, and should remain, part of a generally
Western framework. These diametrically opposed views are again based on
ideological cleavages between the journals, which leave little room for a
discursive engagement between the two. Paradoxically, although NLR and
Merkur share hardly any common political ground, the British journal agrees
with Merkur that European values simply do not exist. However, NLR arrives at
this conclusion by a fatalistic assessment of the US’s unrivalled power and of
European inability to claim any values in its own name, whereas Merkur argues
that Europe is historically indebted towards the US.
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5.3.5 Western Identity against the Islamic Other
In this final section I will argue that Merkur’s strident and somewhat repetitive
claims about Europe’s place in the West serve in the final instance to position it
against the overall threat of Islamic fundamentalism. By this I mean that
European-cum-Western identity serves as a positive foil to the negative Other of
Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. While the topic scarcely features in NLR,
and in Esprit is discussed more as a philosophical problem concerning the
incorporation of Islamic values into the European fold, it is for Merkur at the
forefront of the challenges that Europe has to face. It provides relevant insights
into how Merkur stakes out certain ideas of a Western civilization as a bulwark
against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. The sense of being under attack
takes its cue of course from the events of 9/11, in which the gauntlet was
allegedly first thrown down to the West. In this new world-order, so the
argument goes, Europe has to position itself much more clearly and take a
stand on the values which it must defend. Unsurprisingly, these are once more
primarily Western values, as Dahrendorf explains in the abovementioned article
‘Europa und der Westen’.
In Europa geht es darum, westliche Weste und mit ihnen die Verfassung
der Freiheit innerhalb seiner eigenen, glücklicherweise immer weiter
gezogenen Grenzen aufrechtzuerhalten und überdies solche Werte in
anderen Teilen der Welt zu unterstützen (p. 1023).
With this in mind, Merkur undertakes to sketch a picture of “Europe” as an
infallibly high-cultured civilization, evoking the classical historical sources of
Greek and Roman antiquity, referred to also in Chapter Two, as the defining
European identity traits. Consider in the following, how Europe is defined as the
cradle of such an infallible culture in four texts from Merkur between 2004 and
2006.82 I will not be discussing in detail the various claims made in these texts,
but merely adumbrate them in order to show how the idea of a European
civilizational and cultural supremacy is established.
82 Reinhard Brandt, ‘Die Selbstaufhebung der europäischen Kultur’, Merkur, 664 (2004), 670-
682; Jürgen Mittelstrass, ‘Europa erfinden. Über die europäische Idee, die europäische Kultur
und die Geisteswissenschaften’, Merkur, 669 (2005), 28-38; Christina Weiss, ‘“Wo wir uns
finden”: Orte der Kulturnation’, Merkur, 683 (2006), 275-281; Wolf Dieter Enkelmann, ‘Europa –
nichts als ein Versprechen’, Merkur, 687 (2006), 1103-1112.
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Reinhard Brandt asserts that European culture is marked by a
“gemeinsamer Kulturbestand”, which takes its roots from the Homeric epics of
the Iliad and the Odyssey (p. 674) together with the New and Old Testament as
“prägende Komponente der christlich-europäischen Kultur” (p. 680). In addition,
inherently universal values such as the “Kantische Rechtsgemeinschaft” and
the (p. 672) “Rechtsideen der Freiheit und der Menschenrechte” (p. 674)
originated in Europe.
Jürgen Mittelstrass’s article argues on a similar note that Europe stands
for Kantian universal values, chiefly of course the ideals of argumentative
reason, tolerance and “Selbstbestimmung” (p. 32). This “Vernunftkultur” is at the
core of a European culture, “die das Theoretische entdeckt hat und sich im
Theoretischen, im Denken und durch das Denken, Ausdruck verschafft” (p. 34).
Culture, thus conceived, represents Europe’s prime achievement: “Europas
Stern ist seine Kultur – nicht als museales oder touristisches Ereignis, sondern
in Form der geläuterten Ideen und Werte” (p. 36).
Christina Weiss’s article ’”Wo wir uns finden”: Orte der Kulturnation’
claims that Europe’s intellectual and spiritual unity (“kulturelle und geistige
Einheit”), which flourished until the First World War, has sadly been destroyed.
Now the aim must be to return to such a European state of mind, “[d]en
geistigen Begriff Europas gilt es nun zurückzuerobern” (p. 277). In short,
Europe must retrieve the ideal of a “kulturellen und wertegeprägten Tradition,
die sich gründet auf der Antike, auf Aufklärung und Humanismus“ (p. 277), in
order to restore Europe’s lost glory.
Lastly, Wolf Dieter Enkelmann begins his article with the following claim:
“Die globale Verstaatlichung hat von Europa ihren Ausgang genommen. Sie
manifestiert die Weltmacht einer europäischen Idee und den Erfolg eines
okzidentalen Einspruches“ (p. 1103). The universal claim of the European idea
can be traced back, according to Enkelmann, to the history of expansions,
conquests and the development of a high culture in direct descent from Plato
and Aristotle.
All four texts sketch out an ideal of a European culture derived from
traditions of classical antiquity and crowned by Kantian reason and humanism.
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Based on these convictions, many of Merkur’s articles draw a sharp division
between European and Islamic values. At its most extreme end, Merkur’s
writers locate Islamic thought as the negative antipode of European
Enlightenment values. One such example is the article by American historian
Walter Lacqueur ‘Europa im 21. Jahrhundert’.83 Lacqueur is concerned with the
influx of immigrants of Muslim descent into Europe, for whom the core values of
European humanism have no relevance. A synthesis of cultures is therefore
highly unlikely. The gap is even wider between the ideologues of radical Islamist
thought and the totems of European Enlightenment: “den geistigen Mentoren
des radikalen Islamismus auf der einen Seite, Kant und Rousseau und der
europäischen Aufklärung auf der anderen” (p. 661). Invoking the legacy of the
Enlightenment is of course a familiar strategy pursued in the journals. We have
already established how Enlightenment values became relevant in the response
to the menace of nationalism by the journals during 1989-1992. Esprit, too,
employed the Enlightenment legacy as the basis for claims about Europe’s
inherent universality. In this instance, they serve to throw the distinctions
between culture and civilization versus intolerance and barbarism, freedom
versus unfreedom into even sharper relief.
A similar argument to the one made by Lacqueur is used in Dahrendorf’s
article ‘Versuchungen der Unfreiheit’. Whereas he wrote previously in relatively
neutral tones about the defence of Western values, his diagnosis has now
become fiercer. Paraphrasing the famous opening line of Marx’s Communist
Manifesto, he writes: “Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa, das Gespenst des
Islamismus” (p. 11). Dahrendorf considers different responses towards the
question of Islamic and European values, ranging from the possibility of an
understanding between cultures to the belief that European and Islamic values
are simply irreconcilable. After discussing both options, Dahrendorf comes
down on the side of Huntington’s much-debated theory of a ‘clash of
civilizations’.84 He concurs with Huntington, who is of the opinion that Islam has
failed to undergo the process of “’Verwestlichung’” (p. 11). Dahrendorf
83 Walter Lacqueur, ‘Europa im 21. Jahrhundert’, Merkur, 676 (2005), 653-666.
84 See Huntington’s famous book of the same title, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
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concludes that Islamic fundamentalism as it exists since 9/11 represents the
new Counter-Enlightenment: “Sie [Islamic fundamentalists] wenden sich gegen
die Aufklärung, konstituieren also so etwas wie eine Gegenaufklärung” (p. 13).
Similarly defiant interventions include those of Ulrike Ackermann who
speaks out in defence of Western Enlightenment values against those who seek
to destroy them. Her article ‘Die Feinde der offenen Gesellschaft’ – alluding to
Karl Popper’s booktitle The Open Society and its Enemies – claims that the
ideology of radical Islam has declared war on Western society as a whole, with
its liberalism, secularism, democracy, freedom and cosmopolitanism.85 Thus
Islam provides a direct challenge to the “Errungenschaften unserer Zivilisation,
die über Jahrhunderte hart erkämpft werden mussten” (p. 454). In another
article published a year later, Ackermann makes the following
recommendation.86 In the light of the challenges and threats facing Europe, it is
necessary to initiate a form of “Selbstbesinnung darüber, was Freiheit uns
bedeutet, gleichsam ein Bekenntnis des Westens zu sich selbst” (p. 1161).
On balance, it appears to me that Ackermann’s call for self-reflection and
a declaration of the West’s ‘belief in itself’ is precisely what Merkur has been
conducting over the four years in question. Based upon the themes discussed
here, one can conclude that the journal’s overarching aim is to reassert a strictly
Western identity through processes of inclusion and exclusion. Rather than
rethinking or possibly opening up European identity in the light of numerous
challenges, Merkur prefers to resort to a self-congratulatory form of the
“Bekenntnis des Westens zu sich selbst”. As we have seen, this has entailed
staking out its “territory” as opposed to conceding or renegotiating on any of its
aspects. The “West” is the main benchmark in the discussion of Eastern Europe
and Turkey. Despite its noisy proclamations of Eastern Europe’s role in
transforming the European status quo, in the final instance Merkur only
commends these countries because they reaffirm Western values, while Turkey
is categorized as a “partly” Western country. European identity, Merkur insists,
must be understood as a principally Western identity, buttressed by lofty-
85 Ulrike Ackermann, ‘Die Feinde der offenen Gesellschaft’, Merkur, 673 (2005), 451-455.
86 Ulrike Ackermann, ‘Die schönen Versuchungen der Freiheit’, Merkur, 687 (2006), 1157-1162.
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minded ideals of a European civilization against the insidious threat of Islamic
fundamentalism.
5.4 Conclusion
One development that could be observed from this analysis might be described
as follows: the debate about European identity and the search for European
“values” is conducted at least in Esprit and Merkur in a more overt manner than
during 1989-92. The topic is addressed more openly and self-consciously; the
question of a European identity does not merely underlie or indirectly inform the
articles, but is formulated explicitly and considered of strategic importance,
especially in Esprit. Yet, it is also apparent that NLR does not share the view
that the “value” question is a potent vector in its debates about Europe.
Enlightenment values remain a relevant part of the self-identification
which the journals rely on to define European values. In addition, however,
different forms of European identity models move to the forefront of the journals
and are propagated and sketched out more overtly than previously. One can
point especially to the conservative model of a primarily Christian Europe
defined by its “Western” credentials, versus a model of social Europe, that is
arguably more open in outlook and more accommodating towards religious and
cultural Otherness. In this sense, the gap between an inward-looking and a
more outwards orientated Europe appears to have become in fact more
entrenched.
In respect of the discursive strategies of identity formation during 2003-
06, we have noted that Merkur and NLR employ largely similar arguments as
before. The former relies heavily on inclusion/exclusion mechanisms, the latter
on strategic appropriation of certain values as “European”. Only in Esprit, the
attempt is made to at least move beyond the binaries of Self and Other.
Finally, the question of the extent to which these more overt declarations
about identity, and the solidifying of certain identity models, translate into a
more integrated public sphere between the journals in which criteria of
reference overlap delivers a mixed picture. For example the debate about the
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Constitution certainly produces no common ground on its relevance. Some
partial and temporary overlaps between the journals are, however, apparent.
Consensus exists, for example, between Merkur and Esprit about the events of
1989 as a new European foundation myth and the beginning of the “true”
Europe. Then again, in NLR, however, there is no recognition how these events
have altered or impeded a “post-1989” European identity. Similarly, NLR’s
position on Turkey can be more aptly described as an absence of engagement,
while Turkey presents for Esprit and Merkur a ‘test case’ which goes to the
heart of what European identity stands for. Again, in this instance NLR applies
fundamentally different criteria of relevance in its debate about Europe.
And yet, the discussion about Europe’s role in the aftermath of the
American-led invasion of Iraq proves to be the most potent example of a crisis-
induced common response in all of the journals. Even NLR, otherwise entirely
unconvinced that Europe should be discussed as a matter of values, feels
compelled to respond, and arrives, like Esprit and Merkur at the conclusion that
European values are lacking, or could be more aptly described as Western
values. As with the case of nationalism outlined in the previous chapter, this
crisis galvanizes the need to describe and define what European values should
or could stand for – and importantly not only in those journals which subscribe
to the notion in any case, such as Esprit and Merkur, but also those such who
as NLR which, generally speaking, refuse to treat Europe as a matter of
common values.
On balance, one can conclude that in comparison to 1989-92, some
more instances of partial overlaps and common criteria of reference as
indicators of a transnational public sphere exist and that ideas about European
identity are expressed more openly, in the form of more defined models. Yet
again, a common response that encompasses all the journals is most obvious in
response to a perceived crisis, when the national and intellectual prejudices and
the strategic positioning that the journals adopt in relation to Europe can be -
momentarily at least - overridden, and the space for a common forum of debate
opened up.
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Conclusion
1. Rationale of Thesis
This thesis has endeavoured to assess how the process of European identity
formation is construed and configured in cultural journals and to what extent the
model of a European public sphere is relevant to this process. The year 1989
was chosen as a starting date for the analysis because of the obvious political
ramifications for the newly emerging European landscape which the events of
this year entailed. In addition, the discussion about a potential or existing
European identity has become increasingly prevalent since then in academic
circles, journalism and media discourse and in political rhetoric. Cultural
journals provided, I pointed out, a window onto the process of Europe’s
conceptual configuration, since they combine running commentary of current
events endowed with a longer-term perspective and more in-depth analysis
than most media. The journals also offered a source of tension, it was argued,
between the “national” heritage of the respective cultures and the cosmopolitan
aspirations or principled openness of the cultural journals to debates,
arguments and exchange. Their role in the writing of a European identity was
explored by investigating the ways in which the journals discuss, narrate and
give meaning to this identity, and by uncovering the discursive mechanisms
which the journals employ when doing so. Crucially, this analysis has identified
external factors other than the mechanisms of a public sphere as salient for the
construction of European identity.
To begin with, Habermas’s original model of a public sphere was established as
the framework for the analysis. Cultural journals, it was argued, played a role in
the emergence of the “original” eighteenth-century public sphere and today form
an admittedly small but relevant part in the contemporary public sphere. The
model of a public sphere highlights the political and social relevance of the
processes of criticism, debate and argumentative exchange in which journals
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ideally engage. Habermas assigned to the public sphere an essential function
through which citizens can make their voices and opinions heard, and through
which they come to recognize democratic governance as legitimate. The public
sphere was established as an “ideal type”, which lays down standards for an
argumentative, dialogic exchange based on reason and critical analysis. As
such, it presented a normative rather than a descriptive model.
Following this, I sketched out the concept of the European public sphere
developed by political and social scientists, which applied Habermas’s original
concept to problems of European integration that are commonly described as
the root causes of a persistent European malaise, and which have resurfaced
with remarkable regularity in discussions about Europe. They pertain to a) the
perceived lack of European political legitimacy and b) the alleged weak,
underdeveloped sense of a binding European identity which, if “strengthened”,
might instil a sense of allegiance and loyalty.
I subsequently argued that this link between the European public sphere
and its potential for identity formation rests on one partial tenet of academic
orthodoxy, namely that in contemporary societies which find themselves in a
state of “reflexive modernity (to use Anthony Giddens’s term), identities are
essentially the result of debate and agreement. In the understanding of social
scientists European identity is seen to be shaped and reshaped through textual
construction and discursive debates; its expression is the outcome of a process
of self-ascription and self-identification. It comes as no surprise, then, that the
European public sphere is a desirable and relevant locus of identity
construction, because the mechanisms of the public sphere seemingly ensure
that identities are expressed in a deliberative form and with potential for
subsequent self-critique and rewriting. In this view, identities are no longer
subject to potentially unchecked declarations of allegiances or preferences but
the result of a common debate and agreement. European identity is said to
unfold through a deepening and thickening of communicative exchanges, which
in turn lead to a more sharply defined and unified sense of identity. To find out
whether this view of processes of identity formation adequately captures what is
taking place has been at the heart of this enquiry.
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The relevant criteria for observing an EPS for the purpose of this thesis were
based on points made by Thomas Risse. He emphasised the essentially
dynamic, fluid nature of this sphere of interlocution and exchange, and noted
that an EPS could be observed in the changing levels of communication flow
between national public spheres, rather than as an existing, readily observable
entity. Further, Risse has highlighted the existence of shared values and criteria
of relevance as a crucial indicator of a public sphere: within a public sphere, the
participants need not necessarily agree or come to the same conclusion about
different issues, but they should agree which criteria of relevance are important
in debating certain issues. The debate about Turkey’s accession to the
European Union (which I discussed in Chapter V) provides a good example of
this criterion. According to Risse’s definition, the journals would not have had to
agree whether Turkey should or should not become an EU candidate country,
but should have agreed whether the question of religion is a relevant issue in
debating Turkey’s accession (which was not the case amongst the journals in
question here). The absence or presence of common criteria of reference and
common interpretive frameworks was defined as the guiding focus for the
analysis of the journals.
Further, it was established in Chapter Two that attempts to define a
European identity have depended on the basis of historical, intellectual and
religious sources and influences on which intellectuals and writers have drawn
to varying degrees. Crucially, it was noted that models and definitions of Europe
have been used and construed for many different ideological, political and
intellectual purposes, which the journal discussion has also attempted to
explicate.
2. Identity Formation in the Cultural Journals
The quantitative overview aimed to identify trends about the way in which the
journals frame their discussions about Europe over the years in question, and to
what extent they feature texts written by foreign authors. Esprit emerged as the
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most “Europeanized” of the journals. By contrast, NLR can be described as by
far the most “internationalized” in outlook, and Merkur the most nationally
orientated of the journals. I established that the number of articles explicitly
evoking a European framework rose in all journals. However, this higher level of
attention and awareness of European issues did not translate into a systematic
pattern of higher levels of discursive exchange in the form of a higher level of
foreign contributions or more commissioned foreign authors, which would imply
a further opening towards other European viewpoints. Instead, the journals
followed their own attention cycles, in which certain issues led to a surge in
reporting about Europe, but they did not evince a consistent, incremental
engagement with European issues. The subsequent qualitative analysis further
supported the idea that an increase in articles directly evoking a European
framework did not automatically translate into increased levels of exchange or
evidence of a convergence of European identity narratives.
Identity formation was taking place in the journals in much more complex and
variegated ways than through the classical dialectic interplay of Self and Other,
or through inclusion/exclusion patterns, by which a non-self group is posited as
the (undesirable) “Other” in order to internally strengthen and reify the sense of
one’s own identity. While this mechanism is no doubt prevalent in the journals –
most notably in Merkur’s discussion of Islamic versus European values – other
mechanisms were also visible. Indeed, the idea of a “renewal” was vital for the
rewriting and reshaping of European identity in the wake of 1989. Here, one
could observe instances of “mirroring”, i.e. declarations of sameness which led
to inclusion. In the later period of discussion, strategies of extending and
effectively universalizing European values were evident in Esprit. It might be
added, however, that Esprit was the only journal to display a real qualitative
shift in its treatment of European identity in 2003-2006 towards transcending its
own position and reaching out towards the “unknown”, thereby striving to
circumvent the established patterns of inclusion/exclusion which continued to
prevail in Merkur.
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Thus, European identity was expressed through very different strategies,
including an opening towards and inclusion of the Other, as well as methods of
fencing off and excluding. Importantly, these declarations and proclamations
about European identity were not fixed, but were advanced at certain strategic
points and reversed on other occasions. NLR was such an example; in various
instances it described the historic tradition of a pan-European workers’ solidarity
as the basis for a future social Europe, only to deny the principle of a common
European identity and of shared values in other texts at roughly the same time.
In the other journals, instances of renewal, opening and modes of inclusion
were superseded by attempts to re-establish boundaries: Merkur displayed
these alternating modes of opening up at given points in its discourse about the
inclusion of Eastern Europe, only to retreat and insist on a more exclusive vision
of a purely “Western” European identity. This was not unlike Esprit, which after
a period of declaring Europe’s universality and principled openness, returned to
tentatively posing the question of Europe’s “autolimitation”.
The key point one can deduce from this is that none of the journals
“developed” European identity in any straightforward, linear motion; nor was
there evidence of a “logic of societal convergence or integration.”1 In other
words no observable progressive or even teleological pattern was seen to
emerge. Rather, European identity unfolded in the journals in circular,
sometimes even “conflictual back-and-forth movements”.2
Nonetheless, it was also possible to observe instances of common
argumentative frameworks and understandings of Europe in the journals - even
if they were largely shifting and transient - and despite the fact they did not
usually transcend the effects of existing ideological and political cleavages.
During 1989-1992, a shared concept of Europe as a harbinger of democratic,
liberal, “postnational” values was in evidence, and in the later period, the
imperative for rewriting and reassessing recent European history in order to
1 Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 46.
2 Wilfried Spohn, ‘National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe’, in
Collective Memory and European Identity: the Effects of Integration and Enlargement, ed. by
Klaus Eder and Wilfried Spohn (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 1-14 (p. 13).
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include and incorporate the Eastern European countries was addressed by the
journals as well. At this stage, European identity was addressed jointly in Esprit
and Merkur as a question of common cultural and historical values. Both
journals shared to a certain extent an awareness of 1989 as a defining, or
indeed founding, moment of contemporary Europe, although this line of
discussion was replaced in Esprit by the quest for a social Europe and sidelined
in Merkur for the purpose of tying Europe into an exclusively transatlantic,
Western identity. Furthermore it was possible to observe, at least amongst the
two journals on the Left, Esprit and NLR, the call for a “social Europe”, as the
common denominator and basis for a European identity.
This notion of social Europe was, I would argue, the most convincing
attempt at instilling a positive, non-defensive European identity, built on
inclusive and non-essentialist values of social solidarity. In these instances
where the journals posited the year of 1989 as a binding foundation myth, or
where they evoked European identity as defined by a shared ethos of social
solidarity, one can observe this continual work of “weaving the fabric”, so to
speak, of European identity narratives. In this regard, the journals play a role in
formulating and exploring notions of European identity. Taken individually, the
journals do engage to different degrees in a constant intellectual exercise of
reflection and analysis through which models of European identity can unfold.
Yet it would be to force the analysis to say that these models necessarily
integrate or converge over time. For this comparative perspective has revealed
the challenges of writing a European identity that is free from the entanglements
of national perspectives or of certain intellectual agendas and political biases,
which were evident in all of the journals. One could indeed observe typically
French tendencies towards “universalizing” one’s own position, alongside British
reluctance to treat Europe as a matter of values in the first place. In Merkur’s
case, the salience of ideological predispositions – exemplified in the refusal to
discuss the European Constitution in any other terms than those of the “loss of
the nation state” – oftentimes predetermined the outcome of debates.
This leads onto the final, most relevant point: the most potent mechanism
for eliciting common European identity responses that reach beyond national
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and ideological cleavages has been that of a perceived moment of crisis. The
analysis has shown how throughout 1991-1992, the perceived threat of
nationalism led to a unanimous response in the journals on the need for
European Enlightenment ideals to counter the threat of a nationalist resurgence
in Eastern Europe. In this instance, the journals held up – with different nuances
and emphases – broadly defined Enlightenment values as the distinctive and
enduring trait of European identity, at the moment when these very values were
felt to be under threat. Again, throughout 2003-2004 the crisis provoked by the
American-led Iraq invasion forged consensus amongst the journals that
European identity was thus far inchoate and determined largely through
American influences. It then induced the need to define and posit Europe much
more strongly than a shared discourse about, say, the merits of European
enlargement or the proposed Constitution in all the journals.
Esprit and Merkur referred to Enlightenment values as a positive and
unfailingly positive model throughout, while NLR struck a more ambiguous and
hesitant tone about the Enlightenment’s tarnished legacy (which I briefly
outlined in Chapter Two). However, it constituted the one reference point which
the journals recognised as a shared and defining European value. These
findings overlap with other recent studies on European identity formation, such
as those of Helene Sjursen, who on the basis of analyses of official political
discourses in selected European countries has made the point that, on balance,
European identity is still largely defined by alleged “universal principles”, rather
than through any particular “religious, ethnic or linguistic commonalities.”3 Thus,
it is not only in the context of intellectual debates that Enlightenment values
emerge as the sole European identity model with the capacity to bridge the
left/right ideological divide and to reach above national inclinations and
prejudices. To what extent these Enlightenment values can function as a
resonant and relevant model of identification for Europeans, one that is distinct
enough from “Western” values, would be a good starting point for another line of
discussion.
3 Helene Sjursen, ‘The European Union Between Values and Rights’, in Questioning EU
Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, ed. by Helene Sjursen (London: Routledge, 2006),
pp. 203-215 (p. 211).
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3. The European Public Sphere Model Reconsidered
What, then, are the implications of these findings for the original hypothesis
about identity construction within the framework of a European public sphere? It
was stated above that the EPS model is based on the premise that in
postmodern and self-reflexive European societies, a European identity will be
shaped through processes of self-ascription and discursive exchanges. We
have seen here that cultural journals do participate with varying levels of
intensity, originality and nuance in this reflexive writing and rewriting of
European identities. Discursive identity formation is indeed at work in the
journals, and in some instances one could observe instances of (partial)
common argumentative overlaps and analysis. However, this thesis has
suggested that identity formation is taking place in much more haphazard ways
than the European public sphere envisages: it comes about in circular and
roundabout ways, rather than as a gradual deepening or increasing
convergence.
Furthermore, if the sense of a common identity does come to the fore
mostly as a reaction to a perceived crisis, this opens up the question about the
extent to which one can speak of identities as being entirely “shaped and
reshaped through communicative processes”,4 and thus essentially a matter of
volition. If external factors have a strong effect on generating a sense of identity
even in the ostensibly intellectual and, by implication, self-critical and self-
reflexive context of cultural journals, this seems to suggest that European
identity emerges at least partly as an unintended outcome of these crises,
rather than as the intended outcome of shared debates.
On the basis of these findings it appears to me relevant to ask, therefore,
whether the model of the European public sphere has not been “normatively
overstretched”;5 in other words, whether the premise that a European Public
4 Helene Sjursen, ‘Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity’, in Questioning EU
Enlargement (see Sjursen, above), pp. 1-16 (p. 14).
5 From the title of Hans Jörg Trenz’s article, ‘In Search of the European Public Sphere: Between
Normative Overstretch and Empirical Disenchantment’, Recon Online Working Paper, 2008/07
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Sphere will lead to identity formation has not created heightened expectations
about what such a public sphere can actually fulfil. While it is inevitable that the
realities of any public sphere discourse will fall below the “ideal standards”, I
would contend that in this case the expectations of what such a sphere can
achieve were based on a particular view about how identities are shaped, which
only give a partial account of how identity formation takes place. Taken on their
own, the journals have provided evidence of their continual writing and rewriting
of European identity. Viewed from a comparative perspective, however, the
thesis has shown that national and ideological perspectives have proven salient
vectors in the writing of European identity. In several instances, we have seen,
the journals extend pre-existing cultural identities instead of negotiating a new
transnational space. These tendencies were usually only surmounted in times
of crisis, rather than through a deepening of discursive exchanges. There is a
case to be made, therefore, that European identity is not the intended outcome
of a discursive construction alone, but more likely to crystallize in moments of
perceived crises.
To conclude, I would argue that in principle the original model of the public
sphere remains a desirable model because it lays down standards of an ideally
open field of exchange which bestows social and political relevance on the
processes of debating and exchanging arguments and viewpoints. Future
research into the European public sphere ought, however, to be more mindful of
the numerous complex factors that shape identity formation, which in turn might
lead to a more careful assessment about what role the EPS could and should
meaningfully fulfil. The EPS might perhaps be better understood as a relevant
and desirable accompanying condition, but not necessarily the primary agent of
change, or indeed convergence, of European identities. This discussion has
highlighted the complex and polyvalent factors that are involved in shaping and
configuring European identities over time. With this in mind, further research
into this field of enquiry ought to tread more lightly around the dynamic and
<http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_0807.pdf?fileitem=16662548> [accessed 8
May 08].
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shifting problem of European identity formation. For this present exercise has
indicated that any principled attempt to circumscribe or predict how identities
will develop is likely to be thwarted by external events.
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